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The Employment Tax Incentive (ETI) is a first of its kind wage subsidy policy in South Africa. 
Designed to tackle the problem of youth unemployment, the ETI differs from previous policies 
as it aims to address unemployment through stimulating job creation. Youth unemployment has 
remained above 40 percent in the past ten years and is one of South Africa’s key challenges. The 
policy was adopted in the face of this alarmingly high level of youth unemployment and at a time 
where the aggregate demand was low. 
This thesis is an important contribution to the academic literature on the demand for young 
workers by providing insights into this large active labour market policy intervention. 
The first substantive contribution is the preparation and development of a panel dataset based 
on payroll tax records. The tax data panel is then used to investigate the beneficiaries of the subsidy. 
Large firms in retail; manufacturing and financial services sectors are responsible for the highest 
number and largest value of subsidy claims. The subsidy is well targeted reaching younger workers 
in the eligible group. The subsidy is, however, only reaching half of all subsidy eligible workers.  
The second contribution is the investigation of job creation at the firm level. Using a matched 
difference-in-differences approach, a subset of ETI firms is found to have increased their 
employment of youth and these results are robust to various measures of youth employment. No 
evidence of displacement of ineligible workers if found.  
The third contribution explores the labour market outcomes of individuals eligible for the 
subsidy. Using both tax and survey data, I estimate the intention-to-treat impacts of the ETI using 
a triple differences method. There are very small positive effects on earnings and entry into 
employment and no evidence of change on overall employment and unemployment rates for 
young, low-wage workers.  
The thesis concludes by assessing the aggregate implications from these results for 
understanding youth unemployment in the South African labour market and the role of active 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1 Background and Motivation 
The central question in this thesis is whether the South African youth wage subsidy has succeeded 
in creating jobs for young people. Also termed the Employment Tax Incentive (ETI), the subsidy 
policy is a large policy intervention aimed at increasing the employment of young, low wage 
workers. In the context of excessively high unemployment rates for young people and limited fiscal 
resources in South Africa, it is important to determine whether a policy such as the ETI is creating 
any jobs.  
The ETI is one of several policy interventions in South Africa aimed at reducing high rates of 
unemployment. Despite these many policy interventions, these high rates of unemployment have 
persisted since the advent of democracy. Youth unemployment has been above 40 percent for 
most of the post-apartheid period. When using the expanded definition of unemployment 
(including those not economically active), the unemployment rate for youth is above 65 percent 
(Statistics South Africa, 2020). Prolonged periods of unemployment reduce future employment 
probabilities making it even harder for young people to access the labour market. Typically, 
governments facing high unemployment rates, also face high resource constraints emphasising the 
need for cost-effective and successful implementation of labour market policies. 
Active labour market policies (ALMPs) are one way to deal with increasing and persistent 
unemployment rates. From a microeconomic point of view, ALMPs are evaluated by how well 
they benefit the target group. From a social cost and benefit point of view, it may be necessary to 
determine whether the ALMP is a cost-effective way of creating jobs relative to other 
interventions. Measuring the direct effect of employment policies requires an evaluation of the 
policy effects on the extensive margin, through employment and unemployment rates, as well as 
the intensive margin, through earnings. Thus, the second question in this thesis is how the subsidy 
has affected the wages of young workers.  
The drivers of youth unemployment are many, ranging from challenges in educational 
attainment, lack of credit, challenges in the search for employment and the lack of available jobs. 
The ETI lies within this combination of policies that the government has implemented to 
specifically alleviate the high youth unemployment rate by aiming to increase the number of 
available jobs for youth. The policy was introduced in 2014 and is a tax credit targeted to the 
employers of young (below 30 years of age), low-wage (earning below R6,000 a month) workers. 
The motivation behind the policy lies in the context of both large numbers of low-skilled youth 
and rigidities in the labour market. This has led to a situation where the employment of youth is 
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undesirable to firms. The stated aim of the subsidy is to address the low demand for young workers 
by reducing the costs and risks associated with employing youth (National Treasury, 2011).  
A wage subsidy is a type of subsidy whereby private employers are given a temporary financial 
incentive that reduces the cost of employment a particular set of workers. The reduction in labour 
costs could result in higher labour demand for the target group. This increase in labour demand 
could translate into an increase in employment for the target group, however, it also has the 
potential to affect wages. Increasing the labour demand for the target group may lead to a decrease 
in the labour demand for the non-targeted group who, in this case are, older workers or workers 
above the wage threshold. There is a large body of evidence international showing that hiring 
subsidies have been effective in increasing the employment of the targeted group, but the success 
of these policies is dependent on the design (Martin & Grubb, 2001).  
Evaluating wage subsidy programmes requires access to detailed information about subsidies 
claims and the international literature point to administrative data as the ideal source. In the case 
of the ETI, employers are the claimers of the subsidy and employees may not be aware of the 
subsidy being claimed for their employment. The ETI is claimed through the tax system as a 
reduction in taxes firms owe to the tax revenue authority. For this reason, evaluating the ETI 
requires access to tax administrative data (henceforth, tax data). This is the subject of Chapter 3.  
These tax data have recently been made available for research presenting an opportunity for study 
of the policy at the firm and individual level. Understanding the data, and how it affects the 
subsequent analysis, is key to answering the questions of this thesis and demands our attention 
early on. Once the data is found to be suitable, some descriptive evidence of the take up and use 
of the subsidy is presented. 
From a budgetary perspective, the cost of the policy is non-negligible and is being borne by a 
government with limited fiscal resources. In this context it is imperative to clearly understand 
whether the money is well spent. This requires an examination of the firms that take up the ETI 
and evaluation of any new jobs created. This is the subject of Chapter 4. Subsidising jobs that 
would already have existed in the absence of the subsidy implies a deadweight loss and limited, or 
no, impact on the labour demand for youth.  
The theory tells us that when labour demand is more elastic than labour supply, employment 
subsidies lead to higher wages and hence no or limited employment increases. An increase in wages 
is not necessarily a negative outcome for workers in South Africa, as this can be seen as an indirect 
transfer to young, low paid workers. However, this is not the desired outcome of the policy 
considering there are more than 3 million unemployed youth. Examining the incidence of the 
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subsidy, that is, the earnings response, is appropriate in completing our understanding of how the 
policy affects the target group. This is examined in Chapter 5.  
1.2 Contribution 
This is the first of its kind study of the ETI at both the firm and individual level in South Africa. 
The thesis contributes to the literature by examining the efficiency of wage subsidies in an emerging 
market context, where the capacity to administer the system (both in firms and within the 
administration) may be less perfect than in high-income countries. The sheer size of the unemployment 
crisis also makes pressing the evaluation of the efficiency of the policy.  
The study of the ETI at the firm and individual level allows for a nuanced interrogation of the 
policy in which the whole is greater than the sum of the parts. The thesis contributes to the 
literature on the demand for young workers by providing insights into this large active labour 
market policy intervention in the context of a developing country.  
The first contribution is the preparation and development of payroll tax records into firm and 
individual panel datasets. These two panels are then used to investigate the firms and individuals 
who benefit from the subsidy relative those who are eligible but do not. The second contribution 
is the study of employment behaviour at firms claiming the subsidy. The third contribution is the 
examination of subsidy eligible individuals; the employment, earnings, entry, exit and job duration 
effects on young, low-wage workers. 
As a whole, this thesis is an examination of a policy tool used to combat youth unemployment. 
It considers and adds to three facets of examining the policy: the data, the firms, and the individuals 
affected by the subsidy.  
1.3 Thesis structure 
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the literature to contextualise the ETI among 
similar policies internationally. The chapter gives us a clear picture of the evidence of wage 
subsidies in other countries and the methods used to evaluate them. The chapter also situates the 
ETI in the context of various active labour market policies in South Africa then goes on the discuss 
the origins of the ETI, its design, implementation, and subsequent extension. The chapter includes 
a review of the small body of literature on the ETI within South Africa. Covered in the chapter 
are the expected outcomes of the ETI and outline the opposition towards the policy. The chapter 
develops our expectations of how subsidies perform against other ALMPs and draw lessons on 
how subsidies are typically evaluated.  
Chapter 3 examines the tax data which has been accessed at the National Treasury Secure Data 
Facility in Pretoria. Evaluation of the ETI needs to be grounded in how it is designed and how the 
4 
 
policy works in practice. This thesis is one of the first in South Africa to use tax data and it is 
necessary to show that these data are up to the task of the evaluation. While the tax data includes 
the universe of firms (claiming and non-claiming), there are challenges in the data that relate 
directly to the subsidy claims and this chapter describes how these, and other, challenges are 
overcome. A job-level and firm-level dataset is built from the tax data and the chapter presents 
stylized facts on the firms claiming the ETI and the individuals employed in subsidized jobs. The 
chapter describes how much of the subsidy has been claimed as well as which firms, sectors and 
individuals are claiming the subsidy to set the scene for who could be benefitting from the policy. 
Chapter 4 then uses these data to test whether firms claiming the subsidy are hiring more youth 
in absolute and relative terms. Using a conditional difference-in-difference approach, ETI firms 
are matched with non-ETI firms in the pre-policy period before comparing employment outcomes 
between the firms before and after the policy. The chapter checks for any changes in the 
employment of older workers or non-targeted workers and ensures that identification of any 
changes in employment are not as a result of pre-policy trends of firm growth or contraction. 
Chapter 5 uses both the tax data and survey data to study subsidy eligible individuals. The 
chapter examines the intention-to-treat (ITT) estimates to identify the programme impacts. This 
chapter examines the incidence and employment impacts of the ETI using a triple differences 
method comparing subsidy workers to those just above the wage and age criteria. The chapter 
considers the policy design and take up, and examines the policy different gender, age, and wage 
groups. 
Finally, Chapter 6 summarises key results from the thesis and outlines the implications of these 
results as a whole. The conclusion brings together our understanding of the role of the ETI in 




Chapter 2. Institutional background and literature review 
2.1 Introduction 
The post-apartheid period in South Africa is marked by low, but rising, labour force participation, 
high unemployment, and slow growth in labour demand (Casale & Posel, 2002; Leibbrandt et al., 
2010b). Youth participation increases in the labour force since 1994. There are two possible 
explanations for this: previously discouraged youth may be more actively seeking employment; and 
there may be an increase in the number of new youth entrants to the labour market (Leibbrandt 
et al., 2010b). Normally, when labour supply increases faster than labour demand, the result is a 
decline in wages. In South Africa, there has been an increase in unemployment (Abel et al., 2014; 
Leibbrandt et al., 2010b) and wages have been static (Wittenberg, 2014).  
In contemporary South Africa, 48 percent of people between the age of 18 and 29 are 
unemployed1 in comparison to 29 percent for all working age adults (Statistics South Africa, 2020). 
The broad definition of unemployment (including those not economically active) paints an even 
worse picture for the youth with an unemployment rate of 59 percent. Table 2-1 below makes the 
comparison between the narrow and broad definitions of unemployment as well as distinguishes 
between the unemployment rates experienced by youth and all South Africans.  
Table 2-1 Percentage of unemployed by narrow and broad definitions 
 All Youth 
Narrow definition 29.1 48.4 
Broad definition 38.7 59.3 
Note: Youth is defined for those between the ages of 18 and 24 years old. 
Source: Authors’ estimated of unemployment rates from Statistics South Africa (2020) 
 
Race is still a major factor in determining the likelihood of employment in the post-apartheid era. 
The unemployment rate for Blacks/Africans is approximately 30 percent, Coloureds 22 percent, 
Indians/Asian 11 percent, and Whites 7 percent. The overwhelming majority of unemployed 
youth are Black/African (85 percent) (Statistics South Africa, 2020). 
When considering the youth unemployment (or employment) rate, one is looking at the number 
of youths in the labour market and the percentage of those who are unemployed (or employed). 
The labour force participation rate for youth is around 51 percent which means 49 percent, or 6 
million youth are not part of the labour force. The remaining group are then defined as not 
 
1 Stats SA defines unemployed persons as those who are not employed in the survey week; and actively searched for 
employment or tried to start a business in the four weeks preceding the survey interview; and were available to work 
or had not actively looked for work in the past four weeks but had a job or was starting a business at a specific date 
in the foreseeable future. 
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economically active which does not account for any other activity a young person could be engaged 
in, such as education. It has become common practice to quote the youth NEET rate alongside 
youth unemployment statistics. The NEET rate refers to those Not in Employment, Education 
or Training and is used to highlight the percentage of unemployed youth or not involved in any 
education or training that would grow their human capital or make them more employable (Holte, 
Swart & Hiilamo, 2019). The NEET rate for youth is currently around 47 percent which is more 
than double the OECD average driven by both lower numbers in the labour market and by fewer 
young people in the training and education system (OECD, 2014).  
In the post-apartheid period, the economy has not been able to engage new labour market 
entrants. Levinsohn (2014) argue that sectors demanding low skilled workers have declined while 
tertiary sectors such as the financial and services sector have grown, demanding high skilled 
workers. Bhorat and Khan (2018) show that the main sectors of the economy experienced an 
increase in skill intensity over the period 1995 to 2015 at the cost of low or unskilled labour. The 
authors argue that this has created a skill-biased labour demand trajectory, favouring high skilled 
workers, and making low and unskilled work seekers undesirable in the economy. The informal 
sector is very small and unable to engage low and unskilled work seekers. The majority of the 
unemployed are either low or unskilled.  
The unemployment rate for young people is illustrated in Figure 2.1. In this thesis, youth is 
defined in the same way the policy defines youth: those aged 18-29. The graph shows that the 
youth unemployment rate has been persistently high, hovering above 40 percent, for the past 10 
years. At the end of 2019, the unemployment rate for the policy target group was 48%. This means 
that 3 million youth, between the ages of 18 and 29 years old, are in the labour force without 
employment. The graph also illustrates the unemployment rate for a slightly older group, those 
between the ages of 30 and 35 years old. The unemployment rate for the older group is around 28 
percent, which is lower in comparison to the youth unemployment but still incredibly high by 
international standards. These unemployment rates make it clear that the youth face extreme 
challenges in accessing the labour market in comparison to their older counterparts.   
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Figure 2.1 Unemployment rates by age group 
 
Notes: The unemployment rate is calculated using the narrow definition of unemployment. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on QLFS data from Statistics South Africa (2020) 
Young workers are vulnerable to economic downturns as they have less experience and skills 
(National Treasury, 2016). Furthermore, unemployed youth in South Africa are unable to claim 
from the Unemployment Insurance Fund. This fund requires that a beneficiary should have had 
prior employment so as to contribute to the fund and thus stake a claim to it at a later stage. With 
most of the unemployed youth in South Africa lacking prior employment they are unable to access 
this passive labour market assistance. 
No youth employment policy aimed at stimulating job creation has been implemented in South 
Africa before the Employment Tax Incentive. Several active labour market policies exist in South 
Africa but have typically been focused on improving the skill level of the target group rather than 
the demand for labour. This chapter covers the empirical literature on labour market policies and 
employment subsidies, describes the institutional background and theoretical framework of the 
ETI.  
2.2 Labour market policies and employment subsidies: Empirical literature   
This section starts with a broad overview of labour market policies and examine the literature on 
evaluating active labour market policies before diving into the empirical literature on wage 
subsidies nested in the active labour market setting.  
Labour market policies grew in popularity in the 1920s after World War 1 (Martin, 1998). 
Unemployment was widespread, and governments designed public works programmes to combat 
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the problem. Policies such as unemployment insurance and benefits were popular as well. In the 
mid-1990s passive labour market policies were on the decline while active labour market policies 
(ALMPs) were gaining popularity.  
ALMPs are programmes used by governments to intervene in the labour market to increase 
employment opportunities for the jobless and reduce the gap between available job opportunities 
and the unemployed. Policies can include assistance with job search, job matching, employment 
subsidies, public employment, and training programmes. 
Public spending on ALMPs in OECD countries use a significant portion of GDP and has seen 
an increase between 1985 and 1996 (Martin, 1998). Spending on passive labour market 
programmes has, at the same time, been on the decline but remains a larger percentage of GDP 
when compared to ALMPs (Martin, 1998).  
In 2001, 30 percent of the ALMP expenditure in the OECD countries was spent on job 
assistance programmes and training while approximately 20 percent was on worker and firm 
subsidies. Very little is known about the percentage of GDP spending on ALMPs in developing 
countries.  
The National Treasury (2011) suggest that the largest ALMP expenditure is on direct 
employment through the EPWP, followed by skills development and the learnership programme. 
As a percentage of the gross domestic product (GDP), ALMPs are great than 1 per cent, while in 
developing countries the percentage is much lower (National Treasury, 2011).  
Bördős, Csillag and Scharle (2015) conduct a meta-analysis on econometric evaluations of 
ALMPs. They examine 199 program estimates conducted between 1995 and 2007. The authors 
create a relative ranking of interventions by effectiveness of ALMPs and find that public sector 
employment programs have the least favourable estimates. In the short run, job search assistance 
programs appear to have insignificant or negative effects but are more successful in the medium 
term. On the other hand, they find job training programmes have relative positive results in the 
medium term.  
In a more recent evaluation, Bördős, Csillag and Scharle (2015) analyse the impact estimates of 
ALMPs internationally whereby the authors group estimates by intervention type and target group 
and distinguish between three different post-program time horizons. The authors find the average 
impacts of ALMPs are close to zero in the short run, but results are positive 2-3 years after the 
policy. Policies that include a human capital accumulation (training) component see larger impacts. 
Greater impacts are also found for the long-term unemployed and for programs targeted at 




Most studies examined by Card, Kluve and Weber (2010) are from ALMPs in developed 
countries. Although few developing countries engage in ALMPs, far less has been written on the 
impact of ALMPs in developing countries where they do exist. Kluve et al. (2019) conduct a meta-
analysis of 107 youth interventions worldwide. A large part of their contribution to the literature 
is their evaluation of programmes in middle- and low-income countries. The authors conclude that 
programmes in middle- and low-income countries are more successful and that the design of the 
programme is more important than the type of intervention. They present evidence that 
interventions targeted at low wage youth reported larger effect sizes lending to the argument that 
ALMPs should be targeted. Only modest impacts are seen for policy participants across 
evaluations of ALMPs. While this remains true, the effects of policies vary, where some have large 
impact and others have no impact.  
Assessments of ALMPs often focus on the microeconomic perspective, examining the 
beneficiaries of ALMPs. Many ALMP evaluations do not examine the public economics outcomes 
of programs such as the social desirability and cost-effectiveness or the macroeconomic outcomes 
such as productivity or structural unemployment. The long-term effects, lack of estimates of 
deadweight loss, displacement and substitution effects, changes in the composition of the labour 
market, provide a very narrow view of a policy (Brown & Koettl, 2015). To consider the suitability 
of implementation of ALMPs in other contexts it would be useful to understand the reasons why 
some policies succeed, and others fail. In this regard, the literature provides conflicting accounts 
of what is required described later in this section.  
2.2.1 Evaluating Active Labour Market Policies 
There is a large literature seeking to evaluate specific ALMPs (Bertrand & Crépon, 2014; Martin, 
1998). There are two main types of evaluations of ALMPs. The first type measures the impact of 
an ALMP on an individual once the program has ended. This is popular for ALMPs which seek 
to train, give experience or job-search assistance to the unemployed, also described as supply-side 
interventions. A suitable control group is constructed to be compared to those who received the 
intervention.  
The second type of evaluation measures the effect of the ALMP on the overall prospect of 
employment or the unemployment rate. This is done by estimating the deadweight losses, 
substitution, and displacement effects. This method is popular when evaluating wage subsidies or 




Some countries, for example the USA and Canada, have been evaluating ALMPs for a long 
period of time (Martin, 1998). Many countries have a mix of ALMPs running concurrently and the 
evaluation results are not always able to single out specific programs that cause the success (or 
failure) of the policy. The evidence showcases the short-run effects of programs and the long-run 
effects are largely ignored. Social outcomes, such as crime rates and mental health, are not often 
examined when evaluating ALMPs. When the evidence does indicate a positive result from the 
ALMP, it is unclear whether or not the program is scalable.  
Heckman, Lalonde and Smith (1999) provide a review of the methods used to evaluate ALMPs. 
They suggest that there is no one method suitable to evaluate various policies. The authors raise 
the importance of the “quality of the underlying data” alongside the economic model and questions 
being posed (Heckman, Lalonde & Smith, 1999:1866). Difficulties in determining credible causal 
impacts have pushed contemporary research to consider using randomised control trials (RCT) to 
evaluate ALMPs. In the case of South Africa, one RCT was conducted before the implementation 
of the youth wage subsidy programme.2 The RCT provides the subsidy to firms through the worker 
while in the case of the policy, the subsidy is provided to the firm through the tax system without 
the workers’ knowledge (discussed in further detail in section 2.3.1). It is plausible that a supply 
side mechanism is in effect in the RCT. Firms may view workers with a subsidy voucher more 
favourably than workers without a subsidy voucher that would then lead to a hire. The mechanism 
of youth wage subsidy policy is, however, to influence the labour demand of works at firms. The 
lesson from the study, for South Africa, is the reluctance of firms take on the administration 
required to claim a subsidy. We show later in the thesis that take up of the policy is in fact very 
low (approximately 13%) and this reluctance may explain why firms would leave such monetary 
benefits untouched.   
Meta-analysis, such as (McKenzie, 2017), have pointed out that impacts of ALMPs such as 
wage subsidies and vocational training programs have limited effects in developing countries. At 
best, the effects are modest while the policies are associated with high costs. 
McKenzie (2017) argues that wage subsidies may be useful in contexts where temporary 
employment creation is required such as countries with large numbers of unemployed youth. This 
would suggest that a policy such as the ETI would be effective in creating temporary employment 
in South Africa where youth are inexperienced and less able to signal productivity. The next section 
reviews the set of labour market policies in South Africa to provide further context under which 
the ETI is established. 
 
2 See Levinsohn et al. (2014) 
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2.2.2 Labour Market Policies in South Africa 
This subsection focuses on ALMPs in South Africa; taking stock of what has been implemented 
thus far and how these policies have affected the youth labour market starting with skill 
development and training programmes. The typical aim of a training programme is to reduce the 
skills shortage or skills mismatch in an economy. For participants, training programmes should 
increase their productivity and increase their chances of becoming employed. For employers, 
training programmes increase the pool of skilled workers. Oosthuizen and Bhorat (2005) carefully 
document the change in the labour demand for unskilled workers by sector over the period 1995 
to 2002. The authors show a substitution effect between less skilled and skilled workers. The 
agriculture, manufacturing, community, social and personal services, and utilities sectors were 
replacing low and semi-skilled workers with skilled workers. The wholesale and retail trade and 
construction sectors were at the same time employing unskilled workers at a higher rate than they 
were employing skilled workers. The overall result was a decrease in the demand for unskilled 
labour and an increase in demand for semi- and skilled labour. Training programmes and policies 
can thus serve to fill this gap by helping to facilitate entry into the labour market.  
One of the policies in South Africa includes the establishment of the Sector Education and 
Training Authorities (SETAs) and Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) 
colleges to enhance the level of skill and education of the youth. Regrettably, SETAs and TVETs 
have fallen short of providing the necessary skill required in the market (Leibbrandt et al., 2010b). 
There is also a worry that bridging the skills divide, although important, is not enough and 
employers also require some level of work experience.  
The National Youth Development Agency (NYDA) provides training to youth through The 
Graduate Development Programme, the Job Preparation Programme, and the National Youth 
Service (NYS). Training includes work related life skills, resume preparation, interview readiness, 
accredited technical skills and more. The NYS started in 2011 and is a one-year programme where 
young participants are placed in a structured programme with an emphasis on developing technical 
skills (Graham & Mlatsheni, 2015). No known evaluation of the NYS and other training 
programmes by the NYDA are available to date.  
The learnership tax incentive (LTI) was implemented in 2009 to enhance the skill level of the 
work force. Learnerships are on-the-job training programmes paid for by employers. The 
learnerships provide young people with additional training as well as work experience in the hope 
that this will enhance their prospects of employment later (Graham & Mlatsheni, 2015). Firms can 
claim a tax incentive of up to R30,000 per year, per employee trained. An additional R30,000 
allowance is available per employee on completion of the training. The training is formal and needs 
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to be aligned to the National Qualifications Framework (NQF) allowing for some standardisation 
and accreditation in the training. The LTI can also be regarded as an employment subsidy because 
it lowers the cost of hiring an individual. The administrative burden on firms to administer the 
training and claim the subsidy means that it tends to be the larger firms that are implementing the 
programme (Coetzee, du Preez & Smale, 2013). There is little formal evaluation of the LTI 
programme due to the paucity of data. The success of the programme is therefore unknown.  
Public works programmes enlist the unemployed in short term work related to the public sector. 
Conceptually, public works programmes have the same aim as wage subsidy programmes; to 
provide the unemployed with experience that will improve their chances on employment. In the 
long term, a better public infrastructure can also mean more growth in the economy and therefore 
more jobs. Public works programmes can be seen as an alternative to government welfare 
assistance to the unemployed where instead of a cash transfer there is a skill transfer given to the 
more vulnerable unemployed (Leibbrandt et al., 2010a).  
The Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP) in South Africa was launched in 2004 and 
entered its second phase in 2009. The programme provided productive employment opportunities 
to unskilled unemployed individuals. The jobs are temporary and include training. The first phase 
of the programme provided workers with 51 days of employment in the infrastructure sector and 
165 days of employment in the social sector (Hemson, 2007). This is considered too short a period 
of employment to improve the probability of future employment. McCord et al. (2007) provide a 
thorough review of the first phase of the programme. The second phase of the programme aimed 
to increase the job duration and include more training. There is little evidence that the EPWP 
improved the worker’s probability of employment once the job ended (National Treasury, 2011). 
Public works programmes can rapidly increase the employment rates in the short-term and their 
appeal lies in the increase in the demand for jobs which is suitable in the South African context. 
Again, there is little evidence that the EPWP increased the demand for labour although it had the 
potential to do so in the second phase of the programme.  
The Community Works Programme began in 2010 and was designed as a public works 
programme with a focus on community development. The programme similarly provided access 
to employment at the local level (Philip, 2013). Both the EPWP and the Community Works 
programmes have a large literature touched upon here in relation to the context of ALMPs in 
South Africa and in comparison, to the ETI. See McCord et al. (2007) and Philip (2013) for reviews 
of the EPWP and the Community Works Programmes, respectively.  
Job search and job matching initiatives are provided by the Department of Labour. The 
Department of Labour maintains a register with vacancies and in conjunction with other 
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government departments, publishes an annual list of national scarce skills. Local labour offices 
provide placement services for job seekers. The NYDA offers job search and job match services 
specifically to young job seekers. This is done through the Jobs & Opportunity Seekers (Jobs) 
database and the Graduate Database (focusing on unemployed graduates) where both initiatives 
aim to match young job seekers with job opportunities through an online platform. Job seekers 
can upload their resumes and employers can search for young workers. National Treasury (2011) 
indicate that these databases are increasingly being used by employers to search for employees they 
could enrol in learnerships. The NYDA also established Youth Advisory Centres where young job 
seekers can find assistance with job search and matching activities as well as receive career 
counselling (National Treasury, 2011).  
There are a few factors which affect the usefulness of job search and matching services. Firstly, 
informal networks are one of the most common ways to search for employment. Young job 
seekers with limited to no informal networks are disproportionately affected by unemployment. 
Secondly, the unemployed often live far from economic hubs which raises the costs of job search 
and limiting the ability of job seekers to find employment (Leibbrandt et al., 2010a). Lastly, while 
the database of jobs and scarce skills list helps bridge the information asymmetry between 
employers and jobs seekers, examining the scarce skills list shows that many of the jobs require 
skilled labour leaving the unskilled vulnerable. 
South Africa has a relatively low level of entrepreneurial activity in comparison to other sub-
Saharan countries (Turton & Herrington, 2013; Xavier et al., 2013). The support for 
entrepreneurship has been a policy area focus but this has not translated into increases in 
employment (National Treasury, 2011). The NYDA run entrepreneurship programmes targeted 
towards young people. The programmes include entrepreneurship education, business planning 
support and information about procurement opportunities. While some young people endeavour 
to start their own business, many are concerned about the sustainability (Mlatsheni, 2014). Since 
small, medium, and micro enterprises (SMMEs) are not big employment creators, investing in 
entrepreneurial activities and policies may not yield the necessary number of jobs to affect the 
unemployment rate in South Africa (Kerr, Wittenberg & Arrow, 2014). 
While not an ALMP, South Africa does provide income support to the unemployed through 
the Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF). The UIF supports individuals who have been fired or 
retrenched, become ill or went on maternity leave and provides income support for up to 8 months 
from the time the employment ended. Individuals are only eligible to receive the income if they 
have contributed to the UIF while working and as such, the UIF is targeted at the frictionally 
unemployed. This means that young workers, who have never worked, are not eligible to claim the 
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UIF and find themselves outside of this protection. The short coverage period of the UIF income 
also means that individuals go unsupported after 8 months. It is not expected that more 
experienced youth will crowd out access to the ETI for less experienced youth as experienced 
youth will seek higher wages rendering them ineligible for subsidised jobs. 
The South African government has raised several policy options to alleviate the high levels of 
unemployment: education and training programmes, income support through the UIF, 
learnerships incentive to firms, entrepreneurial programmes, job matching and job search services 
and public employment initiatives. At the same time, the labour market is demanding more skilled 
workers, a dilemma that the government is trying to solve through labour supply side initiatives. 
However, the volume of low or unskilled workers simply cannot be absorbed by the labour market 
even if there were to be an increase in overall skill levels. It is in this context, high number of 
unskilled young workers with little prospect of employment, that sets the stage for an employment 
subsidy in South Africa. The next sub-section considers the literature on employment subsidy 
policies. 
2.2.3 Literature on international employment subsidy programs 
Wage subsidies can be offered either to the job seeker, or to the firm. A subsidy can be claimed by 
a job seeker once employment has been found. Also known as worker side subsidies, wage 
subsidies offered to job seekers aim at increasing labour supply in the market and are often seen 
in developed countries. Such policies include the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) in the United 
States, Working Families’ Tax Credit (WFTC) in Britain, the Self-Sufficiency Project (SSP) in 
Canada and other programmes in Australia, New Zealand, Finland, Ireland and Belgium (Smith, 
1993).  
Firm-side subsidies are subsidies given to firms when the firm employs individuals eligible for 
the subsidy. The aim of a firm-side subsidy is to incentivise firms to hire eligible individuals they 
would otherwise not be interested in hiring. A wage subsidy decreases the cost of employing an 
individual without any change in the amount an individual is paid. This allows firms to increase 
employment of the subsidized group leaving the wages of the subsidized individual unchanged. 
The elasticity of labour demand and the amount of the subsidy determines the increase in 
employment at a firm.  
Between the two types of subsidies, the firm side subsidy fits the South African context as the 
aim is to increase the demand for youth labour where the youth labour supply is already high. 
Furthermore, firm side wage subsidies do not affect (decrease) the wages being paid to workers. 
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There are several examples in the literature of targeted firm side wage subsidies in other 
countries; Crichton and Maré (2013) in New Zealand, Betcherman, Daysal and Pagés (2010) in 
Turkey, Rotger and Arendt (2010) and Kaiser and Kuhn (2016) in Denmark , Bruhn (2016) in 
Mexico and Hujer, Caliendo and Radic (2002) in West Germany, Kangasharju (2007) in Finland 
and Webb, Sweetman and Warman (2016) in Canada. These examples evaluate the subsidy at the 
firm level. Matching and difference-in-difference (DID) are popular methods in the literature to 
compare similar firms across the pre and post policy periods.  
Crichton and Maré (2013), for example, use propensity score matching to analyse a wage 
subsidy programme in New Zealand. The authors use tax administrative data covering a 10-year 
period from 2000 to 2010. The wage subsidy was targeted at disadvantaged jobseekers, lasted for 
up to one year, and represented approximately 50 percent of the weekly wage. Firms employing a 
subsidized worker were matched to a subset of firms that had a similar likelihood of hiring a 
subsidized worker but that had not yet hired one. They restricted their sample to firms 
continuously hiring in the three months prior to hiring a subsidized worker to ensure that firms 
with similar employment trends were matched. The probability of hiring a subsidized worker is 
modelled as a function of past employment trends, workforce composition, industry, and region. 
The authors run separate logistic regressions in firm size categories. Each treated firm is matched 
to a minimum of five control firms. The authors find that firms increase the hiring of subsidized 
workers and see an increase in their total employment relative to the matched comparison firm. 
The authors cannot, however, establish whether the growth in total employment is due to the 
subsidy, as firms are increasing their employment at the same time and they were unable to control 
for this.  
In Turkey, two employment subsidy policies introduced were expanded in a progressive 
manner across neighbouring provinces, a fact that Betcherman, Daysal and Pagés (2010) use to 
identify appropriate treatment and control groups for estimation. The authors use monthly 
administrative panel data for the period 2002–2005 implementing a difference-in-differences 
(DID) method. The two policies varied in their incentives, which included a subsidy on social 
security contributions, an income tax subsidy, an energy consumption subsidy, and a five-year land 
subsidy. The authors find that the employment subsidy schemes led to significant net increases in 
registered jobs in provinces where the policy was implemented, despite deadweight loss 
(considerable in the case of the first policy). Furthermore, they find that the employment subsidy 
policies led to an increase in the number of registered firms; in other words, informal or 
unregistered firms were incentivized to register to benefit from the policy. 
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Rotger and Arendt (2010) use a DID matching estimator to calculate the employment effects 
of a wage subsidy on small private firms in Denmark. The wage subsidy amounted to 
approximately 50 percent of the monthly wage and was available for up to one year. The authors 
use monthly administrative data including individual and firm-level data for 10 months in 2006. 
The authors use a logit model to estimate the propensity score for treatment before conducting 
the DID estimation. They find little evidence of deadweight loss or substitution effects and they 
show that the wage subsidy has a net employment effect of 0.26 employees, that is, an additional 
0.26 employees are hired as a result of the subsidy. 
Measuring the effects of another Danish wage subsidy programme, Kaiser and Kuhn (2016) 
find a positive significant effect on the number of employees per firm in the year of the 
programme. The subsidy aimed to increase the employment of highly skilled workers, lasted 
between 6 and 12 months and subsidized up to half of the eligible employees’ wages. The authors 
examine the performance of the firms that hired subsidized workers, using a sample of 316 firms. 
They match treatment and potential control groups on observed characteristics in the year before 
the wage subsidy programme was introduced. 
Hujer, Caliendo and Radic (2002) estimate the effects of wage subsidy programmes on labour 
demand in West Germany. The subsidies were targeted at individuals with poor labour market 
prospects, including the long-term unemployed and those over 50 years old. In terms of value, the 
subsidies ranged between 30 and 80 percent of the monthly wage, depending on the programme, 
and lasted around 24 months. The authors make use of annual firm survey data to calculate the 
effect of the subsidy using a conditional DID approach. They measure the change in labour 
demand by examining the change in actual employment at the firm. No significant effect of the 
subsidy on employment was found. The authors suggest that this is due to displacement or 
substitution effects.  
Kangasharju (2007) examines the effect of a wage subsidy on employment in subsidized firms 
in Finland. The subsidy was available to the long-term unemployed, unemployed youth under 25 
years old, was equivalent to approximately one-third of their average monthly wages and lasted a 
maximum length of 10 months. The author uses a DID approach preceded by regression and 
matching methods using annual tax administrative data for the period 1995 to 2002. In the 
preceding studies, the authors examined changes in employment by measuring the number of 
employees. Kangasharju (2007) measures the change in employment by calculating the change in 
payroll and concludes that there is roughly a 9 percent increase in employment at the subsidized 
firm based on the change in payroll. 
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The Canadian Youth Hires program, evaluated by Webb, Sweetman and Warman (2016) is 
targeted to youth between the ages of 18 and 24 years. The authors use a DID approach and find 
a small reduction in the unemployment rate. They find no evidence of the displacement of older, 
non-subsidized workers, who are considered substitutes to younger workers.  
In the context of Chapter 5, I also examine the literature on firm side subsidies evaluated at the 
individual level in developing countries. The consensus view in the earlier economic work on the 
impacts of wage subsidies (such as Gruber (1997) on Chile) suggests that since labour demand is 
typically more elastic than labour supply, the incidence of wage subsidies (or payroll tax reduction) 
falls on the employees. This means that earnings rise and the final gross wage cost to the employer 
is not affected. Hence, employment does not react either. However, recent work on Colombia 
(Kugler & Kugler, 2009), Greece (Saez, Matsaganis & Tsakloglou, 2012), France (Cahuc, Carcillo 
& Le Barbanchon, 2019), and Sweden (Saez, Schoefer & Seim, 2019) indicates the opposite; 
earnings are not affected and hence the incidence is (mostly) on employers, opening up a way to 
positive employment impacts.  
In Greece, Saez, Matsaganis and Tsakloglou (2012) analyse the earnings response to an increase 
in payroll taxes for individuals employed from 2003 onwards. Using administrative data for the 
full population, the authors use a regression discontinuity design to estimate the effect on labour 
supply and earnings. The authors find that firms increase the gross wages for the new workers but 
the net wage for the old and new workers remain the same implying that firms bear all of the 
payroll tax difference. The authors find no change in labour supply.  
In the case of a Finnish payroll tax subsidy scheme, Huttunen, Pirttilä and Uusitalo (2013) 
examine the effect on employment and wages. The subsidy was targeted at the older, full-time, 
low-wage workers and accounted for 16 percent of wages. The subsidy was available for 5 years 
and the target group was large. The eligibility criteria allow the authors to use a triple differences 
estimation strategy to measure the subsidy effects. The authors find that the subsidy does not 
change the employment rate or wages of eligible workers. The only effect was a small increase in 
working hours for pension workers with part time working arrangements. The authors conclude 
that the demand for older workers is relatively inelastic which means a subsidy would expectedly 
have limited impacts on employment. 
More recent research finds no change in earnings where a subsidy was implemented, thereby 
allowing firms to absorb the wage subsidy and generate employment. One study in France by 
Cahuc, Carcillo and Le Barbanchon (2019) indicates that a hiring credit had a significant impact 
on employment and no effect on wages. The authors used administrative data to estimate a 
18 
 
structural search and matching model. Cahuc, Carcillo and Le Barbanchon (2019:1) conclude that 
the subsidy can generate employment due to the following reasons:  
Simulations of counterfactual policies show that the effectiveness of the hiring 
credit relied to a large extent on three features: it was unanticipated, temporary, 
and targeted at jobs with rigid wages.  
Saez, Schoefer and Seim (2019) obtain similar finding for a Swedish subsidy programme. The 
authors also use administrative data and a DID method to estimate the effects of the subsidy. The 
subsidy was large and afforded to employers of young workers. The authors find no effect on 
wages of the subsidised young workers relative to slightly older unsubsidized workers. They also 
find an increase in youth employment of between 2 percent and 3 percent. Firms with a larger 
share of young workers before the policy started to also increase their capital, sales, and profits. 
The wages of both young and older workers are seen to increase in these firms as the tax credit is 
large and the firms engage in rent sharing. Saez, Schoefer and Seim (2019:39) make a different 
conclusion about the reasons for the policy success:  
Some features of the tax cut we study may have enhanced its effectiveness. It was 
employer borne, salient, administered in a way to ensure near-perfect, immediate 
and automatic take-up, it targeted young workers but was encompassing (i.e., 
applied not just to new hires out of unemployment or a subset), it was intended to 
be permanent, and it was large. 
In the French wage subsidy Cahuc, Carcillo and Le Barbanchon (2019) tells us the three key design 
features of a wage subsidy: short term, targeted and unforeseen. Saez, Schoefer and Seim (2019), 
on the other hand, explains that the Swedish subsidy was effective as it was long term, applied to 
all young workers and had near perfect take up.  
Less developed countries 
The concentration of wage subsidy evaluations is found in developed countries. In general, 
developing countries have invested far less in ALMPs than developed countries and wage subsidies 
can be costly policies. I outline some cases in the developing countries to bring us closer to the 
South African context.  
In the wake of an economic crisis, a wage subsidy was introduced in Mexico to incentivise firms 
to retain workers in the manufacturing industry. Subsidies were granted to firms that retained 
workers instead of letting them go during an economic crisis and the policy lasted eight months. 
Bruhn (2016) use monthly administrative data for the period 2004–2013 and matching DID to 
evaluate the policy. A positive but not statistically significant effect is found that ranges from a 5 
percent to a 13 percent increase in employment. After the policy ends, the author finds that 
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employment at firms in eligible industries recovered from crises more quickly than in ineligible 
industries. 
Gruber (1997) studies a policy change that led to a large reduction in the average payroll tax 
rate in Chilean firms. Examining all manufacturing firms in Chile, the author find evidence that 
the incidence of the drop in the payroll tax is entirely on wages, that is, there is an increase in 
wages. The author finds no evidence on an effect on employment.  
Kugler and Kugler (2009) consider the effect of large payroll tax increase on manufacturing 
firms in Colombia. The authors show that the payroll tax increase leads to a limited increase in 
wages (between 1.4 percent and 2.3 percent) and that a 10 percent increase in payroll taxes 
decreases employment (between 4 percent and 5 percent).  
In less developed countries, it is also important to consider the cost effectiveness of a wage 
subsidy policy. If the costs are high and the policy is not effective, then perhaps the government 
should be spending their resources on a different policy. Brown (2015) examines the characteristics 
of hiring subsidies in the context of ALMPs targeted at the unemployed. Brown (2015) points to 
four positive characteristics of hiring subsidies: one, less deadweight loss and other negative effects 
than wage subsidies; two, allows for employers to screen workers and give the unemployed some 
experience; three, targeting the long-term unemployed increases the positive effects found in the 
labour market, and four, cost-effective method of increasing employment probabilities in the 
future. Correspondingly, the author points out, there are four main disadvantages of hiring 
subsidies. One, impact can vary depending on the target group and policy design; two, vague 
targeting can create displacement and deadweight loss; three, narrow targeting increases 
administrative costs for employers and, four, the long-term effects of hiring subsidies on 
employment trajectory have not been well studied. The main take away from (Brown, 2015) is that 
cost-effectiveness of the policy lies in the design and the group being targeted. 
In a separate publication, Brown and Koettl (2015) examine the cost effectiveness of hiring 
subsidies in the context of other ALMPs accounting for the policy objectives and the state of the 
economy when applied. They argue that hiring subsidies are more cost effective than wage 
subsidies as they support the unemployed with low labour market prospects such as the long-term 
unemployed or unemployed with low skills. Brown and Koettl (2015:11) point to studies that show 
that hiring subsidies are also more effective at getting the unemployed into work in comparison to 
training and public employment policies. Lastly, the authors suggest that the cost-effectiveness 
depends on whether the hiring subsidy has an impact on the long-run employment probabilities 
on the subsidised group.  
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There are key lessons from the international empirical literature. Administrative data is a 
common data choice due to its advantage of policy population coverage. The South African tax 
data are thus best suited for the evaluation of the ETI as it has detailed information on the subsidy 
claims and covers the entire population of firms and formally employed, private sector workers.  
 DID estimation methods are commonplace with variations depending on the context, design, 
and implementation of the subsidy scheme. These variations include matching before the DID 
and using location as a source of variation. This best practice methodology is contextualised and 
implemented in our analysis. At the firm-level, this thesis will use a matched DID approach and 
at the individual-level, a triple differences approach in line with the design of the subsidy.  
There are no strong lessons from the literature whether to expect that the policy will be 
successful or not. In fact, the literature is at times conflicting on whether a more targeted or more 
permanent subsidy system works better. There are a handful of studies from less developed 
countries, thus requiring more intimate knowledge on the operation of employment subsidies in 
an emerging economy such as South Africa. 
Lastly, in a country where there are fiscal constraints and policy-makers need to consider 
various options to create employment, it is important to examine whether the positive view on the 
cost effectiveness of hiring subsidies expressed in Brown (2015) and Brown and Koettl (2015) 
remains valid in the case of the ETI. This is not the focus of any particular chapter in this thesis 
however, the cost of the policy is covered in Chapter 4. 
2.3 Institutional background 
Proposals for a wage subsidy in South Africa were made early after the first democratic election in 
1994. In 1995, parliament established the Presidential Labour Market Commission. Among other 
tasks, the commission was mandated to develop a framework for employment growth. The 
commission’s report was published in June 1996 and included a description of an Employment 
Subsidy that had been proposed to boost employment. The report includes some statements that 
were made to the commission and interestingly concludes: “The listed disadvantages would seem 
to be much greater and more persuasive” (Standing, Sender & Weeks, 1996:482). Wage subsidies 
continued to be proposed as part of South Africa’s post-apartheid growth strategy (Heintz & 
Bowles, 1996; Levinsohn, 2008; Lewis, 2001; Pollin et al., 2009). Proposals by Heintz and Bowles 
(1996), Levinsohn (2008), Burns, Edwards and Pauw (2010) and Schöer and Rankin (2011) 
considered the South African context, appropriateness of a wage subsidy and possible firm 
responses. The authors proposed details for the design of the policy that would enable 
employment growth.  
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The ETI, previously called the youth wage subsidy, was then conceptualised, and proposed by 
the National Treasury (NT) in 2011. In a discussion paper, the NT highlights the need to address 
the problem of youth unemployment in South Africa. They emphasise the necessity of a “multi-
pronged strategy to raise employment and support inclusion and social cohesion” (National 
Treasury, 2011:5). The discussion paper names economic growth and progress in the education 
system as two important parts to solve the problem of youth unemployment. 
The NT discussion paper also reviews ongoing active labour market policies aimed at youth in 
South Africa. Sector Education Training Authorities (SETA), Learnerships and Technical and 
Vocational Education and Training colleges3 (TVET), were established to enhance the level of skill 
and education of the youth. SETA’s and TVET colleges are criticised for being underfunded and 
for poor management and poor quality of lecturers (Bernstein, Altbeker & Johnston, 2016).  
A host of programmes such as the Graduate Development Programme (GDP), Job Preparation 
Programme (JPP), the National Youth Service, Jobs & Opportunity Seekers (Jobs), the Graduate 
Database and Youth Advisory Centres were established by the National Youth Development 
Agency (NYDA) to provide job search and job matching assistance to young people. The NYDA 
also hosts many entrepreneurship programmes to provide youth with assistance from the inception 
to establishment of a small business. 
These labour market policies that are aimed at increasing individuals’ education or skill levels, 
are termed as labour supply interventions. This, however, has not always transferred into successful 
employment for youth (Altbeker, Schirmer & Bernstein, 2007). Even if one considers the scenario 
where youth have higher education and skill levels, the question remains as to whether there are 
enough jobs in the economy to absorb these youth. If too few jobs exist, then any increase in the 
skill level of youth will limit the extent to which youth are gainfully employed.  
There have been two interventions, before the ETI, aimed at increasing the demand for labour. 
The Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP) and the Learnership programme. The EPWP 
started in 2004 and continues to be implemented. The programme gives individuals an average of 
80 days of work but has not been found to change the future employment probabilities of workers 
(Altbeker, Schirmer & Bernstein, 2007). As the ETI is aimed at private sector workers there is no 
contamination problem when evaluating the ETI. Later in the thesis, the learnership programme 
is accounted for in the empirical strategy. 
The Learnership programme began in 2002 and continues to be implemented. The programme 
provides incentives to firms that train young employees. The majority of those entering the 
Learnership programme were previously unemployed indicating that the intervention is reaching 
 
3 previously Further Education and Training (FET) colleges 
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the required target group. Visser and Kruss (2009) find that 76 percent of those registered for high 
skill level learnerships are employed two years after first registration while only 46 percent of those 
in the low skills programme are employed two years later. The enrolment for the low skills 
programme was double that of the high skills programme. This means that there is a large group 
of youth going through the learnership programme but not finding suitable employment 
afterwards. Section 2.2.2 further details the EPWP and the Learnership programme. 
In the Learnership programme, firms can claim a tax subsidy for training workers while 
employed. Among the previous unemployed on the learnership programme, 73 percent are in 
learnership programmes at large firms. Very few participants report being in learnership 
programmes at smaller firms. This is thought to be the result of the high costs associated with 
administering the learnership programme both in terms of claiming the subsidy as well as formally 
enrolling employees into an accredited programme. 
Even after the implementation of the various programmes discussed above, youth 
unemployment remains stubbornly high in South Africa. The ETI was proposed in addition to 
many of the other policies and programmes aimed at youth. The defining difference is that the 
ETI is designed to stimulate the demand for youth labour by lowering the relative cost of hiring 
an inexperienced youth, a labour demand side initiative. 
Proposals for a wage subsidy in South Africa were made by Heintz and Bowles (1996) soon 
after the first democratic election in 1994. Wage subsidies were proposed as part of South Africa’s 
post-apartheid growth strategy (Lewis, 2001; Pollin et al., 2009). Reducing unemployment emerged 
as a policy priority on the agenda of the ANC-led government. The government’s New Growth 
Path strategy aimed to create 5 million jobs by 2020 (Development, 2011) and is emphasised in 
the National Development Plan 2030 (Presidency, 2011). In 2011, President Jacob Zuma 
announced the governments’ intention to spend 9 billion rand on job creation (Zuma, 2011). The 
same year, the National Treasury proposed the Youth Employment Subsidy as one of multiple 
policies to combat youth unemployment (National Treasury, 2011). 
2.3.1 Between policy proposal and implementation 
Several studies conducted after the wage subsidy was proposed by Heintz and Bowles (1996) in 
1996 were of the opinion that it had the potential to change the employment prospects for youth 
(Burns, Edwards & Pauw, 2010; Levinsohn, 2008; Levinsohn, 2014; Levinsohn & Pugatch, 2014; 
Mtembu & Govender, 2015; National Treasury, 2011).  
Earlier work by Pauw and Edwards (2006) using a computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
model of the South African economy, evaluate the general equilibrium effect of the prospective 
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wage subsidy. The authors find that employment of semi- and unskilled workers can be increased 
through a wage subsidy. They suggest the effects of the wage subsidy will vary by sector. 
Levinsohn (2008) put forward the proposal for a targeted wage subsidy to deal with the 
unemployment problem. He makes recommendations on how the policy should be implemented 
in order to be effective, coupled with suggestions on how to deal with some of the negative 
consequences of a wage subsidy through good policy design.  
Go et al. (2010) assess the employment effects and cost of the wage subsidy. The authors find 
that the employment impact is dependent on the elasticities of substitution of the factors of 
production. The authors highlight that the wage subsidy will be able to increase the employment 
of low- and semi-skilled workers if there is medium elasticity of substitution for the factors of 
production. They warn that the effect of the policy might be reduced by labour market rigidities.  
Burns, Edwards and Pauw (2010) provide a general review of the wage subsidy literature and 
apply it to the South African context. They show that design, implementation, and the structure 
of the labour market in South Africa are key in determining the success of a wage subsidy policy. 
They argue that the wage subsidy might be successful in creating jobs in South Africa if it is 
associated with skills training, especially in industries that are sensitive to labour costs, and should 
have a focus on youth. 
Schöer and Rankin (2011) find that firms recruit and hire few youths creating a disadvantage 
for youth seeking employment. Firms indicate their willingness to hire subsidised youth but not in 
addition to their workforce.  
The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) responded to the NT discussion 
paper (National Treasury, 2011) and the draft Employment Tax Incentive Bill through a formal 
response to draft bill and an analysis of the proposed policy (COSATU, 2013). The union raised 
several issues it had with the policy including possible downward pressure on wages and the 
displacement of unsubsidised workers. The union was not optimistic and claimed the subsidy 
would not be of benefit to the targeted group of young workers.  
Levinsohn and Pugatch (2014) use a structural search model to estimate the prospective impact 
of a wage subsidy on youth in Cape Town. The authors find that a R1,000 wage subsidy leads to 
an increase of R660 in mean accepted wages and a decrease in the share of youth experiencing 
long-term unemployment. 
Levinsohn et al. (2014) conducted a randomized control trial in South Africa before the policy 
was enacted to examine how a wage subsidy might affect youth unemployment in the South 
African context. Participants in the trial were given a voucher for a wage subsidy that the firm 
could claim monthly for up to six months. The authors found that participants who were given a 
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wage subsidy voucher were more likely to be in waged employment both one year and two years 
after they were given the voucher. The wage subsidy voucher differs from the ETI as it provides 
a voucher to the employee which they use to find employment. The ETI is a tax credit provided 
to firms for all eligible youth hired after the 1st of October 2013. 
Mtembu and Govender (2015) examined the perception of the wage subsidy among 
unemployed youth and employers in Kwazulu-Natal. The authors find that both parties were in 
support of the policy, hoping that it would decrease youth unemployment and ease the wage 
burden. 
Between the policy proposal and implementation, the perception and outlook for the ETI was 
mostly positive. Firms seemed committed to use the incentive to create new jobs for youth and 
simulation models indicated that jobs could be created by the policy. Overall, in the literature, the 
criteria, structure, and implementation of the programme was thought to be an important 
determinant of whether or not the policy would be successful.  
2.3.2 Mechanics of the policy 
The ETI policy was enacted in December 2013, implemented on 1 January 2014, and retroactively 
applied to new hires from 1 October 2013. The ETI was available for a period of three years, 
ending on 31 December 2016. During 2016, the NT conducted an evaluation of the policy and 
decided to renew the policy for an additional two years ending 28 February 2019. No changes were 
made to the policy. In 2018, a second evaluation was done where the outcome was to extend the 
policy for an additional 10 years ending in 2029 (Ramaphosa, 2019). The 10-year extension also 
included a small increase to the monthly wage condition and subsidy value. 
The ETI is similar in design to the Learnership programme. Firms hiring ETI eligible employees 
can claim the tax subsidy through reduction tax bill. However, the ETI also differs from the 
learnership programme because firms were not required to provide any training for the eligible 
workers in order to claim the subsidy.  
The ETI is a hybrid of a hiring subsidy and a wage subsidy. Hiring subsidies typically cover new 
hires and are only valid for a short period of time while wage subsidies are targeted at specific 
worker groups, irrespective of when they were employed and typically long term or permanent. 
The ETI is available to employers of workers hired after a specific date, however the subsidy 
period is 24 months which far exceeds a typical hiring subsidy period. On the other hand, the ETI 
also targets a specific group of workers; young and low wage workers, making it more similar to a 
wage subsidy. Brown (2015) suggest that hiring subsidies tend to be more successful than wage 
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subsidies because of their targeted and temporary nature. A similar sentiment is expressed by 
(Cahuc, Carcillo & Le Barbanchon, 2019).  
The subsidy is subject to a set of criteria for the firms wishing to claim the tax credit as well as 
for the individuals for whom firms can claim the subsidy. The criteria are outlined in Table 2-2.  
Table 2-2 Criteria to claim the ETI. 
Employer criteria Employee criteria 
- Employers in the Public sector are ineligible. 
o not in the national, provincial, or local 
sphere of government 
o not a public entity listed in Schedule 2 or 
3 of the Public Finance Management Act 
(PMFA)4 
o not a municipal entity 
- Employers need to be registered, or eligible to 
register, for Pay-As-You-Earn (PAYE) 
- Employers cannot claim if any money is owed 
to SARS. 
- Employers not disqualified for the 
displacement of an employee 
- Employees need to be between the ages of 18 
and 29 years. 
- Employees are required to be hired after 1 
October 2013. 
- Employee wages should be less than R6,000 
per month but more than the minimum wage. 
- Employees need to be South African citizens. 
- Employees cannot be related to employer. 
Note: PAYE refers to the direct payment of taxes from employers to the revenue collector. 
Source: Author’s own construction based on information from the SARS website.  
https://www.sars.gov.za/TaxTypes/PAYE/ETI/Pages/default.aspx 
The policy does not require any training for the employed youth and is available to all industries. 
No requirements are placed on length of unemployment for eligible youth as is sometimes seen in 
similar policies in other countries. Domestic workers and public sector employees are not eligible 
for their employer to claim the subsidy. Employers of domestic workers are not required to register 
as an employer and employers in the public sector are ineligible to claim. 
To reduce the displacement of older workers that might result from the policy, a R30,000 
penalty per employee displaced was included in the policy for offending firms. Penalties are also 
imposed on firms that claim the ETI for workers who are paid less than the minimum wage. No 
information is however available about the monitoring of displacement of older workers and 
whether any penalties were imposed on employers. 
Firms can claim the subsidy for a 24-month period for an eligible employee. However, the 
amount of the subsidy is greater for the first 12 months of the employment contract than the 
second 12 months. The amount claimed per employee is based on the employee’s monthly salary, 
as shown in Table 2-3. Firms can claim the subsidy for as many eligible workers they employ after 
1 October 2013. This is unlike the case of the Turkish wage subsidy where firms were only able to 
 
4 List of public entities from the PMFA can be found here: PFMA Public Entity Schedules 
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claim the subsidy after a certain threshold number of eligible workers were hired (Betcherman, 
Daysal & Pagés, 2010). 
Table 2-3 Monthly subsidy calculation per employee 
 First 12 months Next 12 months 
R0-R2,000 50% of monthly income 25% of monthly income 
R2,001 – R4,000 R1,000 R500 
R4,001 – R6,000 R1,000-0.5x (monthly income-4000) R500-0.25x (monthly income-4000) 
Notes: Minimum wages occur in some sectors. The subsidy applies to part time employment. 
Source: Author’s computation based on the Employment Tax Incentive Act (2013) 
The amount of the subsidy follows a sliding scale. In the phase-in region, between R0 and R2,000, 
the subsidy rate is 50 percent of monthly income. Between the R2,000 and R4,000, the plateau 
region, the subsidy is a constant amount equally R1,000. In the phase-out region, for wages above 
R4,000, the amount of the subsidy decreases as a rate of 50 percent until it reaches zero. The 
subsidy is phased out at this point where the monthly income is equal to R6,000. Figure 2.2 
graphically depicts the monthly subsidy value in relation to the monthly income. The value of the 
subsidy is halved in the following 12 months of employment. 
Figure 2.2 Monthly subsidy amount 
 
Note: Graph depicts the subsidy value in relation to monthly income for the first and second years of employment. 
Source: Authors’ own estimates. 
Where employees worked for less than 160 hours per month, part time, the subsidy value is 
calculated by calculating the monthly salary (hourly wage x 160 hours), matching this to the correct 
monthly subsidy value and then dividing the monthly subsidy value by 160 over the number of 
hours worked. For example, if someone works for 80 hours per month and earns R2000, the 
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associated monthly salary would be R4000 (multiply by 2) corresponding to an ETI value of R1000. 
The calculated subsidy value is therefore R500 (divide by 2). 
The subsidy is not automatically applied to employers of eligible workers. In order to claim the 
subsidy firms are required to submit the Monthly Employment Declaration form (also known as 
EMP201 form) which includes an ETI field for the value of the subsidy they wish to claim in the 
month. This means that the wage received by the employee is not affected and employees may not 
be aware that employers are claiming the subsidy for their employment. The forms are submitted 
to SARS monthly, and the subsidy amount reduces the amount of PAYE tax that is owed to the 
revenue service.  
A scenario of how the ETI works is useful in understanding the value and mechanics of the 
subsidy: Paula is hired on 1 January 2014 at ABC retail. Paula is 21 years old and earns R3,000 per 
month. ABC retail is a privately-owned company, is registered for PAYE and owes no debt to 
SARS. For the first twelve months of her contract, ABC retail can claim a tax incentive of R1,000 
per month through a reduction in taxes owed to SARS. Paula’s contract is renewed in December 
2014 and she continues working for ABC retail. Her salary from January 2015 is R3,750 per month, 
however, ABC retail claims a reduced tax incentive of R500 per month from January to December 
2015 after which no further ETI can be claimed for Paula.  
2.3.3 Challenges facing the ETI 
Disadvantages, warnings, and criticisms of the ETI have stemmed from both the research 
community and the trade unions. The criticisms relate to the design and implementation of the 
policy. This subsection discusses the challenges to the wage subsidy, what each challenge means 
and how the design or implementation of the policy have addressed, or not addressed, these 
problems. This also provides some framing for the empirical work in the subsequent chapters 
where some of these challenges are quantified.  
The cost of the ETI is paid for by the government through revenue collection from taxpayers. 
The subsidy applies to youth earning less than R6,000 per month who pay no employment taxes5. 
Unsubsidised workers paying taxes are thus indirectly financing the policy. The National Treasury 
estimated that the policy would cost a total of R5 billion over the first three years and create 
178,000 jobs at a cost of R28,000 per job created (5 billion ÷ 178,000). This is similar to cost-per-
job estimates from The Jobs Fund, a business funding initiative also aimed at creating jobs 
(National Treasury, 2014). The expanded public works programme, also a job creation initiative 
 




by the South African government, is said to have had a cost of R100,000 per job6. In this context, 
R28,000 does not appear to be as high if the targeted number of jobs are created. The actual costs 
and number of jobs created are examined in Section 4.6 in Chapter 4. 
The ETI is to be claimed for newly hired youth employees. These criteria were stipulated in 
order to stimulate the creation of jobs but could be hampered if firms are hiring youth with past 
work experience. Thus, ETI workers may not necessarily be new entrants to the labour market. 
The employment history of ETI participants is examined in Section 3.4.7 in Chapter 3. 
The wage subsidy decreases the relative cost between a subsidised and unsubsidised worker. 
This has the potential to place downward wage pressure on unsubsidised workers. Downward 
pressure can also be experienced by subsidised workers. Firms could hire two people with a 
monthly subsidy of R2,000 each and claim a total subsidy of R2,000 but at the same cost of hiring 
one person with a monthly remuneration of R4,000 per month and only claiming a R1,000 subsidy. 
The subsidy also tapers off at a higher rate for those earning between R4,000 and R6,000, making 
wage increases for this group more expensive to employers exerting a downward pressure on 
wages for earners within this group. The flipside of this argument is that firms employing part time 
workers for R1,000 per month would earn a subsidy of R500. If they increase the number of hours 
so that the monthly remuneration is R2,000 per month, the firm will receive a R1,000 monthly 
subsidy. This would result in no net cost effect to the firm. The point here is that the cost-
minimizing nature of firms will determine how they respond to the subsidy and how wages will be 
affected. This is examined in Section 5.6 in Chapter 5. 
Where eligible and ineligible youth workers are substitutes, the ETI will create an incentive to 
hire eligible workers instead of ineligible workers known as a substitution effect. For example, 
one could consider that the scenario where a worker earning R6,200 and may be substituted for a 
worker earning R5,900. The eligible worker, earning R5,900 will be hired as they attract a tax credit 
for the firm. This is due to the change in the relative labour-cost that the policy creates. Another 
way to think about this is to consider the scenario where firms may substitute medium-ability 
workers with low ability workers. This is however unlikely in the case of the ETI due to the value 
of the subsidy close to the threshold. Going back to the example of a worker earning R5,900, the 
associated subsidy value is R50. The cost of firing the worker earning R6,200 and rehiring a new 
worker earning R5,900 is likely to cost more than the tax benefit the firm will receive decreasing 
the likelihood of this kind of substitution to take place.  
 
6 The source of this information is from an article written by Carol Paton quoting this information from Andrew 






Substitution is not always seen as unfavourable. Fay (1996) points out that targeted wage 
subsidies aim to ‘shuffle-the-queue’ of the unemployed. Subsidies targeted at the youth with low 
employment probabilities may induce firms to hire them instead of those youth with good 
employment probabilities who would have been hired anyway. Arguably this is one of the aims of 
the policy, to give some work experience to youth with low employment prospects.  
Displacement can also occur between subsidised youth workers and unsubsidised older 
workers. This has been one of the biggest concerns voiced by COSATU (COSATU, 2013). Firms 
could hire subsidized workers instead of hiring unsubsidised workers or fire unsubsidised workers 
in order to replace them with subsidised workers. Displacement effects can also occur when the 
subsidy expires after 24 months and the subsidised worker is fired. The policy, however, has a 
penalty in place for firms who are found to displace workers in order to employ subsidised workers. 
Enforcement and monitoring of displacement in firms might be hard and it is not clear if any firms 
have been fined for displacing any worker. Levinsohn (2008) argues that the dismissal of 
unsubsidised workers will be limited because of South African regulations around layoffs. Brown, 
Merkl and Snower (2011) also highlight that some level of displacement may be tolerated where it 
is expected that the employment experience gained by the target group is more valuable as it 
enables the long-term unemployed to enter the labour market, gain some experience and improve 
their overall employability. Displacement effects can be mitigated when subsidies only apply to 
additional workers (Hujer, Caliendo & Radic, 2002). This, however, is not the case for the ETI. 
Chapter 4 examines the effects of the subsidy on older and ineligible workers and calculates any 
deadweight loss. 
The policy is at risk of creating a large deadweight loss. A deadweight loss occurs when the 
aid of the policy accrues to beneficiaries who, in the absence of the policy, would meet the aim of 
the policy. This can occur with the ETI when firms would have hired eligible workers in the 
absence of the policy. There is some expectation of deadweight loss since firms are expected to 
hire several eligible workers over the duration of the policy irrespective of the subsidy and again, 
firms are not required to hire any additional workers.  
Another indirect effect of the ETI may be a churning effect. Churning occurs when the 
subsidy beneficiary only participates to claim the benefits. One way in which a firm can 
continuously benefit from the ETI is to layoff subsidised workers once their subsidy ends and hire 
a new eligible worker. The high unemployment rate for low-income youth in South Africa means 
there are enough eligible youth who could be used as replacements by firms. Levinsohn (2008) 
argues that firms are unlikely to get rid of good workers in order to claim the subsidy but that 
some level of churn can be expected as an outcome of the policy. Additionally, firms may incur 
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some costs related to hiring and training which they will need to pay again if they hire a new worker. 
The counterargument, also made by Levinsohn (2008), is that it is the job experience that is 
valuable to the worker, with the ETI contributing to a change in their employment probabilities 
where they would have still been unemployed. As with the displacement effect, some level of 
churning may be tolerated. 
In other wage subsidy programmes, the targeted population are sometimes stigmatised and 
perceived to be deficient (Kluve, Lehmann & Schmidt, 1999). This has been found in developed 
countries where subsidy vouchers were given to the unemployed. This was tested in the South 
African context through the randomised control trial conducted by Levinsohn et al. (2014). The 
authors find an increase in employment of those with a wage subsidy voucher and thus no evidence 
of stigmatisation. In the case of the ETI, the subsidy is claimed by the employer and stigmatisation 
could take place if a subsequent employer finds out that a potential employee was in a subsidised 
position previously signalling low productivity of the worker. There is little chance of this 
happening as there is no easy way for an employer to know whether a worker was previously 
subsidised. 
The target population of ETI includes recent school-leavers and thus can induce students to 
leave school early in order to find a subsidised job also termed a negative skill-acquisition effect. 
Levinsohn (2008) suggests that the design of the policy only allows for subsidy claims for workers 
aged 18 and above. This means that those who remain in school can be employed in subsidised 
jobs once they finish school. In practice, youth do not have enough knowledge of the policy or 
were led to believe they were easily able to get a job should they drop out of school. The target 
audience for promoting the policy, by the NT, is firms. 
Lastly, there are two potential ways in which fraud can manifest in the ETI. One, a person 
could set up a dummy firm, hire young unemployed relatives and claim the subsidy. This will be 
hard to monitor if persons are easily able to set up dummy firms. Two, firms can claim the subsidy 
for employees not eligible for the subsidy. The potential of fraud is explored in Chapter 3 and 
some of the other criticisms of the ETI in the subsequent chapters. 
In some ways the design of the policy has tried to mitigate some of the challenges that arise in 
a wage subsidy setting. Challenges such as churning, displacement and substitution effects, 
deadweight loss need to be calculated and weighed up against any benefit the policy brings.  
2.3.4 Policy evaluation 
Within the first 5 months of the policy period, President Zuma announced that 133,000 employees 
had benefitted from the policy in 11,000 firms (Zuma, 2014). In his state of the nation address in 
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February 2015, President Zuma indicated that the subsidy had been claimed for 270,000 youth in 
29,000 firms at a cost of R2 billion in the first year of the policy period (Zuma, 2015).  
Few studies have been published with the aim of evaluating the policy. De Jongh, Meyer and 
Meyer (2016) studied perceptions of the ETI among 13 local businesses in the Vaal triangle in 
Gauteng. The authors find that firms were in support of the policy, but that 8 of the 10 businesses 
claiming subsidies had admitted to not creating any new jobs.  Singizi Consulting (2016) produced 
a qualitative report on the ETI for the National Economic Development and Labour Council 
(NEDLAC). The report details interviews and focus groups conducted with 42 firms across certain 
industries and of varying sizes. The report suggests firms are using the ETI to create or retain jobs 
and that the subsidy was being used to increase overall employment at firms. 
Ranchhod and Finn (2014) examine the policy six months after its inception. They measured 
the effects of the ETI using nationally representative survey data. The authors implement an 
individual-level difference-in-differences model to estimate the effects of the ETI on the 
employment probabilities of youth. The method examines the employment probabilities of youth 
before and after policy implementation accounting for any changes in the economic climate at the 
time of the policy. The authors find no change in youth employment probabilities in the first six 
months after the policy was implemented. Extending their analysis to the first 12 months of the 
policy period, they do not find a statistically significant change in the probability of youth 
employment (Ranchhod & Finn, 2015). 
In 2016, the treasury released a descriptive report on the ETI, formalising the information 
provided by the president Zuma. The report also indicates that the number of jobs supported are 
greater than what was previously projected in the 2011 discussion paper (National Treasury, 2016). 
The report does not make any claims about the success or failure of the policy. 
In a conference presentation, Makgetla (2016) used a comparative interrupted time series 
method to evaluate the ETI. The author finds no sustained impact on employment of young 
people at firms on aggregate. She did find positive employment effects amongst small firms and 
finds a decrease in the youth employment at large firms but notes that there is a problem of 
adequate controls for larger firms. The study is limited by the period of data available with only 
one full policy year included in the sample.7 
The limited results from the quantitative and qualitative literature leaves fertile ground for 
further evaluation of the policy. The little evidence is in part due to the difficulty that survey data 
may not capture the effect of the subsidy since employees might be unaware of the subsidy claims 
 
7 At the same conference Neil Rankin also presented analysis of the ETI using tax data in conjunction with the 




made by their employers. A limitation of studies on wage subsidies, presented in (McKenzie, 2017), 
is the  but something As the subsidy is claimed through the tax system the only way to examine 
subsidy claims is through examining tax data. 
2.4 Theoretical framework 
Having established that firms are the beneficiaries of the ETI, this section begins by showing the 
effects of a wage subsidy on firms, then looks at the effect on labour demand considering two 
labour supply scenarios. 
Drawing from both Hujer, Caliendo and Radic (2002) and Burns, Edwards and Pauw (2010),  
the theoretical effects of a wage subsidy on labour demand at the firm are illustrated. Figure 2.3 
illustrates a simple static model where a firm produces output 𝑦 using two inputs 𝐿𝑌𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ and 
𝐿𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑌𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ and describe this equation (2.1).
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 𝑦 = 𝐹(𝐿𝑌𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ, 𝐿𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑌𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ) (2.1) 
 
The model assumes 𝐹𝑖 > 0, 𝐹𝑗 < 0 and 𝐹𝑖𝑗 > 0 where 𝑖, 𝑗 =  𝐿𝑌𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ, 𝐿𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑌𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ. It also assumes 
the two input factors are separable from capital and the labour supply is infinitely elastic. 
Firms maximise their profit 𝜋 = 𝐹(𝐿𝑌𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ, 𝐿𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑌𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ) − 𝑤𝐿𝑌𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ − 𝑟𝐿𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑌𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ by choosing 
how much of each factor (youth or non-youth labour) to use. 𝑤 is the cost of youth labour and 𝑟 
is the cost of non-youth labour.  The first order conditions are: 
𝐹𝐿𝑌𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ − 𝜆𝑤 = 0  
𝐹𝐿𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑌𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ − 𝜆𝑟 = 0′  
where 𝜆 is the Lagrangean multiplier. The optimal demand for youth and non-youth workers is set 







That is, the marginal rate of technical substitution, where 
𝐹𝐿𝑌𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ
𝐹𝐿𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑌𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ
 equals the factor-price ratio, 
𝑤𝐿𝑌𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ
𝑟𝐿𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑌𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ
, for a profit maximizing firm. This optimal demand for youth and non-youth lies at 
point A on isocost curve IC1 in Figure 2.3. The wage subsidy will rotate the isocost curve from 
IC1 to IC2.  
 
8 The typical approach considers labour, L, and capital, K, as factors. The analysis can also be applied to high versus 
low skilled, local versus foreign workers and young versus old as is done here. 
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Crucial to the analysis of a wage subsidy is the elasticity of substitution between the two input 
factors 𝐿𝑌𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ and 𝐿𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑌𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ , holding output constant. This is the rate of change in the use of 
𝐿𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑌𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ to 𝐿𝑌𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ from a change in the relative price of 𝑤 to 𝑟, holding output constant. The 












Intuitively, this elasticity measures the ease of substituting non youth labour for the youth labour 
in response to a change in the price on youth labour without changing output. A larger elasticity 
of substitution means youth and non-youth labour become closer to perfect substitutes. The closer 
the elasticity of substitution is to zero, the youth and non-youth labour cannot be substitutes. 
Equation (2.2) cannot be negative.  
The main aim of a subsidy is the change in labour demand as a result of the change in the wage 
or the constant output labour demand elasticity described in equation (2.3) below: 
 Δ𝐿𝑌𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ =
% 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑
% 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠 
= (1 − 𝑠)𝜎 (2.3) 
where Δ𝐿𝑌𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ reflects the increasing demand for youth labour, 𝑠 is the share of labour costs for 
young workers in total revenue (𝑠 =
𝑤𝐿𝑌𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ
𝑌
) and 𝜎 is the elasticity of substitution between youth 
and non-youth labour.  
The relative price of non-youth labour increases thereby reducing the demand for non-youth 
labour presented in equation (2.4) below: 
 Δ𝐿𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑌𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ = −(1 − 𝑠)𝜎 (2.4) 
Together equations (2.3) and (2.4) describe the substitution effect or the move from point A to 
point B on isocost curve IC1.  
Finally, the model needs to account for the lower production costs in subsidised firms brought 
about by the decrease in costs of youth labour. Lower production costs mean a decrease in prices 
and an increase in demand for the produced good 𝑦 in subsidised firms. This is termed the scale 
or output effect and is seen as the shift from point 𝐵 on IC1 to point 𝐶 on IC2. The output effect 
is the youth labour factor’s share times the product demand elasticity, given as 𝜂 in equation (2.5). 
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Figure 2.3 Theoretical effects of a wage subsidy 
 
Note: The figure depicts the rotation of the isocost curve from IC1 to IC2 as a result of a wage subsidy. Both 
substitution and output effects are depicted. 
Source: Author’s own illustration 
The total demand effect for youth and non-youth labour can be described in the equations below: 
 
Δ𝐿𝑌𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ = (1 − 𝑠)𝜎 + 𝑠𝜂             > 0 






The change in youth labour demand is the summation of the substitution effect and the output 
effect, both of which are positive. The theory thus predicts that the effect on youth labour will be 
positive. The total demand effect for non-youth is negative for the substitution effect but positive 
for the output effect and the magnitude of these effects will determine effect on non-youth. Where 
the elasticity of substitution is high, the demand for non-youth workers will decrease, where the 
elasticity of substitution is low the demand for non-youth increases (Burns, Edwards & Pauw, 
2010).  
The implicit assumption in this model is that all youth are eligible for the subsidy. This 
assumption does not hold true for the ETI as only a subset of youth, within a low-income bracket, 
are eligible for the subsidy. The problem could arise if eligible youth are substitutes for non-eligible 
youth. Depending on the elasticity of substitution between these two groups, eligible and non-
eligible youth, there may be substitution effects. The substitution between eligible and non-eligible 
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youth produces a net employment effect of zero as no new jobs would have been created, a desired 
outcome of the ETI. This is examined in Chapter 5. 
The static model does not show the effect of providing experience to unemployed youth who 
would have remained unemployed otherwise. This is important in the context of South Africa 
where past work experience is positively correlated with future employment prospects (Kingdon 
& Knight, 2004). 
The aggregate demand for youth labour is the sum of the demand for youth labour in each firm 
at a point in time. The policy can therefore increase the number of youths employed through 
increasing the number of firms that employ youth or increasing the number of youths employed 
in existing firms, or both. The flip side of this that there are possibly no general equilibrium effects 
when only some firms take advantage of the subsidy. It is possible that ETI claiming firms poach 
eligible workers from non-ETI claiming firms. While this will increase youth employment in the 
ETI firm the non-ETI firm will see a decrease in youth employment and thus no aggregate effect. 
In the short run analysis covered in this thesis, it can be expected that any changes in youth 
employment are likely to happen in existing firms and given the high churn and high numbers of 
eligible workers is unlikely to see ETI-firms poaching workers from non-ETI firms.  
Within each firm, a wage subsidy reduces the cost of employment and causes an increase in the 
demand for labour. This means that a shift to the right of the aggregate demand for labour in the 
economy from LD1 to LD2 illustrated in Figure 2.4. 
Where the Labour Supply curve LS is upward sloping the effect of the subsidy will be shared 
between the workers and the firms depending on the elasticity of labour demand and labour 
supply. This raises the wages of workers from W0 to W1 and decreases the cost of employment to 
firms from W0 to W1 – C. The amount of labour demanded moves from QL0 to QL1. I consider 
the case where labour supply is highly elastic as the unemployment rate in South Africa is high. In 
the second scenario, there is a small increase in wages to workers and a large reduction in the cost 
of employment to firms. The amount of labour demanded moves from QL0 to QL2 a larger 
increase than in the first scenario.  
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Notes: The graph on the left shows a shift to the right of the aggregate demand for labour in the economy from LD1 
to LD2 where the Labour Supply curve (LS) is upward sloping leading to a rise in wages from W0 to W1 and decline in 
cost of employment to firms from W0 to W1–C. The graph on the right shows the case where labour supply is highly 
elastic. With the labour supply is highly elastic, there is a small increase in wages to workers from W’0 to W’1, decreases 
in the cost of employment to firms from W’0 to W’1 – C and a large increase in labour demanded from QL0 to QL2. 
Source: Author’s own illustration 
From a theoretical standpoint, a wage subsidy targeted at youth can create jobs for them, in part 
alleviating the large youth unemployment problem as well as producing a positive impact on low 
wage youth. On the other hand, the theoretical framework does not indicate a clear positive or 
negative effect on non-youth. The prevailing view on wage subsidies in the 1990’s proposed that 
the relative elasticity of labour demand in relation to labour supply meant that employees were 
mainly the beneficiaries of the subsidies and not employers (Gruber, 1997). This means that while 
earnings rise, the gross wage cost to employers is only slightly, or not, affected. This provided 
evidence to the view that subsidies were not affecting employment.  
2.5 Conclusion 
The South African ETI is a targeted, non-permanent subsidy that requires some administrative 
effort to claim. It is a mix between a wage subsidy and a hiring subsidy. In 2014, the first year of 
the subsidy, it likely functioned more as a hiring subsidy as the eligibility criteria meant that only 
new employees hired after 1 October 2013, were eligible for the subsidy claim.  
Several ALMPs have been implemented in South Africa including skills development or training 
programmes, a public employment programme and job-search and job-matching initiatives. These 
policies have not, however, translated into decreases in the unemployment rate.  
The skills shortage highlighted by the scarce skills database points to excess labour demand for 
skilled workers that is not being met by labour supply. It is agreed that increasing skill levels will 
assist in decreasing the unemployment rate and could lead to greater economic growth. It is not 
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believed that increasing skill levels alone will address the unemployment problem. Increasing skill 
level also takes time and is difficult to do given the systemic issues in South Africa’s education 
system. The combination of the lack of policy success in creating employment and the nature of 
the South African labour market set the stage for a policy that can increase the demand for 
unskilled labour, a necessary tool to bring down the high levels of youth unemployment. 
While discussions of the ETI started in the early democratic years, the policy was formally 
proposed in 2011 and came into effect in 2014. Several criticisms were levelled against the policy 
in the proposal phase some of which were considered in the design of the policy, such as the 
penalty for displacing unsubsidised workers. The mechanics of the policy are not straight forward 
as is the case in many other countries, thus presenting some challenges in terms of evaluating the 
policy and placing it in the literature.  
The theoretical literature tells us that a decrease in the cost of hiring a young worker increased 
the likelihood of employment of young workers. The decrease in costs of employment of one 
group means an increase in the relative cost of employing another group and therefore a decrease 
in employment for the non-targeted group. The theoretical literature also suggests that the elasticity 
of labour demand and labour supply will determine the effectiveness of a subsidy in creating 
employment.  
The empirical literature presents several examples of subsidy programmes applied in other 
countries, although dominated by the developed countries due to the high costs associated with 
implementing a subsidy programme. There are very few instances of a wage subsidy being 
implemented in developing countries and even fewer in Africa. Wage subsidy programmes are 
mostly targeted at the unemployed with low labour market prospects. This often includes youth, 
the long-term unemployed and in some cases, older workers.  
The literature measuring the firm-level employment effects of a wage subsidy show that the 
observed effects are positive (Crichton & Maré, 2013; Kaiser & Kuhn, 2016; Rotger & Arendt, 
2010). In many cases, the observed effects are modest, ranging from 0.17 to 1.09 additional jobs 
at the firm. Kangasharju (2007) and Betcherman, Daysal and Pagés (2010), on the other hand, see 
a 5 and 12 percent increase in employment in their respective studies. Many of these studies suggest 
that the long-term effects of the policies are either modest or short-lived. Only a few estimate 
deadweight loss and substitution effects, as these are often harder to measure. 
When turning to individual-level studies, the literature is mixed. Older studies find that subsidy 
programmes lead to wage changes while the recent literature shows impacts on employment and 
limited effects on wages. The literature points to contradictory policy design features that could 
38 
 
lead to the successful creation of jobs making it difficult to conclude whether the ETI will be 
effective or not.  
Lastly, the literature suggests there could be high costs associated with a subsidy programme 
depending on the design. Abel et al. (2014) and Bertrand and Crépon (2014) suggest, more 
generally, that ALMPs need to be well designed and locally contextualised as the costs involved 
are high and the results varying or unknown. Betcherman, Daysal and Pagés (2010) warn that the 
cost of subsidized employment is especially high in cases where there is large deadweight loss. In 
the context of subsidy programmes, Brown (2015) suggests hiring subsidies can be more cost 
effective than wage subsidies.  
The aim of the ETI is to increase the number of jobs for unskilled youth in the national 
economy. The literature review shows that the design features are very important to potential 
success and to appropriate methods of evaluating this success.  
The low economic growth in South Africa suggests that firms will welcome that tax windfall 
however, this does not imply that the ETI will create jobs. With no previous subsidy policy of its 
kind in the country, firms may be slow or reluctant to take up the policy until they can understand 
the implications thereof. The theory suggests we should expect an increase in youth employment, 
but the empirical evidence leaves us questioning whether this will be possible in South Africa.  
The next chapter begins with an examination of the policy by describing the administrative tax 




Chapter 3. Wage subsidy beneficiaries 
3.1 Introduction 
Governments around the world record information in their administration of education, health, 
safety, social security, and tax programmes. The data are systematically collected and stored by the 
relevant authority and used to make decisions or report on the relevant programme.  
Administrative data can include sales transactions, medical records, car registrations and education 
records. Tax records are one kind of administrative data, more simply referred to as tax data.  
Administrative data are seen as the “big data” in social science research. The buzz generated 
around big data stems from the rich set of opportunities that big data offers which cannot be 
matched by other sources. In economics, ‘big data’ has more frequently been used to describe tax 
data and is considered to be an authoritative source of information. The use of tax data for 
empirical research is gaining popularity internationally (Card et al., 2010). Research using tax 
records to evaluate public policy has become widespread in Europe and the USA. There is a 
substantial literature making use of tax data as well as literature on the advantages and 
disadvantages, access procedures and confidentiality of tax records.  
Tax data are attractive as they can offer additional analysis into important issues beyond survey 
data. Firstly, tax data typically offers much larger sample sizes than survey data. In the case of 
formally employed individuals or registered firms, tax data can present a full census of the 
population. Larger sample sizes lend well to broader and more persuasive research designs.  
Secondly, tax authorities regularly collect information from taxpayers allowing for the tracking 
of taxpayers over time. This enables policy evaluation as the data provides information before, 
during and after policy implementation enabling long-term follow up.  
Thirdly, tax data can provide more dependable information. Survey data is vulnerable to high 
rates of non-response, attrition or under sampling. Tax records are often audited providing an 
added level of reliability. Technological advances also mean tax forms are sometimes prepopulated 
with information from employers or information previously provided to the revenue collector. 
Fourth, the use of tax data can be less costly than designing surveys and collecting new data. 
Income information can be particularly difficult to collect via a survey due to respondents’ desire 
not to disclose their personal information.  
There are, however, disadvantages related to using all administrative data. Researchers do not 
collect the data and have no control over the method of collection and what information is 
collected, affecting the scope and depth of analysis that can be conducted. There is also a lack of 
theory and methods to guide the use of administrative data, for example, when considering that 
administrative data are the full population and not a sample (Wallgren & Wallgren, 2014). 
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Additionally, much of the information that is collected in surveys is not required by administrative 
forms and thus these data may be incomplete or incorrect. For example, not all fields are required 
to be completed on a tax form; some fields are optional, and many relevant fields are not on the 
form at all. Lastly, administrative data often does not have any metadata or accompanying 
information available and requires researchers to make their own assumptions about the data 
where the details cannot be verified.  
The confidential nature of tax data means it is typically not publicly available. Several research 
projects using tax data indicate the examination of de-identified or anonymized data in a secure 
facility (Crichton & Maré, 2013). Secure facilities additionally require researchers and proposals to 
be passed through an approval process to maintain strict standards of confidentiality while still 
providing data access.  
The South African Revenue Service (SARS) made anonymized tax data available, under secure 
conditions at the National Treasury offices in Pretoria, South Africa. Through a joint SARS, NT, 
and UNU-WIDER initiative, the data have been made available for use to researchers in the 
National Treasury Secure Data Facility. These data include, but are not limited to, Company 
Income Tax (CIT), Employee Tax Certificate (or IRP5), Value Added Tax and Customs data. 
These data can never be removed from the facility; only research results can be taken out. 
This chapter describes in detail the South African administrative tax records that will be used 
to evaluate the ETI. The tax data is not publicly available, and access to the secure facility is limited 
to approved researchers. This means that there is little description of the data available and even 
less information available about the ETI which this chapter describes.  
What follows is a description of the data, the inconsistencies and challenges encountered in the 
data and the way in which the data is cleaned and prepared for analysis. Using the tax data, the 
ETI is documented by presenting the characteristics of firms and individuals linked to the policy. 
This chapter puts forth a set of facts about ETI firms and ETI participants that provides the 
groundwork for our explanation of the effects of the ETI. 
3.2 South African tax data 
This thesis makes use of the payroll data (henceforth IRP5 data) for the period 2011 through 2018. 
The Company Income Tax data (henceforth CIT data) is available for the period 2008 through 
2016. The data is only used from 2011 onwards due to data quality concerns in the earlier years. 
There is a lag in access to the full complement of the CIT data as companies have 12 months from 
their financial year-end in which to complete their tax returns. Additionally, if there are any 
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disputes with SARS about the taxes owed or paid, firms or individuals may not be reported in the 
version of data used within this research but may become available at a later stage. 
The tax data administration act (2011) allows for the use of the tax data for research purposes 
at the NT. The anonymized data were accessed under a non-disclosure agreement that allows for 
research to be conducted where no individual or firm can be identified. Most of the data work 
contained in this thesis was conducted at the secure data facility at the NT. The results are not 
considered official statistics and have been created for this research.  
The tax data initiative started around 2015 where the first extractions of data from SARS were 
conducted and analysed (Arndt, 2018). There have been various extractions and versions of the 
data with little or no documentation about these differences. The most recent extraction of the 
data is assumed to be the most accurate as resolution of disputes, resubmission of tax forms or 
errors made may have been corrected. It is therefore likely that research conducted at a different 
time to this analysis will reflect slightly different numbers.9  
3.2.1 Data advantages with respect to the ETI 
The use of administrative tax records is advantageous for the evaluation of the ETI as the subsidy 
claims are processed through the tax system. The ETI is claimed through a reduction in firm taxes 
owed to SARS. There are records of these claims for every firm that claimed the subsidy as well 
as the amount claimed. The subsidy is available to all firms registered for pay-as-you-earn (PAYE) 
taxes and the administrative data represents the entire population of PAYE-firms irrespective of 
their claim on the subsidy. PAYE is the withholding tax on compensation to employees which 
firms are liable to pay to SARS on behalf of employees. The data allows us to observe tax paying 
individuals and firms before the subsidy start and during implementation. In the context of the 
ETI, surveys would have been costly to administer and would be subject to response biases as 
firms may not be willing to discuss their tax claims or employee wage information. However, there 
are some challenges with the administrative tax data related to the ETI which is discussed in a 
subsequent section.  
3.2.2 Description of IRP5 data 
The IRP5 data is a collection of job-level administrative tax records. Firms are required to register 
with SARS within 21 days of becoming employers and furnish all employees with an IRP5 
certificate each year where compensation was paid or is payable. The data also includes IT3(a) 
certificates which are issued where an employee received more than R2,000 per month but no tax 
 
9 Where possible we include in reference list details of the data used herein. 
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has been deducted. Henceforth, the data is referred to as IRP5 data acknowledging that it includes 
IT3(a) certificates as well. 
Employees must submit their IRP5 certificates to SARS within 60 days of the end of the tax 
year. Public entities also issue IRP5 certificates to their employees; consequently, the data includes 
employees in both the formal private sector and the public sector. If an individual has multiple 
jobs in a year (within the same firm or in different firms), that individual will be seen multiple times 
in the data. Small firms such as sole proprietors with only one employee need not register for 
PAYE. The data excludes those who are self-employed but does include individuals collecting a 
pension income from a company. The individual identifier in the IRP5 data is an anonymized 
South African national identity (ID) number. Where no South African ID number exists but an 
anonymized passport number was present, it is assumed that the individual is a non-resident of 
South Africa.  
The data includes some basic individual-level information—date of birth, gender, start and end 
of employment dates. The lack of further demographic information is often typical of 
administrative data. Details on the tax certificate also include total wages paid by the employer, 
total amount of tax paid by the employer, unemployment insurance fund contribution as well as 
ETI amounts claimed. The PAYE reference number (or payroll reference) serves as the firm 
identifier in the IRP5 data. Larger firms may have several payrolls and therefore several PAYE 
reference numbers but only one Company Income Tax (CIT) reference number.  
The data is organised in two ways: one, by creating a panel of IRP5 data and two, by aggregating 
the IRP5 data by the CIT reference number to create a panel of firms. No CIT reference number 
exists for public entities thus our firm panel is restricted to data on formal private sector firms.  
3.2.3 Description of the CIT-IRP5 panel  
The CIT-IRP5 panel was created during the UNU-WIDER regional growth and development in 
Southern Africa programme10. The dataset is an unbalanced panel created by merging four tax 
administrative datasets: company income tax (CIT) data, employee income tax certificates IRP5, 
value-added tax (VAT) data, and customs records from trading firms. Variables in the panel are 
created from the fields of tax forms submitted to SARS. The CIT data includes firm-level 
information such as revenue amounts, tax paid, location and sector of the firm and is derived from 
the Income Tax Returns for Company forms. This is also known as the IT14 form which was replaced 
with ITR14 forms in the 2013 tax year. Variables relating to employees come from aggregated 
IRP5 data. This includes information about remuneration, tax paid, deductions and contributions 
 
10 For more information: https://www.wider.unu.edu/project/regional-growth-and-development-southern-africa 
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of the firm. The VAT data includes information about the VAT paid by the firm and the customs 
data contains records on the products imported and exported, value and volume of goods, and 
origin and destination information. 
The CIT-IRP5 panel matches employer–employee variables from the IRP5 and CIT datasets. 
The panel includes tax information from 2008 to 2017 and makes use of the CIT reference number 
as the unique identifier for the firm. Pieterse, Kreuser and Gavin (2016) provide a more detailed 
description of the CIT-IRP5 panel. The authors discuss how the panel was constructed, any biases 
it might contain, and compare the panel with other data sources. The CIT-IRP5 panel also contains 
no public firms. 
The overwhelming majority of firms in the CIT panel (96%) have only 1 payroll (also known 
as PAYE Reference). The largest firm, in terms of number of payrolls, has 396 payrolls (or PAYE 
References) making up the CIT firm. To complement our analysis, firm-level variables are used 
from the CIT-IRP5 panel with the IRP5 panel created. Firm-level variables from the CIT-IRP5 
panel include firm sales, age of firm, firm assets, firm debt, and firm trade status.  
3.3 Data structure and challenges 
The IRP5 data is unaudited, presenting some challenges when conducting any analysis. Only a 
handful of researchers have accessed the administrative tax data and even fewer researchers have 
used the IRP5 data. The contribution of this section is the examination and discussion of the 
challenges in the IRP5 data. The data cleaning process described below creates two datasets; an 
IRP5 firm-level dataset to examine youth employment at the firm lever, and a job-level dataset to 
assess the impact of the ETI on individuals and jobs. 
The IRP5 records, unlike the company income tax records, are organised within the South 
African tax year which begins on the 1st of March the previous year and ends on the 28/29th 
February of the tax year. Administrative data gives us information over time through the panel, 
but the data is drawn at a specific point in time. This means that late submissions and revisions 
after this cut off point will not be in the data. Any correction made to an IRP5 certificate and later 
resubmitted will not be available in this data.  
The use of the tax year in the data also affects the examination of the ETI. The ETI was 
implemented from 1 January 2014, however, the 2014 tax year ends on 28 February 2014. This 
means that while there are claims for the ETI in the 2014 tax year, the claims only represent two 
months of the policy period. From the 2015 tax year, the ETI is captured for the full 12 months 
of the tax year.  
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This section starts off with a description of the cleaning of the IRP5 data. Once cleaned, the 
data is aggregated to the firm level which the later subsections discuss. 
3.3.1 Nature of person 
The first step in the cleaning the IRP5 data is recognising that the data includes certificates for 
clubs, partnerships, retirement funds, associations and other types of entities that are required to 
submit IRP5 tax forms. All non-individuals are removed from the data. Identifying and keeping 
individuals is a method used to overcome the issue of retirement income listed as individual 
income identified in the IRP5 data by Kerr (2016). Where the nature of person was missing, it is 
inferred from other years whether the observation was the tax form submission of an individual. 
For example, where the nature of person identified an observation as individual (coded “A” in the 
data) in 2012 and 2015 but was missing for the same person (identified by the ID number) in 2013 
and 2014, the observations in 2013 and 2014 are classified as individuals. This reduces the number 
of observations that are dropped due to missing ‘nature of person’ information.  
3.3.2 Hires and Separations 
Due to the errors in the start and end dates of employment, the calculation of a new hire or a 
separation is not straightforward. One error is the large number of individuals who report the start 
of employment within one week of the beginning of the tax year.11 This is dealt with in the 
following manner: where an employee was hired after 1 March in the tax year but was not 
previously seen in the data in the previous tax year, the employee is regarded as a true hire. Where 
employees were seen in a previous year, but they only report a start date one week after the 
beginning of the tax year, this is regarded as a continuation of the period employed from the 
previous year. 
A similar occurrence is found for the end date of employment. Many individuals do not report 
employment in the last two weeks of the tax year which affect how separation are counted. To 
make sure our analysis is not affected by this error, employees are not counted as separated from 
a firm if the end date listed is after the 14th of February in a tax year. The end date is counted as a 
separate if the individual is not seen in the same job in the following tax year.  
Lastly, if an employee has multiple jobs in the same firm in the same year, they are not counted 
as a new hire or repeated separations. This issue is discussed in a subsequent section.  
 




An age variable is constructed from the reported date of birth on the IRP5 record. As the ID 
number is anonymized, the date of birth cannot be verified. There is a small percentage of 
observations with missing data on date of birth. The population of interest is those of working 
age. Approximately 0.18% of the data includes those below 15 years of age. This is regarded as a 
data entry error in the date of birth variable as it is illegal for children under the age of 15 to be 
employed. Approximately 7% of the individuals per tax year are over the age of 65. There is also 
a very small percentage of observations with ages over 99 years.  
The ETI can only be claimed for employees over the age of 18 and under that age of 30. For 
this reason, the age at the start of the employment date is calculated to determine eligibility of the 
ETI. In the end, observations with ages below or beyond the working age range from 15 to 65 
years old are dropped to maintain a dataset of those of working age. 
3.3.4 Income 
There are several income variables in the IRP5 data. The three prominent income variables: gross 
non-retirement fund income, gross retirement fund income and gross taxable income. In the 2017 
tax year, the gross non-retirement fund income becomes gross remuneration amount. These 
variables are summed to give us the income variable for each observation in the data. For those 
with a reported annual income of more than 100 million rand the observations are dropped due 
to possible data entry error only affecting a handful of observations. 
ETI eligibility is based on several factors including monthly income, that is, the subsidy is 
available to those who earn a monthly income of less than R6,000. The monthly income is 
therefore calculated by dividing the annual income by the number of days worked, and then 
multiplying it by 
7
5
 and 21.75 as the average number of working days in calendar month12. This is 
described in equation (3.1) below: 






×  21.75 (3.1) 
where 𝑖 relates to the individual, 𝑓 represents the firm and 𝑡 represents the tax year. For example, 
if the income is R10,000 and the period employed is 365 days then the monthly income is R834. 
In cases where the period of employment cannot be determined, the monthly income cannot be 
calculated.  
 
12 The average number of days in a month is 30.44 which is calculated by multiplying 
7
5
 by 21.75. 
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Where individuals work overtime, or less hours than required in the month, the monthly income 
variable will be higher, or lower, respectively, than the true monthly income. The IRP5 data does 
not include any information on the number of hours worked thus the direction of the bias cannot 
be verified in monthly income.  
3.3.5 Repeatedly identified in the same year 
One of the biggest challenges in the IRP5 data is the repeated observation of the same individuals 
in the tax year. The IRP5 data allows for individuals to be seen multiple times in the same year. 
Individuals can be seen multiple times if they change jobs, move firms, resubmit an IRP5 certificate 
or perhaps held multiple jobs. This is both advantageous and challenging. An individual is 
identified in the data using the unique anonymized SA ID number while an individual within a 
firm is identified by a combination of the SA ID number and the PAYE reference number. This 
combined is also referred to as the ‘Job ID’. There are many instances where the Job ID is repeated 
sometimes up to 14 times. Table 3-1 highlights 7 cases where individuals are repeatedly seen and 
describe them below. Table. 3.A.1 in the appendix mirrors this cleaning process with the number 
of observation and individuals dropped. 
Case 1: The Job ID is repeated, and the start or end date of employment is missing. The job 
duration, monthly income, ETI amount and worker’s weights cannot be verified without start and 
end dates of employment thus these observations are dropped. Approximately 0.6% of 
observation are dropped. These observations are labelled IRP5 1 in Table 3-1. 
Case 2: No Job ID exists as the South African ID number is missing. There are approximately 
600,000 observations per year (3 to 4 per cent of all observations) without a South African ID 
number. This does not represent the number of individuals without an ID number, there is a chance 
that many of these will be repeated observations which is unverifiable. It is assumed that those 
without a South African ID number are foreigners. Those with a missing ID are removed from 
the dataset as foreigners are not eligible for the ETI. These observations can be seen in “Case 2” 
in Table 3-1. 
Case 3: In this case 3, individual identified as IRP5 3 claims they work at PAYE 3 for 1 day in 
April and again 1 day in May. A job is defined as a paid position of regular employment. As this 
does not represent regular employment, it is not considered a job and thus drop these observations. 
Approximately 5% of observations report only 1 day of employment.  
Case 4: Repeated Job ID with the same start and end dates but different income amounts.  
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Scenario 1: IRP5 4 works in firm PAYE 4 for the full year (365 days). The entries are repeated 
four times where the start and end dates are the same and the income is the same for each entry 
except the last one.  
Scenario 2: IRP5 6 works in firm PAYE 6 for 184 days. The entries are repeated twice. The start 
and end dates are the same, but the income is different. 
Revisions of the IRP5 certificates may also result in Job ID repeats in the same tax year. Repeated 
records are dropped. It is assumed that the repetition is due to a revision of the IRP5 certificate. 
The entry with the highest income in kept. Again, this affects a very small sample of the dataset.  
Case 5: Separate periods of employment can be identified when an individual works for different 
periods in the same tax year in the same firm. This could occur in sectors such as agriculture and 
manufacturing where there could be seasonal employment: Consider 2 scenarios:  
Scenario 1: IRP5 7 claims they work at firm PAYE 7 from 1 March to 30 June (122 days) then 
works from 28 July to 1 September (36 days) then works 22 September to 3 October (12 days) 
and again works 30 October to 14 November (16 days). We consider this one job as a seasonal 
worker and do not count the separate start dates and end dates as a hire or a separation.  
Scenario 2: IRP5 8 claims they work at firm PAYE 8 from 1 March to 31 December and again 
from 1 January to 28 February. In this scenario, the total work period ads up to 365 days, a full 
year. This can occur where a firm has a financial year end different from the tax year end such 
as December 31st as in this scenario. We count this as one job.  
In Case 5 the period worked, the income, the ETI amount claimed, and the worker weight are 
summed to reflect only 1 job in the data. Only the summed-up observation is kept. 
 
Case 6: Overlapping periods of employment: an individual works multiple jobs in the same firm 
in the same tax year. Consider the scenario: 
The individual identified as IRP5 9 works at firm PAYE 9 from 1 March to 20 February (357 
days) but also works at the same firm from 1 March to 27 June (119 days) in the same tax year. 
We consider this a case of multiple part time jobs in the same firms. However, we limit this to 
scenarios where an individual has at most 3 part-time jobs in the same firm.  
In Case 6 the repeated entries are kept as they are considered as 3 separate part time jobs.  
Case 7: Multiple overlapping periods with multiple income values. This is similar to Case 6 but 
here there are three or more repeated entries. This is considered as one job and an average of the 
job duration, income and ETI amount claimed is used. This is illustrated through individual IRP5 
10 and firm PAYE 10 and individual IRP5 11 and firm PAYE 11 in Table 3-1. The number of 
48 
 
observations left with after cleaning represents the number of jobs in the data. As this method 
allows individuals to have multiple jobs within the tax year there are more jobs than there are 
unique individuals in the data.  
Lastly, the cases listed above are not mutually exclusive. Observations with Missing ID numbers 
may also have missing information on their start or end dates of employment or only be employed 
for one day. Included in the appendix Table. 3.A.1 are the number of observations at the start and 
the number dropped at each stage of the cleaning process. After the cleaning processes is complete, 




















IRP5 1 PAYE 1 - 07-Sep-14 - 117 1,000 - 
Observations dropped 
IRP5 1 PAYE 1 22-Oct-14 - - 1,002 5,000 - 
          
Case 2 
- PAYE 2 01-Mar-12 30-Jun-12 122 3,000 - 0.33 
Observations dropped 
- PAYE 2 01-Jul-12 30-Dec-12 183 4,000 - 0.50 
          
Case 3 
IRP5 3 PAYE 3 07-Apr-14 07-Apr-14 1 10,000 12,000 0.00 Observations dropped 
IRP5 3 PAYE 3 22-May-14 22-May-14 1 6,000 6,000 0.00  
           
Case 4 
IRP5 4 PAYE 4 01-Mar-14 28-Feb-15 365 246,408 10,000 1 
Choose highest income and 
highest ETI amount. Keep job 
duration and worker weight. 
  
  
IRP5 4 PAYE 4 01-Mar-14 28-Feb-15 365 246,408 10,000 1 
IRP5 4 PAYE 4 01-Mar-14 28-Feb-15 365 246,408 12,000 1 
IRP5 4 PAYE 4 01-Mar-14 28-Feb-15 365 277,087 10,000 1 
IRP5 4 PAYE 4 01-Mar-14 28-Feb-15 365 277,087 12,000 1 
        
IRP5 6 PAYE 6 01-Mar-13 31-Aug-13 184 29500 - 0.5 
IRP5 6 PAYE 6 01-Mar-13 31-Aug-13 184 6200 - 0.5 
IRP5 6 PAYE 6 01-Mar-13 31-Aug-13 184 29500 - 0.5 
          
Case 5 
IRP5 7 PAYE 7 01-Mar-14 30-Jun-14 122 66,825 4,000  0.33 Sums up period worked, 
income, ETI amount and 
worker weight. Repeats are 
dropped so that only one job 
observation remains 
IRP5 7 PAYE 7 28-Jul-14 01-Sep-14 36 14,447  1,000  0.1 
IRP5 7 PAYE 7 22-Sep-14 03-Oct-14 12 4,895  300  0.03 
IRP5 7 PAYE 7 30-Oct-14 14-Nov-14 16 8,942  400  0.04 
IRP5 7 PAYE 7 01-Mar-14 30-Jun-14 186 95,109  5,700  0.5   
         
IRP5 8 PAYE 8 01-Mar-10 31-Dec-10 306 108,980 - 0.84 Sometimes happens when 
firms’ year-end is 31 Dec IRP5 8 PAYE 8 01-Jan-11 28-Feb-11 59 30,212 - 0.16 

















IRP5 9 PAYE 9 01-Mar-14 20-Feb-15 357 24650 6,000 0.98 Count as two separate part time 
jobs  IRP5 9 PAYE 9 01-Mar-14 27-Jun-14 119 12325 1,900 0.33 
         
IRP5 10 PAYE 10 01-Mar-14 20-Feb-15 357 24650 1,000 0.98 
Count as three separate part 
time jobs 
IRP5 10 PAYE 10 10-Mar-14 15-May-14 67 4520 500 0.18 
IRP5 10 PAYE 10 01-Jul-14 30-Aug-14 61 4332 450 0.17 
          
Case 7 
IRP5 11 PAYE 11 01-Mar-11 16-Dec-11 291 20457 - 0.80 There are more than 3 repeats, 
averages are taken for job 
duration, income, ETI amount 
and Worker weight 
IRP5 11 PAYE 11 01-Mar-11 01-Sep-11 185 58198 - 0.51 
IRP5 11 PAYE 11 01-Mar-11 16-Aug-11 169 5160 - 0.46 
IRP5 11 PAYE 11 11-Sep-11 15-Feb-12 158 9085 - 0.43 
IRP5 11 PAYE 11 01-Mar-11 16-Dec-11 201 23225   0.55 *Average taken 
         
IRP5 12 PAYE 12 01-Mar-15 16-Dec-15 291 20457 9000 0.80 There are more than 3 repeats, 
averages are taken for job 
duration, income, ETI amount 
and Worker weight 
IRP5 12 PAYE 12 01-Aug-15 01-Sep-15 32 58198 1000 0.09 
IRP5 12 PAYE 12 01-Apr-15 16-Aug-15 138 5160 1500 0.38 
IRP5 12 PAYE 12 11-Sep-15 15-Feb-16 158 9085 2500 0.43 
IRP5 12 PAYE 12 01-Mar-11 16-Dec-11 154.75 23225 3500 0.42 *Average taken 
Note: The table highlights seven cases where individuals are repeatedly seen in the data and describes how these observations are dealt with. 
Source: Author’s own illustration of IRP5 data. 
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3.3.6 Job duration and worker weights 
The IRP5 certificate contains information on the start of the period of employment and the end 
of the period of employment in each tax year. They correspond to the fields “Period Employed 
From” and “Period Employed To”. Employers are instructed to fill in the date of the employee’s 
start for the relevant tax year for the former field and fill in the last date which the employee’s tax 
is being calculated for the latter field. This information can be used to determine the job duration 
of the individual and informs us on the hiring and separations of employees. 
Job duration is calculated by taking the end date and subtracting it from the start date. The job 
duration is also used to create a weighted employment variable. The weighted employment variable 
accounts for the case where individuals are not employed for the full tax year. This becomes 
important later when firm labour is calculated. Weighted employment is calculated by job duration 
divided by the number of days in the tax year as described in equation (3.2). 
 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑖,𝑓,𝑡 =
(𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑓,𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑓,𝑡)
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡
  (3.2) 
where 𝑖 relates to the individual, 𝑓 represents the firm and 𝑡 represents the tax year.  
If the employee’s start date is listed in the previous tax year, the start date is brought forward 
to the first day of the relevant tax year. Similarly, where an employee’s end date is in the following 
tax year, the end date is brought back to the end of the relevant tax year. For example, if an 
employee’s start date is listed as 1 January 2012 for the 2013 tax year, this date is brought forward 
to start their work period on 1 March 2012. If an employee’s end date is 15 June 2013 for the 2013 
tax year, this date taken back to 28 February 2013 to match the tax year. This gives a job duration 
for each tax year based on the period employed the relevant tax year. 
There are, however, some errors in the start and end dates of employment. For example, there 
are cases where the employment start is after the employment end date and the correct dates 
cannot be verified. There are also cases where the start or end date of employment is missing. In 
both these cases, job duration is calculated using two alternative variables. The IRP5 form captures 
the number of pay periods in which the employer divides the tax year as well as the number of 
periods the employee works of the pay periods the employer lists. These are the variables “Total 
Periods in Year of Assessment” and “Total Periods Worked”. This means that if an employee 
worked 22 weeks in the year, then we can still record their employment weight as described in 
equation (3.3).   
 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑖,𝑓,𝑡 =
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑠 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑑




Where both employment dates and periods worked are missing, observations are dropped.  
3.3.7 ETI in the data 
Each IRP5 certificate after 2013 contains two variables related to the ETI; an indicator whether 
the form includes an ETI claim and a variable with the amount of ETI claimed. There are many 
errors in the data related to the eligibility criteria of the ETI claims as well as the amount claimed.  
The ETI is targeted at a specific group of youths: individuals between the ages of 18 and 29, 
starting work after 1 October 2013, earning less than R6,000 per month and working in the private 
sector. However, the data includes many claims for the ETI from people who do not meet these 
eligibility criteria. Five types of errors in claims in the data are identified: 
1. Over age: those older than 30 years old at the start of their work period 
2. Underage: those younger than 18 years at the start of their work period 
3. Before the policy claims in the 2014 tax year from individuals hired before 1 October 
2013. 
4. Public sector: claims from those employed in the public sector. 
5. Over-claimed: claims that are more than is possible. The maximum possible claim amount 
for an individual per month is R1,000. The ETI came into effect on 1 January 2014; thus, 
for the 2014 tax year the maximum claim per individual is R2,000. The ETI was in effect 
for the full tax years (2015-2018); thus, the maximum claim for each tax year is R12,000 
per eligible employee.  
Table 3-2 Types of incorrect claims, by tax year 
 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Over-claimed 1.08 0.24 0.14 0.04 0.04 
Over age 16.90 0.92 0.35 0.20 0.38 
Underage 0.48 0.42 0.33 0.26 0.23 
Before policy 34.49 - - - - 
Public sector 0.09 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.04 
Total number of incorrect claims 120,794 14,694 9,732 6,490 8,934 
Percentage of incorrect claims 53.0 1.6 0.9 0.5 0.7 
Total number of claims 227,735 906,013 1,127,005 1,267,929 1,300,843 
Note: The table describes the percentage and total number of incorrect claims seen in the tax data. 
Source: Authors’ estimates based on IRP5 data.  
The figures in Table 3-2 present the percentages of incorrect ETI claims per tax year. However, 
they may be understated in two categories: over age and over-claimed. First, it cannot be 
established that claims ended when an employee turned 30, as the data is annual. Second, 
employees earning between R2,000 and R4,000 have a maximum claim of R1,000 per month. For 
employees earning R1,500 per month the maximum claim in the first 12 months is R750 per 
month. By setting the maximum claims to R2,000 for 2014 and R12,000 for subsequent years, the 
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cleaning process may be missing employees over-claiming in the R0–2,000 and R4,000–6,000 
categories of monthly income. 
Alarmingly, 53 per cent of the claims made in 2014 had some error. This is mainly due to the 
large number of claims made for individuals who started work before 1 October 2013. The number 
of incorrect claims drop to 1.8 per cent in 2015 and 1 per cent or lower in the subsequent years, 
indicating that firms better understood the eligibility criteria for the ETI in the later years. The 
incorrect claims cases are not mutually exclusive; for example, there are very few cases where 
multiple criteria are violated on the same claim. In the data, it can be identified where firms have 
made errors in their claims for the subsidy. Given that firms need to register for PAYE in order 
to claim the subsidy, the likelihood of fraudulent cases (such as a dummy firm hiring unemployed 
relatives to claim the subsidy) is low. 
In cases where the ETI claims are incorrect due to their age, start date before 1 October 2013 
or are in the public sector, their claim amount is set to zero. Where ETI claims are more than the 
maximum annual claim value, the claim amount is set to the maximum amount per tax year.  This 
is what is assumed happens during the auditing process at SARS the claims that are not eligible are 
rejected or the claim values are recalculated in the reconciliation process between SARS and firms.  
3.3.8 Data cleaning summary 
Thus far, we have described at length the characteristics of the tax data and how we choose to 
clean the data. This short section can be viewed as an interim summary of this process. Table 3-3 
reports the number of observations before and after the data cleaning process. There are between 
16 million and 19 million observations each year and around 4% of these observations do not have 
ID numbers. There appears to be a lower number of observations in 2018 which is expected as 
there is some delay in reporting tax records to SARS. As advised early in this chapter, this is 
dependent on the version of data used. Later versions of the data may reflect slightly different 
(increased) numbers of observations. 
What results from the cleaning process is an unbalanced job-level panel from 2011 to 2018 
from the IRP5 data. The panel is limited to the working-age population (15 to 65-year-olds) and 




Table 3-3 Data description by tax year 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Before cleaning         
All IPR5 certificates 16,304,393  17,085,352  17,229,167  17,791,554  19,773,138  18,316,154  19,537,156  17,366,496  
No. of observations with missing ID numbers 775,865  716,343  734,608  726,011  767,398  745,049  877,804  702,572  
Missing (%) 4.8% 4.2% 4.3% 4.1% 3.9% 4.1% 4.5% 4.0% 
After cleaning         
No. of IRP5 jobs 12,681,797  12,822,654  12,962,240  12,966,110  13,266,810  13,221,745  13,377,984  12,640,044  
No. of ETI eligible jobs - - - 540,088  2,692,550  2,594,056  2,468,684  2,241,741  
No. of ETI jobs - - - 137,596  810,834  1,002,556  1,101,897  1,110,552  
ETI claims as percentage of all jobs - - - 1.1% 6.1% 7.6% 8.2% 8.8% 
ETI claims as percentage of ETI eligible jobs - - - 25.5% 30.1% 38.6% 44.6% 49.5% 
Note: The table describes the IRP5 data by tax year before and after cleaning including the ETI characteristics. 




3.3.9 Defining the firm 
Using the job-level panel, a firm-level panel is created. There are two ways in which to aggregate 
the data at the firm-level; using the PAYE reference number or the CIT reference number. Original 
to the IRP5 data is the PAYE reference number of the business entity completing the tax 
certificate. The PAYE reference number is pre-populated on the form. Company income tax 
information is reported at the level of the CIT tax reference number. The overwhelming majority 
of firms have only one PAYE reference number related to a single CIT reference number. The 
CIT reference number is not native to the IRP5 data and SARS provides a concordance file that 
allows us to link the CIT reference numbers to PAYE reference numbers.  
The IRP5 data is aggregated at the CIT-level and thus the firm is defined as the CIT reporting 
entity. This allows the merging of firm level variables from the CIT-IRP5 panel into the aggregated 
IRP5 panel. The downside of aggregating the IRP5 data at the CIT-level is that some IRP5 
observations are not linked to the CIT reference number. This happens because some firms, for 
example in the public sector, are not required to submit company income taxes and therefore 
cannot be matched. For an evaluation of the ETI this is not a concern as firms in the public sector 
are not allowed to claim for the ETI. Henceforth, these aggregated observations are referred to as 
IRP5 firms.  
In Table 3-4, the total number of firms are shown for each tax year. This is the number of firms 
found in the IRP5 data. There is a year-on-year increase in the number of firms reported. The 
second row in Table 3-4 shows the number of firms with matched CIT information merged from 
the CIT-IRP5 V3.3 panel. Approximately 70% of IRP5 firms have corresponding CIT data. It is 
not clear why the remaining 30% of IRP5 firms do not have corresponding CIT information. At 
the time of writing this was being queried at SARS.  
As described in the paper by Pieterse, Kreuser and Gavin (2016), several firms in the CIT-IRP5 
panel do not have any corresponding values for some important variables such as sales and cost 
of sales. This does not seem to have a big impact on our data as shown in row 3 of Table 3-4. In 
the years 2011, 2012 and 2013 there are fewer firms with corresponding CIT information. The 
reason for this may be the change over from the IT14 form to the ITR14 form in this period. As 
the CIT-IRP5 panel covers the years 2008 – 2017 there are no firms reported for the 2018 tax 
year. All 2018 IRP5 firms are therefore dropped. 
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Table 3-4 Total number of firms by tax year 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Number of CIT Firms  231,297 235,309 237,115 240,391 245,331 248,426 251,392 
Matched number of firms 164,339 167,619 167,098 166,462 168,526 167,063 156,147 
Matched with CIT info 159,366 163,711 164,499 166,462 168,526 167,063 156,147 
Note: The table describes the number of CIT firms matched with the firm-level IRP5 data.  
Source: Author’s own estimates based on firm-level IRP5 and CIT-IRP5 version 3.3 panel data 
CIT and IRP5 data do not perfectly align, and this is perhaps a subtle, but important, point about 
the data. Not all the firms in the IRP5 data have corresponding company tax information. And 
vice versa, all the firms in the CIT data do not have corresponding employee information. From 
the population of firms in the IRP5 data, approximately 69% have matched company tax 
information that is non-missing. Part of the matching problem is related to delays in firms filing 
their company income tax with SARS and the remainder is an unresolved anomaly in the data 
which SARS have been unable to provide any reasons for this occurrence. Pieterse, Kreuser and 
Gavin (2016:21) provide detail on the CIT firms with missing information. These firms are 
sometimes dormant companies, share block companies or body corporates. Implications for the 
analysis are discussed in section 3.4.1.   
3.3.10 Tax year versus financial year  
The IRP5 data are reported by tax year where the tax year for individuals in South Africa runs 
from 1 March to 28/29 February the following year. The tax year for firms is calculated from the 
firm’s financial year end. Approximately 85 per cent of firms have their financial year end at the 
end of February (Pieterse, Kreuser & Gavin, 2016). Firms in the CIT-IRP5 panel with a financial 
year end different to the tax year end are dealt with in the following way: Firms that have a financial 
year end in calendar year 2013 are added to the 2013 tax year even though the tax year ends on 28 
February 2013. Table 3-5 below illustrates this. 
Table 3-5 Tax year versus company financial year end 
Tax reference number Tax year Company Financial Year end 
CIT 1 2013 1 January 2013 
CIT 2 2013 30 September 2013 
CIT 3 2013 31 December 2013 
CIT 4 2014 28 February 2014 
CIT 5 2014 31 August 2014 
Note: The table depicts five examples of differences between tax year and company financial year. 
Source: Authors’ illustration based on the Pieterse, Kreuser and Gavin (2016) merging of the CIT-IRP5 version 3.3 
panel data. 
There are two further important points about timing in the CIT-IRP5 panel; companies are 
required to submit their tax returns to SARS within 12 months of the end of their financial year. 
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A firm with a financial year end of 31 December 2017 may only submit their tax return in 
December 2018 after which it takes some time before SARS releases the data. The second point 
is when the CIT-IRP5 panel was updated. This thesis uses the CIT-IRP5 panel version 3.3. The 
delay in submission to SARS, the lag in SARS reporting the data and the actual date of update of 
the panel means that the CIT-IRP5 is mostly complete for the 2016 tax year but does not contains 
all the firms for the 2017 tax year. This is perhaps why there is a slight drop off in the number of 
firms matched in 2017 in comparison to 2016. 
This concludes all the pertinent information on the cleaning of job-level IRP5 data and the 
creation of the firm-level IRP5 data. Having created a new dataset that allows for the analysis of 
the ETI, our attention changes to the description of the firms claiming the ETI thereafter the 
individual participants of the ETI.  
3.4 Who is claiming the ETI? 
To assess whether the policy is indeed creating any jobs, a thorough investigation of the firms 
claiming the ETI will guide the evaluation of the policy. Furthermore, there are the questions about 
how much was spent on the ETI and who really benefitted from the subsidy funds.  
This section describes the firms claiming the ETI; the take up rate, size, location, structure, 
industry, hiring and separations patterns. Interesting differences in the ETI-claiming firms versus 
those eligible but non ETI-claiming firms are highlighted. The main advantage of accessing the 
tax data is the ability to observe ETI claiming firms. The firm-level data allows us to examine the 
different types of firms employing youth. It gives us information on whether the ETI has changed 
the firm preference to youth over older workers and lastly, allows us to see which firms are 
benefitting financially from the policy. This section breaks down the firm characteristics that are 
related to the take up of the ETI.  
3.4.1 The ETI claiming firm 
More than thirty thousand firms are claiming the tax subsidy each year.13 The statistics in Table 
3-6 reflect the number of ETI claiming firms after the data has been cleaned and the incorrect 
claims have been accounted for. The 2014 tax year reflects only two months where firms could 
claim the subsidy. Claims in subsequent years reflect the full tax year. The total number of firms 
for each year ranges between 226,000 and 251,000 firms. The number of ETI claiming firms are 
divide by the total number of firms to get a take-up rate of approximately 12.7%14. This take-up 
 
13 In 2015, only 25,544 ETI firm have company income tax information available and matched into the data. This 
becomes important in Chapter 4 as we lose information on 6,261 ETI firms when we estimate the impact of the ETI 
at the firm level. 
14 This excludes the 2014 tax year where the take up rate appears low due to the duration of the subsidy validity in the 
2014 tax year. 
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rate seems low when comparing to similar programmes in other countries. For example, take up 
was nearly 100 per cent for firms hiring eligible workers for a young workers tax cut in Sweden 
(Saez, Schoefer & Seim, 2019). In South Africa, the take up rate is viewed as high as the 
government anticipated that fewer firms would use the subsidy. Thus, an alternate take-up rate is 
considered; the number ETI claiming firms over the number of ETI-eligible firms where ETI-
eligible firms are defined as firms that have at least one young, low wage (eligible) worker. The 
take up rate is on average 25%; still low in comparison to other countries but not as low as 
previously thought.  
Table 3-6 Summary statistics for ETI firm claims by tax year 
 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
ETI duration (months) 2 12 12 12 12 
No. of firms claiming ETI 12,157  31,786  30,108  30,660  30,785  
No. of ETI eligible firms 50,776  130,321  126,010  120,627  104,486  
No. of firms not claiming ETI 228,234  213,545  218,318  220,732  196,021  
No. of firms claiming ETI with CIT information 10,093  25,544  23,801  2,282  -    
Percentage of ETI-firms 5.1% 13.0% 12.1% 12.2% 13.6% 
Total number of firms  240,391  245,331  248,426  251,392  226,806  
Percentage of ETI eligible firms 23.9% 24.4% 23.9% 25.4% 29.5% 
Note: ETI eligible firms refers to firms that hired at least 1 ETI eligible worker. 
Source: Author’s estimates based on IRP5 firm-level data. 
The subsequent subsections compare firms claiming the subsidy to those not claiming, with 
consideration for firms who employ eligible workers but may not claim the subsidy.  
3.4.2 Industries that claim the ETI 
Employment of low or unskilled youth varies by industry. It would then follow that the ETI take 
up would vary across industries. The industries where take up of the ETI is possible is described, 
that is, industries with firms that employ young low-wage workers.  
Wage subsidies are sometimes targeted to specific industries to reduce the cost of the policy or 
increase effectiveness. For example in Mexico, the wage subsidy program was targeted to the 
manufacturing industry as this is where the job losses were expected to be high in the wake of the 
2008 economic crisis (Bruhn, 2016). 
Burns, Edwards and Pauw (2010) recommends that the ETI be targeted to industries where 
employment is responsive to lower costs of labour. This is not the case in the design of the policy, 
the ETI is available to all private sector firms excluding only public-sector entities. 
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Industry codes are generated from the “main income source code” variable in the job-level 
IRP5 panel. These codes are converted to the ISIC4 codes for which there are 21 industry 
categories.15  
The industry codes are aggregated to the firm level. In some cases, IRP5 records within the 
same firm report different industry codes. In such cases when aggregating at the firm level, the 
most repeated industry is taken as the firm industry. In cases where there is a 50-50 split between 
two industries, the industry is coded as missing. This is not a concern as it affects only 2% of firms. 
Lastly, firms are permitted to list different industries in consecutive years. This only affects 
approximately 1% of firms.  
Within the data the sectoral affiliation of firms that hire low- or semi-skilled youth. The 
industries of firms with at least one eligible youth employed are examined. Eligible youth are 
defined by the policy as individuals employed at the firm between the ages of 18 and 29 and earning 
less than R6,000 per month. Firms do not necessarily claim the subsidy for all eligible youth. Some 
firms may not be claiming the ETI for any eligible youth. In the face of declining demand for 
young, low-wage workers, it may be challenging for the ETI to create any new employment or the 
ETI may just be what firms need to encourage them to employ young workers. 
Table 3-7 documents the industries of firms with at least one young, low wage worker for the 
period 2011 to 2017. Firms with eligible workers are concentrated in manufacturing, wholesale 
and retail, financial services, professional, scientific, and technical, agriculture and construction. 
Firms in these sectors account for up to 75% of firms employing young, low wage workers. The 
table also shows us that there is a decline in the employment of young, low wage workers in the 
manufacturing sector over the period. Although excluded from the ETI, it is known that the public 
sector is not a large employer of young, low wage workers.  
Another interesting feature about Table 3-7 is the overall decrease in the number of firms that 
employed young, low wage workers. In 2011, approximately 60%, or 138,350, of all firms, employ 
at least 1 young, low wage worker, while in 2017 this drops to 48% or 120,749 firms. 
 
 
15 See https://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/regcst.asp?Cl=27 for a detailed list of the International Standard 
Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities, Rev.4 
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Table 3-7 Industry affiliation of firms employing at least one young, low wage worker (%) 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Agriculture, forestry & fishing                7.5                  7.9                   8.3                   8.4                 8.7                   8.9                   9.3  
Mining & quarrying                1.0                  1.0                   1.0                   1.0                 1.0                   1.0                   1.0  
Manufacturing              24.8                 24.6                 24.1                 23.6              22.9                 22.3                 21.8  
Electricity, gas, steam, & AC supply                0.5                   0.5                   0.5                   0.5                 0.5                   0.5                   0.4  
Water supply & waste management                0.5                   0.5                   0.5                   0.5                 0.5                   0.5                   0.5  
Construction                7.3                   7.1                   7.0                   7.0                 6.9                   6.9                   6.9  
Wholesale & retail              16.4                 16.3                 16.2                 16.1              15.8                 15.6                 15.4  
Transportation & storage                3.1                   3.1                   3.0                   3.0                 2.9                   2.8                   2.6  
Accommodation & food services                4.7                   4.8                   5.0                   5.1                 5.2                   5.5                   5.7  
Information & communication                0.3                   0.3                   0.3                   0.3                 0.3                   0.3                   0.3  
Financial & insurance services              11.2                 11.2                 11.2                 11.0              10.7                 10.5                 10.2  
Real estate activities                1.5                   1.5                   1.5                   1.5                 1.5                   1.6                   1.6  
Professional, scientific, & technical                8.2                   8.2                   8.1                   8.0                 7.8                   7.7                   7.7  
Administrative & support services                1.2                   1.2                   1.2                   1.2                 1.3                   1.3                   1.3  
Public administration                 0.1                   0.1                   0.1                   0.1                 0.1                   0.1                   0.1  
Education                2.5                   2.6                   2.7                   2.8                 2.9                   3.0                   3.2  
Human health & social work                3.5                   3.5                   3.6                   3.5                 3.5                   3.5                   3.4  
Arts, entertainment, & recreation                0.9                   0.9                   0.9                   1.0                 1.0                   1.0                   1.0  
Other service activities                3.2                   3.3                   3.3                   3.3                 3.2                   3.2                   3.2  
Missing                1.5                   1.5                   1.6                   2.3                 3.5                   3.9                   4.4  
Number of firms with at least 1 eligible worker       138,350          137,738          135,681          132,835        130,440          126,139          120,749  
Total number of firms       231,297          235,309          237,115          240,391        245,331          248,426          251,392  
% of firms with at least 1 eligible worker 59.8% 58.5% 57.2% 55.3% 53.2% 50.8% 48.0% 
Note: Industry codes are based on the International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities Revision 4 (ISIC4), available at: 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/regcst.asp?Cl=27. 
Source: Authors’ estimates based on IRP5 data. 
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Table 3-8 summarizes the percentage of ETI firms, non-ETI firms and all firms in the respective 
industries. In the subsidy period, tax years 2014 to 2017, the industry mostly likely to claim the 
ETI was manufacturing. Almost a quarter, 22.3%, of firm ETI claims in 2017 were from firms in 
the manufacturing sector. Following manufacturing, the wholesale and retail sector accounts for 
around 17.4% of firm ETI claims. This is followed by the financial and insurance services and 
agricultural sectors with 10.5% and 10.5% of claims from these sectors, respectively. These four 
sectors account for more than 60% of all firm ETI claims. Claims for the subsidy are lowest in the 
information and communication industry. It seems surprising that the financial and insurance 
services sector is one of the main sectors claiming from the ETI as the sector is expected to be a 
higher-paying and higher-skill sector. However, Table 3.7 suggest that many firms in the financial 
and insurance sector employ young, low-wage worker even before the policy period. The jobs that 
are subsidised by firms in this sector are unknown as the tax data do not include the occupation 
of workers. 
Using input-output tables from Statistics South Africa, Edwards (2001) show that there has 
been a declining demand for low skilled labour across sectors in the late 1990s. Banerjee et al. 
(2008) use survey data to show the increase in supply and decrease in demand for low skilled labour 
in the years after the apartheid period. Low-wage employment is most evident in the agriculture, 
wholesale and retail, construction, and manufacturing sectors (Valodia et al., 2006). The 
manufacturing and retailing sectors are the industries with the largest ETI take-up as they typically 
require low-waged labour. These findings are similar to Hamersma (2008), where the industries 
with a large low-skilled workforce are more likely to claim wage subsidies. 
Pauw and Edwards (2006) suggest the effects of the wage subsidy will vary by sector. In 





Table 3-8 ETI firms versus all firms, by tax year and industry 
 




ETI Non-ETI All  ETI Non-ETI All  ETI Non-ETI All  ETI Non-ETI All 
Agriculture, forestry & fishing 8.4 6.7 6.8  9.7 6.4 6.9  10.4 6.5 7.0  10.5 6.6 7.1 
Mining & quarrying 1.3 0.9 0.9  1.2 0.9 0.9  1.1 0.9 0.9  1.1 0.9 0.9 
Manufacturing 24.2 20.5 20.7  23.1 19.5 20.0  22.5 19.2 19.6  22.3 18.7 19.2 
Electricity, gas, steam, & AC supply 0.4 0.5 0.5  0.4 0.4 0.4  0.4 0.4 0.4  0.4 0.4 0.4 
Water supply & waste management 0.5 0.8 0.8  0.6 0.8 0.8  0.6 0.8 0.8  0.5 0.9 0.8 
Construction 5.2 6.3 6.3  5.5 6.2 6.1  5.9 6.0 6.0  5.7 6.0 5.9 
Wholesale & retail 17.8 13.4 13.6  17.3 12.6 13.2  17.5 12.3 12.9  17.4 12.0 12.6 
Transportation & storage 3.1 3.1 3.1  2.9 3.0 3.0  2.7 3.0 3.0  2.6 3.0 2.9 
Accommodation & food services 7.6 3.4 3.6  6.9 3.1 3.6  7.3 3.2 3.7  7.5 3.2 3.7 
Information & communication 0.3 0.3 0.3  0.2 0.3 0.3  0.2 0.4 0.3  0.1 0.4 0.3 
Financial & insurance services 12.0 13.7 13.7  10.9 13.6 13.3  10.5 13.5 13.2  10.5 13.3 13.0 
Real estate activities 0.6 2.7 2.6  1.0 2.8 2.5  1.0 2.8 2.6  1.0 2.8 2.6 
Professional, scientific, & technical 8.6 10.0 9.9  8.8 9.9 9.7  8.6 9.9 9.7  8.4 10.0 9.8 
Administrative & support services 1.6 1.0 1.0  1.5 1.0 1.0  1.6 1.0 1.1  1.6 1.0 1.1 
Public administration  - 0.1 0.1  - 0.1 0.1  - 0.1 0.1  - 0.1 0.1 
Education 2.6 2.3 2.3  2.8 2.2 2.3  2.7 2.3 2.3  2.9 2.3 2.4 
Human health & social work 2.0 5.7 5.5  2.4 5.9 5.5  2.1 6.0 5.5  2.0 6.0 5.5 
Arts, entertainment, & recreation 1.1 0.9 0.9  1.1 0.9 0.9  1.2 0.9 0.9  1.3 0.9 0.9 
Other service activities 2.4 3.7 3.6  2.6 3.6 3.5  2.7 3.6 3.5  2.8 3.5 3.4 
Missing 0.4 4.2 4.0  1.2 6.8 6.1  1.4 7.5 6.7  1.3 8.3 7.4 
Total number of firms 12,157 228,234 240,391  31,786 213,545 245,331  30,108 218,318 248,426  30,660 220,732 251,392 
Note: Industry codes are based on the International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities Revision 4 (ISIC4), available at: 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/regcst.asp?Cl=27. Source: Authors’ estimates based on IRP5 data. 
Source: Authors’ estimates based on IRP5 data. 
 
Source: Authors’ estimates based on IRP5 data. 
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3.4.3 Firm location 
Firms benefit from access to labour, suppliers, and infrastructure in a location. The tax data provides 
only broad location of the firms in the data. The ETI is not restricted to any location in the country 
however, it is expected that the presence of location economies will affect where ETI claiming firms 
are seen. In the case of the Turkish wage subsidy programme, examined by Betcherman, Daysal and 
Pagés (2010), the subsidy was restricted to provinces below a certain income per capita threshold.  
At the provincial level, most claims are from provinces with large economic centres such as 
Gauteng, the Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal. This is shown in Table 3-9. Gauteng has almost 
double the number of ETI-firms than the next province, the Western Cape. This means heterogeneous 
impacts of the policy across different provinces can be expected. The take up rate by province is 
reported in Table. 3.D.1 in the Chapter appendix. Take up of the subsidy is highest in the Northern 
Cape province. 
Table 3-9 ETI firms, by province 
 2014  2015  2016  2017 
 ETI All  ETI All  ETI All  ETI All 
Western Cape 19.4% 14.9%  18.9% 14.9%  19.3% 14.7%  18.1% 13.8% 
Eastern Cape 4.9% 3.8%  5.1% 3.7%  5.4% 3.7%  5.3% 3.4% 
Northern Cape 1.7% 1.1%  1.8% 1.1%  1.8% 1.1%  1.8% 1.0% 
Free State 2.8% 2.4%  2.8% 2.3%  2.8% 2.2%  2.8% 2.1% 
KwaZulu-Natal 11.4% 9.4%  12.6% 9.3%  12.7% 9.0%  11.9% 8.4% 
North West 2.7% 2.1%  2.4% 2.1%  2.4% 2.1%  2.2% 2.0% 
Gauteng 33.8% 30.2%  30.4% 29.9%  28.8% 29.2%  26.8% 26.6% 
Mpumalanga 3.4% 2.8%  3.5% 2.7%  3.2% 2.7%  3.0% 2.6% 
Limpopo 2.0% 1.8%  2.1% 1.8%  1.9% 1.8%  2.0% 1.7% 
Missing 17.9% 31.7%  20.4% 32.2%  21.7% 33.6%  26.1% 38.6% 
Number of ETI firms 12,157 240,391  31,786 245,331  30,108 248,426  30,660 251,392 
Note: The table shows the percentage of ETI firms and all firms by province and tax year. 
Source: Authors’ own estimates using IRP5 data. 
3.4.4 Firm size 
Firm size is likely to be an important determinant of the change in the labour composition at the firm. 
The effect of hiring one additional young employee at a firm with 10 employees is very different from 
a firm with 500 employees. The subsidy may mean more to a small firm, allowing them to hire 
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additional youth, while larger firms, already hiring eligible workers, might be claiming the subsidy for 
youth they were already planning to hire, creating a deadweight loss.  
There are many ways in which firm size can be defined. Firms can be classified in terms of number of 
employees, the revenue of a firm or the assets of a firm. The number of employees in a firm per year 
is used to measure the firm size. As observations with missing ID are dropped, what remains is a firm 
size variable that reflects only the number of employees with a South African ID. Figure 3.1 illustrates 
the firm size distribution for the 2015 tax year for firms with less than 100 employees. Approximately 
95% of firms have fewer than 100 employees.  
Figure 3.1 Firm size distribution, 2015 
 
Note: Unweighted number of employees are used to calculate the firm size.  
Source: Author’s own illustration based on the 2015 IRP5 data. 
De Mel, Mckenzie and Woodruff (2016) test whether hiring additional labour can benefit small firms 
in Sri Lanka. The authors run an experiment where they provide a temporary wage subsidy to small 
enterprises that covers half the wage of an unskilled worker for a six-month period. The authors argue 
that there are firms who would benefit from employing more workers but do not increase their 
workforce due to hiring constraints. Hiring and firing frictions may prevent a firm from employing 
additional workers and a wage subsidy lowers the cost of employment thereby temporarily increasing 
employment. The long-term effect happens if firms recruit employees that are good matches and will 
therefore retain once the subsidy ends.  
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Table 3-10 interrogates firm size, examining the take-up rate by firm size in terms of weighted 
number of employees per firm. As before, two definitions of the take-up rate are considered, first as 
the percentage of firms claiming the ETI divided by the total number of firms in the category, and 
second, the percentage of firms claiming the ETI divided by the number of firms eligible for the ETI 
(employing at least 1 eligible worker). Take up rates are low for firms with less than 10 employees even 
when only considering eligible firms. The take up rates are higher for firms with more than 10 
employees when considering only eligible firms. For example, the take up rate is around 10% for small 
firms when measured against all firms but more than 30% when considering eligible firms. This means 
that more than 30% of small firms hiring at least one eligible youth are making use of the subsidy. 
Take up rates are high for very large firms, and only higher when considering take up by eligible firms. 
The take up rates in Table 3-10 are similar to Hujer, Caliendo and Radic (2002), the take-up for 
firms with less than 50 employees is low and the take-up for large firms, more than 50 employees, is 
high. One explanation for the low take-up rate in small firms is that they may find it difficult to 
administer the subsidy or that the cost of administering the subsidy outweighs the benefits of claiming 
for very few employees. For large firms, the opposite is true, it might be easier to administer the ETI 
for all eligible employees as larger firms have an accountant, tax practitioner or finance department 
who are able to administer the ETI successfully. This could be one reason for the high take up rates 
at larger firms. 
Given these findings, the later analysis controls for the firm size by examining the effects within 
firm size subgroups and more carefully try to consider the evaluation of larger firms where the take 
up rate is higher.
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Table 3-10 Subsidy take-up rate by firm size 
 2014  2015  2016  2017  2018 
 All Eligible  All Eligible  All Eligible  All Eligible  All Eligible 
Micro: 0 – 5 0.9% 14.4%  3.1% 11.6%  3.1% 12.7%  3.1% 13.8%  3% 15% 
Small: 6 – 10 2.7% 15.6%  9.5% 15.3%  9.4% 16.0%  9.8% 17.6%  10% 20% 
Medium: 11 – 50 7.4% 20.4%  21.5% 25.7%  20.2% 25.0%  20.6% 26.4%  23% 31% 
Large: 51 - 100 20.7% 31.8%  45.9% 48.6%  40.5% 43.7%  40.0% 44.1%  49% 54% 
Very Large: 100+ 37.6% 46.2%  63.7% 65.7%  56.3% 58.8%  56.4% 59.6%  66% 70% 
               
Overall take-up 5.1% 23.9%  13.0% 24.4%  12.1% 23.9%  12.2% 25.4%  14% 29% 
Total no. of firms 240,391 50,777  245,331 130,322  248,426 126,013  251,392 120,625  226,806 104,484 
Note: Number of jobs per firm are weighted by the period worked. The take up rate is calculated as the number of firms claiming the ETI over the total number of 
firms in the same size category. 
Source: Authors’ own estimates based on IRP5 data. 
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3.4.5 Employment, hiring and separation rates 
Anchoring the ETI analysis in the general hiring process of the firm is crucial to assessing the impact. 
The ETI functions as a hiring subsidy therefore it is expected that firms with a higher employment 
growth rate are more likely to take up the ETI. The ETI has the potential to be claimed by all firms 
but only some firms claim the subsidy. Table 3-11 displays the mean firm employment growth for the 
years 2012 to 2017. The table reports the employment growth by firm size categories. The employment 
growth rate is calculated as the difference in the number of employees between two years divided by 
the number of employees in the previous year.  
Table 3-11 Employment growth by firm size, 2012-2017 
Firm size: Number of employees 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Micro: 0 – 5 -0.034 -0.076 -0.056 -0.050 -0.053 -0.048 
Small: 6 – 10 0.105 0.068 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.085 
Medium: 11 – 50 0.122 0.092 0.093 0.091 0.088 0.091 
Large: 51 – 100 0.134 0.136 0.108 0.114 0.109 0.108 
Very Large: 100+ 0.164 0.166 0.133 0.131 0.119 0.127 
Note: Weighted number of employees is used 
Source: Authors’ own estimates based on IRP5 data. 
Employment growth at micro, small, medium firms seem consistent across the years except for 2012 
where the growth rate for all size groups appears higher. Large and very large firms do see a difference 
in their employment growth in 2013 and 2017 indicating a decline in employment growth at large and 
very large firms.  
The ETI imposes some restrictions designed to hinder the substitution of young workers for older 
employees. The next step is to look at the hiring and separations of employees to establish whether 
hiring a subsidized worker is associated with the substitution of older workers.  
Two categories of older workers are defined: non-youth are workers older than 30 years but 
younger than the retirement age of 65, prime age workers are between the ages of 30 and 40 years old. 
The rate of hiring (separation) is calculated as the number of new hires (separations) divided by the 
number of employees in the previous period.  
68 
 
Figure 3.2 Rates of hiring and separation of workers, by age group 
 
Note: The graphs show the hiring and separation rate for all ages, youth (18-29 years), prime age (30-40 years) and non-
youth (30-65 years). The rate of hiring (separation) is calculated as the number of new hires (separations) divided by the 
number of employees in the previous period. 
Source: Authors’ own estimates based on IRP5 data. 
In the left panel of Figure 3.2, there is a decline in hiring rates between 2013 and 2014 across groups. 
The hiring rates increase across all groups in 2015 but the rate of increase appears less pronounced 
for youth. The hiring rate decreased in 2016 across group but increase 2017. The increase in the 2017 
tax year corresponds with the 2016 calendar year when the subsidy was initially set to expire. It is 
possible that firms may have realised that this was the final year to make use of the wage subsidy and 
increased their hiring of young people before the policy was confirmed to be extended. The 
announcement was made late in the year so it is less likely that firms may have reacted to the extension 
announcement. The graphs do not suggest displacement of prime age or non-youth workers.  
In the right panel of Figure 3.2, the separation rates for youth, prime age, non-youth, and all 
employees are presented. The separation rates decrease across all groups in the year preceding the start 
of the policy. The separation rates increase across all groups after the 2014 tax year but the rates of 
increase in separation differ between some groups.  
Chapter 5 tests whether the differences in the employment of youth and non-youth is significant. 
Firms with a higher youth hiring rate can derive greater benefit from the ETI than firms that are not 
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3.4.6 Youth concentration 
The policy has the potential to shift the focus of employment towards youth and away from non-
youth. Another way to look at this is to examine the youthfulness of firms. To do so, the youth 
concentration at the firm level is calculated by taking the ratio of youth to total employees at the firm. 
This is done within firm size groups as the take up rates vary between small and larger firms. This is 
separately considered for ETI firms and non-ETI firms in order to examine the differences between 
the two groups in the Figure 3.3 below. 
Figure 3.3 Youth Concentration at ETI and non-ETI firms, by size 
 
Note: The graphs show the youth concentration at firms of different sizes for ETI claiming (on left) and non-ETI claiming 
firms (on right). 
Source: Authors’ own estimates using IRP5 firm-level data. 
The concentration of youth is higher at ETI firms. There is a steep decline in the concentration of 
youth from 2011 to 2018 in non-ETI firms. The pattern for small and medium ETI firms is somewhat 
different; small and medium ETI firms become more youthful with the advent of the policy. For 
medium and larger firms, the youth concentration faces a steep decline in the youth concentration 
over the same period. 
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3.4.7 How much has been claimed? 
Since the take up of the policy has been higher than the government expected16 and is borne by the 
government, it is important to examine what the cost of the policy has been and weigh this against the 
benefit. In this section, some detail on the cost of the policy is provided. The details on subsidy claim 
values for the policy period provides a framework for the later discussion.  
For the period 1 January 2014 to 31 December 2014, the first calendar year of the policy, President 
Jacob Zuma declared in the 2015 State of the Nation address that “R2 billion has been claimed to date 
by some 29 000 employers, who have claimed for at least 270 000 young people.” (Zuma, 2015). This 
would amount to a cost of R7,407 per job. It is important to keep in mind that while the subsidy may 
have been claimed for 270,000 young workers, these claims may have been for workers for whom 
firms already planned to employ and do not necessarily imply that these are new jobs that had been 
created in response to the policy.  
Using the tax data, the total amount claimed per tax year is found in Table 3-12. The total ETI 
claimed for the first two months of the policy is R151 million. The claimed amount peaks in 2017 at 
R3.9 billion and is only slightly lower in 2018. This means a total of R14.7 billion was claimed for 50 
months of the policy presented in the table. While the National Treasury budgeted R5 billion for the 
first 3 years of the policy, the claims for the period were closer to R8 billion.17 This is attributed to the 
higher than expected take-up rate of the policy by firms.  
 
16 The National Treasury did not release information or calculations to support their estimates for the number of jobs 
created and take-up of the policy. 




Table 3-12 Total ETI amount claimed 
 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Claimed total (in millions)  151   2,911   3,781   3,943   3,921  
      
Top 20 total claimed (in millions)  44   823   973   965   852  
% of ETI claimed by Top 20 29% 28% 26% 24% 22% 
% of ETI claimed by Top firm 10% 8% 6% 7% 7% 
       
Number of firms claiming >R10 million 1 22 32 38 42 
Total number of firms        12,157         31,786         30,108         30,660         30,785  
Notes: 2014 duration is 2 months, while all other years are 12 months.  
Source: Authors’ estimates based on IRP5 firm-level data. 
Furthermore, the twenty highest claiming firms account for approximately a quarter of the total ETI 
claimed per year. This is an astonishing development as it means that only 20 firms are claiming a 
subsidy value of R852 million in the 2018 tax year alone.  Perhaps more troubling, is the firm claiming 
the highest amount of the ETI, claims between 6% and 10% of the total ETI each year. The top 20 
claiming firms are very large firms with more than 200 employees. 
The take up rate by firm size described earlier suggests there may be heterogeneous effects of the 
subsidy by firms of different sizes. This is examined in the next chapter, but the value of claims by 
firm size groups may be important to think through the efficiency of the policy should the cost and 
effect vary. Table 3-13 breaks down the value of the claims by firm size and confirms, as one would 
expect from the previous table, that the very large firms claim a large portion of the ETI.  
Table 3-13 Value of ETI claims by firm size (in millions) 
 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Micro: 0 – 5  1.9   23.4   25.4   24.7   21.9  
Small: 6 – 10  2.5   41.5   46.9   46.9   42.7  
Medium: 11 – 50  12.9   269.5   331.4   344.0   334.1  
Large: 51 – 100  10.4   211.2   277.0   294.4   309.1  
Very Large: 100+  123.2   2,365.2   3,100.0   3,233.5   3,212.9  
Total 151.0  2,910.7  3,780.6  3,943.5  3,920.6  
Note: Number of jobs per firm are weighted by the period worked. 
Source: Authors’ estimates based on IRP5 firm-level data. 
Examining the value of ETI claims is important because the ETI is being funded through tax revenue 
that could be used for other policies or interventions. It is also important to measure the total amount 
claimed in relation to the number of jobs created to give us the cost of additional jobs created in South 
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Africa. Lastly, where no jobs were created, the incentive claimed by firms amounts to a deadweight 
loss. Imperfect market conditions jeopardize the employment-generating potential of a wage subsidy 
scheme. Firms with some market power may be able to capture some of the subsidy as rent (Go et al., 
2010). The higher the degree of non-competitiveness, the lower the incentive for firms to raise 
employment or reduce output prices (Burns, Edwards & Pauw, 2010). 
In summary, ETI claiming firms are concentrated in a handful of industries and in provinces with 
large economic hubs. ETI claiming firms are large with an average of 135 employees. Take up rates 
vary substantially by firm size with the value of claims following a similar pattern. While firm size is 
not necessarily important to the overall employment impact of the subsidy, heterogeneous effects 
within firm size subgroups may be important in determining where job creation is possible and how 
the policy can be better implemented. Lastly, employment growth and hiring and separation rates 
suggest there are no large changes in the employment of youth during the policy. Before delving into 
the discussion on the firm-level effects of the subsidy in the following chapter, the last part of this 
chapter is dedicated to presenting some facts about the participants of the ETI. 
3.5 Participants of the ETI 
Little is known about the employees for whom firms are claiming the ETI mainly due to a paucity of 
data available. While a survey of young workers is possible, youth might not be aware of their firm 
claiming the ETI once they were employed, therefore a survey of youth employed after the policy 
inception will not provide us with the relevant information. The tax data indicates which employees 
the ETI was claimed for and provides some details on the participants of the ETI. The tax data falls 
short in terms of ETI participant demographic information such as educational attainment, 
occupation, or race; factors which affects labour market outcomes. In this section the IRP5 job level 
panel described in section 3.3 is used.  
3.5.1 Eligibility, jobs, and participants 
In this section, ETI-participants are individuals for whom their employer claimed a wage subsidy for 
employing them. ETI-jobs refers to the job at the firm for which there is a corresponding ETI claim. 
ETI participants can have multiple jobs some of which will be ETI-jobs. For example, an individual 
can change jobs during the year and both jobs can be ETI-jobs. This is counted as two ETI-jobs but 
only one ETI-participant.  
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While the subsidy was made available to all private sector firms, not all firms claimed the subsidy 
for eligible employees. There are many reasons why firms do not claim the subsidy: Firms may not 
have been aware of the subsidy, or the administrative costs outweighed the benefit, or firms may have 
been nervous that claiming the subsidy would attract a financial audit by SARS. This means that there 
are an excess number of eligible workers who are not ETI participants as described in Table 3-14. 
Table 3-14 Numbers of eligible workers, ETI participants, eligible jobs and ETI jobs 
 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Number of eligible workers  514,503   2,274,549   2,183,675   2,091,622   1,922,229  
Number of ETI participants  136,726   749,784   910,004   994,892   1,006,954  
      
Number of eligible jobs  540,088   2,692,527   2,594,080   2,468,650   2,241,755  
Number of ETI jobs  137,597   810,847   1,002,569   1,101,868   1,110,591  
Note: The table shows the number of ETI eligible workers and jobs and ETI participants and jobs for tax years 2014 
to 2018. 
Source: Authors’ estimates based on IRP5 data. 
There are around 2 million eligible workers in each tax year (excluding 2014 tax year given the two-
month subsidy claim period). The number of participants increases each year. The take-up rate, the 
number of participants divided by the number of eligible workers, is around 50 percent in 2018, the 
highest take-up rate of the policy thus far. There are slightly higher numbers of eligible jobs and ETI 
jobs compared to eligible worker and ETI participants, but the pattern remains the same, there is an 
increase in take-up of the policy in each successive year.  
3.5.2 Industries hiring low wage youth  
Table 3-15 documents the industries where low-wage youth are working. The industries with the 
greatest number of low-wage youth are the finance and insurance sector, followed by the wholesale 
and retail sector, followed by the manufacturing sector and then the agricultural sector. The same 
trend is maintained over the period in the data. The table also points out that the public sector employs 
approximately 5 percent of young, low-wage workers.  
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Table 3-15 Eligible youth, industry affiliation, 2014-2018 
 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Agriculture  346,557   366,070   413,905   407,508   364,463  
Mining and quarrying  30,139   26,178   20,871   21,947   18,718  
Manufacturing  392,775   373,346   380,364   327,188   324,410  
Electricity, gas, steam, & AC supply  7,631   5,648   4,441   4,631   4,074  
Water supply & waste management  5,410   5,178   4,743   4,847   5,639  
Construction  107,398   101,404   90,510   83,249   67,046  
Wholesale & retail  529,103   541,999   507,675   517,429   455,686  
Transportation & storage  51,142   47,663   44,278   32,686   32,016  
Accommodation & food service  117,527   131,552   130,251   134,489   104,924  
Information & communication  12,668   12,341   14,623   14,496   12,384  
Financial & insurance services  611,324   581,266   553,709   492,887   451,254  
Real estate activities  9,684   9,629   7,906   8,848   6,621  
Professional, scientific, & technical  222,050   214,513   171,504   157,589   157,692  
Administrative & support service  82,543   82,255   59,956   68,189   58,378  
Public administration    140,628   151,395   150,306   130,617   117,556  
Education  83,927   88,706   89,352   93,194   89,372  
Health & welfare  29,432   30,438   28,474   27,736   23,703  
Arts, entertainment, & recreation  22,130   23,037   23,428   24,353   24,664  
Other service activities  43,506   41,368   37,618   35,843   31,347  
Missing  6,675   9,941   10,475   11,545   9,367  
      
Number of eligible youths   2,852,249   2,843,927   2,744,389   2,599,271   2,359,314  
Note: Industry codes are based on the International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities 
Revision 4 (ISIC4), available at: http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/regcst.asp?Cl=27. 
Source: Authors’ estimates based on IRP5 data. 
Table 3-16 documents the number of ETI jobs per industry. The distribution closely follows what is 
seen at the firm level. The majority of claims arise in the manufacturing sector, followed by the 
financial and insurance sector, wholesale and retail and the agricultural sector. There is a notable 
increase in ETI jobs in agriculture.  
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Table 3-16 ETI jobs, industry affiliation, 2014-2018 
 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Agriculture  19,226  129,250   200,588   216,801   206,175  
Mining and quarrying  1,240   5,542   5,384   8,314   8,123  
Manufacturing  17,271   94,720   113,215   122,424   142,113  
Electricity, gas, steam, & AC supply  212   833   762   819   1,036  
Water supply & waste management  195   1,830   1,697   1,648   3,205  
Construction  3,744   20,919   23,484   22,260   21,398  
Wholesale & retail  35,945  200,939   238,551   277,554   280,147  
Transportation & storage  1,886   10,955   13,844   13,829   14,454  
Accommodation & food service  5,702   42,220   56,853   65,481   49,765  
Information & communication  252   937   1,105   1,466   1,455  
Financial & insurance services  30,299  179,708   225,295   235,534   238,276  
Real estate activities  182   1,956   1,233   3,563   2,497  
Professional, scientific, & technical  10,337   67,544   69,601   68,946   74,041  
Administrative & support service  5,036   24,759   19,199   30,481   28,614  
Education  1,364   8,692   9,362   9,219   12,968  
Health & welfare  1,267   6,541   6,987   5,358   7,608  
Arts, entertainment, & recreation  1,413   5,959   8,563   10,573   10,628  
Other service activities  1,946   6,793   5,949   6,627   7,053  
Missing 80  750   897   971   1,035  
      
Number of ETI jobs  137,597   810,847   1,002,569   1,101,868  1,110,591  
Note: Industry codes are based on the International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities 
Revision 4 (ISIC4), available at: http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/regcst.asp?Cl=27. 
Source: Authors’ estimates based on IRP5 data. 
There emerges a clear set of industries in which low-skilled, low-wage young workers are in demand. 
Levinsohn (2014) argue that sectors demanding low skilled workers have declined while tertiary 
sectors, such as the financial and services sector, have grown, demanding high skilled workers. Bhorat 
and Khan (2018) show that the main sectors of the economy experienced an increase in skill intensity 
over the period 1995 to 2015 at the cost of low or unskilled labour. The authors argue that this has 
created a skills-biased labour demand trajectory favouring high skilled workers and disadvantaging low 
and unskilled work seekers. The informal sector is also very small and unable to engage low and 
unskilled work seekers. The majority of the unemployed are either low or unskilled. Burns, Edwards 
and Pauw (2010) suggest that the policy should be targeted to industries that can grow the demand 
for low-skilled youth. Horn (2018) provides an industry list ranking employment intensity suggesting 




It does not appear that any of the industries have shifted their employment to favour youth in order 
to claim the subsidy. However, this is unlikely as certain industries require higher skill levels from 
young workers and the ETI will not affect them in the same way as, for example, the wholesale and 
retail sector where high numbers of low-skilled (low-wage) young workers are employed. A further 
example to highlight this, the mining sector employs large numbers of unskilled labour but the 
minimum wage in the mining sector is greater than R6,000 with only few eligible workers.  
3.5.3 Age of ETI job claims 
The unemployment rates for those aged 15-24 was 55.2% while the unemployment rate for those aged 
25-35 was 36.1% at the end of 2019 (Statistics South Africa, 2020). Older youth are more likely to be 
employed than younger youth highlighting the desperate need for jobs for younger youth.  
The earlier a young person gets a job, the greater the likelihood of being employed in later years. 
In South Africa, the longer one is unemployed, the harder it becomes to find a job. A problem that is 
sometimes referred to as chronic unemployment. The ETI is a wage subsidy that targets this most 
vulnerable group in two ways. One, the subsidy is restricted to youth between the ages of 18 and 29 
years old and two, the subsidy is structured such that it can only be claimed for a new employee.  
Figure 3.4 Age distribution of ETI jobs, 2018 
 
Note: The graphs present the number of ETI jobs in 2018 against the total number of ETI eligible jobs by age.  
Source: Author’s own estimate based on IRP5 data 
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Figure 3.4 presents the age distribution of those holding ETI jobs in 2018. The previous years have a 
similar pattern shown in the appendix in Figure. 3.E.1. The majority of ETI jobs are occupied by 
youth between the ages of 21 and 25 years old. This points to successful targeting of the policy and 
fits the general trend of youth employment, that is, the older individuals are more likely to be 
employed. There are fewer workers in low-wage jobs from the age of 25 and up. This is likely due to 
higher reservation wages for the older cohort in the target group. Older workers may also have more 
years of work experience and firms may offer higher paying jobs to employees with some work 
experience who are not eligible for the subsidy. The fact that the ETI is claimed for workers above 
the age of 25 could also point to good targeting of the policy if the older workers have less experience 
and are vulnerable to long-term unemployment. 
3.5.4 ETI characteristics 
The tax data allows us to measure the effect of the ETI on the intensive margin, through earnings. A 
shortcoming of the tax data is that it does not include information on the number of hours worked. 
The design of the policy permits claims for full time and part time employees as discussed in the 
previous chapter. Firms could increase the number of hours they employ eligible workers. The 
duration of the ETI job is especially important to those who are employed for the first time, as it 
provides them with some work experience should they change jobs.  
The average employment duration for an ETI job ranges from 189 to 212 days in the period 2015 
to 2018. This falls short of a full year of employment. Kerr (2016), using the same administrative data, 
indicated that job churn is high. On the other hand, it is expected that firms would try to retain ETI 
workers for up to one year to maintain their ETI claims. The job duration in 2016 is possibly lower as 
some ETI-participants may be in their second year of employment where the subsidy is reduced 
leaving room for firms to remove these workers in favour or new eligible workers, but this is not 
obviously seen in the data. 
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Table 3-17 Job duration and wages 
 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Average ETI job duration (days) 78 189 206 212 209 
Average ETI eligible non-claimer job duration (days) 67 229 221 217 213 
      
Average ETI job wages (Rands) 2,884 2,763  2,862  3,058  3,165  
Average ETI eligible non-claimer wages (Rands) 2,302 2,678 2,731  2,755  2,809  
Note: The table includes the average job duration and average wages in Rands for ETI jobs and ETI eligible jobs where 
there are no ETI claims, 
Source Author’s own estimates based on IRP5 data 
The average wage for an ETI job is R2,763 in 2015. The maximum claim amount is R1,000 for those 
earning between R2,000 and R4,000 per month. At R2,000 this means a 50% wage subsidy but at 
R4,000 this means a 25% wage subsidy. The wage subsidy means the most to employers paying a wage 
of something closer to R2,000 than R4,000. 
3.6 Conclusion 
The tax data available at the National Treasury Secure Data Facility is possibly one of the richest and 
most useful administrative datasets that South Africa has to offer researchers at present. The tax data 
are collected to calculate the tax lability of the relevant taxpayer and as such has several opportunities 
and constraints for research analysis. Some of these constraints include the lack of demographic 
information of individual taxpayers that is considered key to labour market analysis in South Africa, 
for example, years of education or race group.18 The other constraint with the data lies within the 
variables themselves. This is related to how the data is collected, stored, and transferred to the secure 
lab. This chapter carefully documents these issues and suggest ways in which they can be resolved. 
Once cleaned, the data has an average of 11 million individuals for each year available in the data. 
What remains from the cleaning process is a dataset that is still the best available to examine the effects 
of the ETI, given that the subsidy is claimed through the tax system.  
Take up of the policy has been concentrated at large firms in the manufacturing and wholesale and 
retail sectors. Further the take up is expectedly higher in Gauteng, the Western Cape, and Kwa-Zulu 
Natal where South Africa’s large economic centres are. There is no graphical evidence that the ETI 
has changed the hiring or separation rates of eligible or older workers. Micro and small firms claiming 
the ETI do appear to be more youthful once the policy starts. Considering how much has been claimed 
 
18 At the time of writing there is little that can be done to solve the lack of information, in the future, it is possible that the 
tax data could be merged with other data sources, such as the Department of Higher Education data. 
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for the policy, it is alarming that the twenty highest claiming firms account for 26% of the total value 
of the subsidy claimed each year. These firms are large with more than 200 employees.  
The final section of the chapter looks at those eligible for the subsidy and examine the individuals 
for whom the subsidy was claimed. For each year that the subsidy has been available, there have been 
around 2 million eligible workers and between 700,000 and 1 million ETI participants. The subsidy is 
not being claimed for every possible worker. The sectoral analysis suggests that there are clear sets of 
industries in which low-skilled, low-wage young workers are in demand. The subsidy does, however, 
appear to be targeting a younger cohort of eligible workers which is a good sign as younger workers 
are more vulnerable to long-term unemployment. The average wage of ETI participants appear to be 
higher than eligible non-claiming workers, but the average job duration appears to be lower for ETI 
participants. This is something investigated in Chapter 5; the earnings and job duration response to 
the ETI, alongside the response to entry and exit of workers. 
In summary, there are differences between firms claiming the subsidy and those not claiming. 
These differences need to be accounted for as selection into the programme will affect our evaluation 
of any change in employment.  
In the subsequent chapters of this thesis, the cleaning process is taken as given. Lastly, there may 






Appendix 3.A Data Cleaning summary 
Table. 3.A.1 Results of duplicate and invalid job cleaning 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
 Raw number of observations 15,710,843 15,494,214 15,240,497 14,754,992 16,881,841 15,821,825 15,882,581 15,551,416 
Raw number of individuals 11,459,724 11,506,856 11,640,467 11,370,019 11,717,110 11,662,905 11,831,318 11,891,982 
         
Missing job duration 44 9721 56 24 56 145 78 44 
Missing ID numbers 565,710 470,113 455,492 436,226 482,627 469,403 487,315 496,716 
Missing income information 6 2 7 23 12 13 23 63 
1-day contracts 633,718 735,636 538,930 447,271 863,484 405,103 513,706 556,318 
Repeated job contracts  521,635 409,334 371,182 275,265 2,391,135 1,379,399 998,296 564,940 
         
Total number of observations 13,778,572 13,542,556 13,565,808 13,162,767 13,507,484 13,573,274 13,667,933 13,668,806 
% observations dropped 12.3% 12.6% 11.0% 10.8% 20.0% 14.2% 13.9% 12.1% 
Total number of individuals  10,609,890   10,828,667   11,051,480   11,123,102   11,374,061   11,387,158   11,502,375   11,566,138  
% of individuals dropped 7.4% 5.9% 5.1% 2.2% 2.9% 2.4% 2.8% 2.7% 
Note: The number of observations lost at each step of the cleaning process by tax year. 
Source: Authors’ estimates based on IRP5 data. 
81 
 
Appendix 3.B Variable list 
Table. 3.B.1. List of variables used and created 
Variable name Description 
Employment Panel  
tax_year The tax year starts 1 Mar and ends the following year 28/29 Feb 
id_number Anonymized South African identity number 
date_of_birth Date of birth as completed on IRP5 form 
certificate_number The number on the IRP5 certificate 
paye_ref_no Anonymized PAYE reference number for firm 
amtgrossnontaxableinc Gross non-taxable income amount 
amtgrossretfundinc Gross retirement fund income amount 
amtgrossnretfundinc Gross non-retirement fund income amount 
employment_start Date of the start of employment 
employment_end Date of the end of employment 
eti_amount Amount of ETI claimed 
main_income_source_code Main income source code for the individual 
natureofperson Nature of Person includes individuals, pensioners, clubs, associations 
gender Gender where ID number is non-missing 
totalperiodinyearofassessment The periods recorded in the tax year of assessment 
totalperiodsworked The periods worked in the year of assessment 
- variables created  
income Summation of income variables in the data.  
month_inc Income divided by the period worked converted to a monthly amount 
work period End date of employment minus the start date of employment 
age_start Start of employment date minus date of birth 
eti Indicator for ETI claim, excluding incorrect ETI claims 
industry Main income source code converted to the ISIC4 codes 
hire Indicator for newly hired 
exit Indicator for separation from job 
firm_size Weighted number of employees per CIT firm 
firm_eti Weighted number of ETI employees per CIT firm 
firm_eti_amt Amount of ETI claimed per CIT firm 
  
CIT-IRP5 panel  
taxrefno Unique ID for CIT firm 
tax_year The tax year starts 1 Mar and ends the following year 28/29 Feb 
ITR14_c_taamt Total assets owned by the firm 
ITR14_l_totliabilities Total debts owed by the firm 
g_sales Firm profit item - Total sales amount per firm 
g_cos1 Firm profit item - Total cost of sales 
y_np Firm income - Net profit 
x_wages Firm Expense - Total payroll 
x_labcost Firm Expense - Labour cost 
cust_impexpind Customs Item - Categorical variable for trade status 
c_province Firm characteristic - Firm location variable 
- created  
lticlaim Learnership tax incentive claim indicator 
tot_var_cost Total Variable Cost 
  
PAYE_1col_1  
taxrefno Company Income Tax reference number 
paye_ref_no PAYE reference number 
Source: Authors’ own list of variables used from the tax data. 
82 
 
Appendix 3.C Firm size graphs 
Figure. 3.C.1 Firm size 
 
Note: The graph shows the number of firms by firm size calculated by the number of employees. 
Source: Author’s own estimates using IRP5 data. 
Figure. 3.C.2 Firm size distribution against normal distribution 
 




Appendix 3.D Firm location take-up 
Table. 3.D.1 Take up rate by province 
 
2014 2015 2016 2017 
Western Cape 7% 16% 16% 16% 
Eastern Cape 7% 18% 18% 19% 
Northern Cape 8% 22% 21% 21% 
Free State 6% 15% 15% 16% 
KwaZulu-Natal 6% 17% 17% 17% 
North West 7% 14% 13% 13% 
Gauteng 6% 13% 12% 12% 
Mpumalanga 6% 16% 14% 14% 
Limpopo 6% 15% 13% 14% 
Notes: Take up rate is calculated as the number of ETI claiming firms in each province divided by the number of 
firms in the province.  





Appendix 3.E Age distribution 
Figure. 3.E.1 ETI age distribution, 2014-2017 
  
Note: The graphs present the number of ETI jobs against the total number of ETI eligible jobs by age for the 2014 
to 2017 tax years.  




Chapter 4. Estimating firm-level impacts of the ETI 
4.1 Introduction 
The main contribution of the present chapter is the analysis of the ETI at the firm level. This is 
done by examining the impact of the ETI at firms. This chapter utilizes a matched difference-in-
difference approach to isolate the causal effect of the ETI on the number of youth employed at 
the firm.  
Early analysis of the ETI made use of survey data to analyse the effect of the ETI on youth 
employment probabilities (Ranchhod & Finn, 2014; Ranchhod & Finn, 2015). The key conclusion 
of the analysis is that the ETI has had no positive significant impact on the employment 
probabilities of young workers in the first policy year. Linking back to the very early discussion in 
Chapter 2, the stated objective of the ETI was to create 178,000 jobs in the first three years of the 
programme. Assuming the aim was to create approximately 60,000 jobs per year, or 30,000 jobs in 
the first six months, due to the survey sample size and design it may not have been possible to 
observe these changes.  
 A more recent analysis by the National Treasury (2016) provides a descriptive overview of the 
policy using the same tax data used in this thesis. The limitation of the report is that it does not 
qualify whether the policy is meeting its objective through creating any jobs.  
While only a few studies of the ETI exist, a more extensive review of these studies, their 
methodologies and findings are presented in Section 2.3.4. Different from previous work on the 
ETI, this chapter presents an analysis of the ETI at the firm-level allowing us to measure the 
change in youth employment against the backdrop of stated policy objectives.  
With detailed information on the take-up of the subsidy from the tax data, the types of firms 
where the subsidy has been most effective in creating jobs can be examined. Propensity score 
matching is used to construct a group of ETI and non-ETI firms that are statistically similar in 
terms of pre-policy firm characteristics. Then a difference-in-differences estimation strategy is used 
and a positive statistically significant effect on youth employment is found. Other outcome 
variables such as non-youth employment is used to examine any substitution effects and 
additionally examine the effect on payroll and youth ratio at the firm to check the sensitivity of the 
results. It matters little whether small or large firms create unemployment in South Africa since 
the unemployment problem, described in Chapter 2, is so large. However, small, and large firms 
react differently to the policy and any difference in effect at small or large firms could point to 
deadweight losses or opportunities to improve the implementation of the policy. For this reason, 
different firm sizes are evaluated separately by separately matching and estimating difference-in-
differences for firm size subgroups established in Chapter 3.   
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The theoretical framework in section 2.4 describes how a targeted subsidy can have both a 
positive and negative employment effect on non-target groups. Indeed, there is a major policy 
concern that the ETI would decrease the demand for or increase the churn for older workers in 
the non-target group. Examining the non-target group as a whole could hide the effect of the 
subsidy on non-target workers who are substitutes for the target group. For example, it is more 
likely that a 32-year-old is substitute for a subsidy eligible 29-year-old than a 45-year-old. Also, a 
worker earning R6,200 per month may be a closer substitute for a worker earning R5,800 per 
month. To examine the possible displacement effects of the subsidy, two non-target groups are 
considered: older workers, between the ages of 30 and 40 years old, as well as ‘higher wage’ young 
workers earning between R6,000 and R7,500.  
The last section of this chapter does a basic cost and benefit analysis of the policy. Thus far, 
the cost of this policy has been non-negligible and begs the question as to whether scarce 
government funding should continue to be spent on this policy or if it could be better spent on a 
different policy. The resulting number of jobs created, and cost of these jobs, are measured against 
the intention of the policy.  
This chapter is organized in the following manner: the next section lays out the evaluation 
process; defining the outcomes to be assessed and outlining our identification strategy. Section 4.3 
describes the study sample of firms, Section 4.4 details the matching process including estimating 
propensity scores, assessing the matching algorithm, and evaluating the matched treatment and 
control groups. Section 4.5 presents the results of conditional difference-in-differences methods 
and finally, Section 4.6, concludes.  
4.2 Evaluation process 
4.2.1 Outcome Measure 
The evaluation process is started by choosing suitable outcome measures. This is to clarify how 
the policy works and what is defined as a policy success. The ETI was aimed at addressing the 
youth unemployment problem through stimulating the demand for youth labour. The aggregate 
demand for youth labour is the sum of the demand for youth labour in each firm. The number of 
youth employed at a firm is used as proxy for labour demand for youth. 
This chapter aims to test whether there is an aggregate increase in youth employment in firms 
due to the implementation of the ETI. Wage subsidies decrease the relative cost of employing 
youth, thereby in theory increasing the demand for youth workers. However, holding all other 
things constant, if youth workers are substitutes for non-youth workers, the decrease in the relative 
cost of employing youth will result in substitution (of employment) away from non-youth workers.  
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At the same time, all other things are not constant and a decrease in the wage bill lowers 
production costs, resulting in lower prices and an increase in demand for produced goods - termed 
the output effect.19 The effect on youth and non-youth therefore also depends on whether the 
substitution effect or the output effect is larger. A change in non-youth employment as a result of 
the ETI will be evidence of an output effect. 
Many wage subsidy policies see an increase in total employment, greater than the change in 
employment for the subsidised group (Crichton & Maré, 2013; Kaiser & Kuhn, 2016; Rotger & 
Arendt, 2010). This is viewed as a positive externality; the increase of unsubsidised employment 
can amplify the effect of the policy through enabling firms to grow. Total employment and payroll 
are examined as additional outcomes of the policy.  
Over time, wage subsidies can increase the number of formal firms through incentivising 
informal firms to register with the government, as was the case in the Turkey (Betcherman, Daysal 
& Pagés, 2010). Existing firms could also increase the number of youth employed in established 
firms. These outcomes are not mutually exclusive and can occur simultaneously. The sample is 
restricted to established firms to measure the change in the number of youth employed, not 
allowing for any firm entry or exit.  
The subsequent sections outline the evaluation problem and the solution to assessing the 
above-mentioned outcomes. 
4.2.2 The Microeconometric Evaluation problem 
The impact of the wage subsidy policy on the outcome of the ETI claiming firm requires us to 
consider how the ETI firm would have behaved in the absence of the policy. It is impossible for 
us to observe the ETI firm not claiming the subsidy. The pre-policy behaviour is used to anchor 
how it is expected that the ETI firm would behave in the absence of the policy. A simple before-
after analysis would be susceptible to any possible confounding such as changes in economic 
growth. Any change in employment at the ETI firm would erroneously be interpreted as a change 
due to the policy where the response may be a result of the change in economic growth.  
The difference-in-difference (DID) method allows us to examine the policy impact by 
comparing the pre- and post-policy change in employment for the ETI firm relative to a 
comparison group. The comparison group should mimic the behaviour of the ETI firms in the 
absence of the policy. The difficulty in policy evaluation is finding a credible comparison. The key 
assumption in a DID analysis is a parallel trend between the ETI firms and the comparison group. 
 




A parallel trend would suggest that the average change in the comparison group characterizes the 
counterfactual change in the ETI firms without the policy. The descriptive statistics in Chapter 3 
point to several differences between ETI firms and non-ETI firms. Notably, ETI firms are large 
by number of employees, concentrated in the agriculture and manufacturing sectors and have 
higher concentrations of youth. These observable differences mean the assumption of 
unconditional parallel trends, between ETI and non-ETI firms, is unlikely to hold. The next 
subsection discusses how ETI take-up is modelled so that the parallel trends assumption holds 
conditional on covariates. The randomisation of the policy implementation at firms means that 
with a large enough sample, the many dimensions on which firms differ from each other is 
accommodated and the average difference is truly due to the policy. This is not the case for the 
ETI as the policy was available to all firms at the same time. Instead to construct our comparison 
group matching is done on some of the key observables identified in the previous chapter. This 
problem is described mathematically and applied to our evaluation of the ETI. 
Consider two outcomes: 𝑌𝑇, where the firm claims the ETI and 𝑌𝐶 , where the firm does not 
claim the ETI. Borrowing language from the evaluation literature, 𝑌𝑇refers to the “treated firm” 
and 𝑌𝐶  the “control firm”. Let 𝐸𝑇𝐼 be an indicator for whether a firm claimed ETI or did not 
claim the ETI. 
The treatment effect is the difference between the treated and control firm: 
 ∆= 𝑌𝑇 − 𝑌𝐶 (4.1) 
However, the ETI firm not claiming the subsidy, 𝑌𝐶 , cannot be observed if the firm has claimed 
the subsidy, a challenge in casual inference research (Angrist & Pischke, 2008; Holland, 1986). The 
observed outcome for each firm is: 
 𝑌 = 𝐸𝑇𝐼. 𝑌𝑇 + (1 − 𝐸𝑇𝐼)𝑌𝐶  (4.2) 
This means 𝑌𝑓
𝑇 and 𝑌𝑓
𝐶  cannot be observed at the same time. When 𝐸𝑇𝐼 = 1, that is the firm is 
treated, 𝑌𝑓 is 𝑌𝑓
𝑇 and 𝑌𝑓
𝐶  is the counterfactual. When 𝐸𝑇𝐼 = 0, that is the firm is not treated, 𝑌𝑓 is 
𝑌𝑓
𝐶  and 𝑌𝑓
𝑇 is the counterfactual. The average treatment effect on the treated is thus: 
 𝐸(∆|𝐸𝑇𝐼 = 1) = 𝐸(𝑌𝑓
𝑇|𝐸𝑇𝐼 = 1) − 𝐸(𝑌𝑓
𝐶|𝐸𝑇𝐼 = 1) (4.3) 
This equation calculates whether there is difference in outcome between the firm who claimed the 
ETI compared to the hypothetical situation where the same firm did not claim the ETI. However, 
the hypothetical firm not claiming the ETI represented by 𝐸(𝑌𝑓
𝑐|𝐸𝑇𝐼 = 1) cannot simultaneously 
be observed.  
In cases where a randomised experiment is conducted, the control group is constructed such 




𝑐|𝐸𝑇𝐼 = 1) = 𝐸(𝑌𝑓
𝑐|𝐸𝑇𝐼 = 0) (4.4) 
That is, on average, the control firm is a comparable to the hypothetical firm.  
Firms claiming the ETI were not randomly assigned thus the condition is not true: 
 𝐸(𝑌𝑓
𝑐|𝐸𝑇𝐼 = 1) ≠ 𝐸(𝑌𝑓
𝑐|𝐸𝑇𝐼 = 0) (4.5) 
Using the mean outcome of the non-claiming firms to approximate the outcomes for the 
hypothetical firm that did not claim the ETI is not ideal as ETI and non-ETI firms may differ 
without the policy. Using the non-ETI firms as a control group will thus lead to selection bias on 
observable and unobservable characteristics (Hujer, Caliendo & Radic, 2002). The next subsection 
tries to address the selection bias problem. 
4.2.3 Selection on observable characteristics 
One way to deal with selection bias on observables is through matching. Matching is done to 
construct a credible counterfactual group for the DID analysis.20 The idea behind matching is to 
search for a similar and comparable non-ETI firm from a large group of non-ETI firms. Similarity 
is based on firm pre-treatment covariates and matching can be conducted by covariates (Rubin, 
2006) or by propensity scores (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983).  
The difference in outcomes computed between the treated and matched control groups can 
then be attributed to the policy (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983).  
Matches are made based on the identifying assumption that, conditional on all relevant pre-
treatment covariates (𝑋), the potential outcomes (𝑌𝑇 , 𝑌𝐶) are independent of participation 
(conditional independence assumption or CIA)(Angrist & Pischke, 2008).  
 𝑌𝑇 , 𝑌𝐶 ∐ 𝐸𝑇𝐼|𝑋 (4.6) 
If the CIA holds, then the treatment and control groups are balanced, thus the control group is a 
valid counterfactual for the treatment group. This means the observed outcome of the non-ETI 
firm can be used to estimate the counterfactual outcome of the hypothetical ETI firm if it did not 
claim the ETI. This is described in the equation below: 
 𝐸(𝑌𝑓
𝑐|𝑋, 𝐸𝑇𝐼 = 1) = 𝐸(𝑌𝑓
𝑐|𝑋, 𝐸𝑇𝐼 = 0) = 𝐸(𝑌𝑓
𝑐|𝑋) (4.7) 
 
20 As discussed in the previous section, the parallel trends assumption is unlikely to hold given the many differences 
between ETI and non-ETI firms. 
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The role of matching is to ensure balance between the treatment and control groups based on pre-
treatment covariates. This confirms independence between the potential outcome and treatment 
and gives an unbiased estimator assuming that the expected value of the two error terms is both 
equal to zero. That is, there is no difference between the two error structures. 
The most intuitive way to match firms is to match directly using firm characteristics. However, 
the number of covariates that determine selection is large and it becomes impossible to match 
directly; also known as the curse of dimensionality. There are two ways to proceed; through 
mapping covariates into a metric measuring the closeness of two observations (Rubin, 2006) or 
matching by propensity score (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). Both methods make the distribution 
of covariates in the treatment group and in the control group the same. Rosenbaum and Rubin 
(1983) recommend the use of a balancing score, that is a function of the covariates. The propensity 
score is an example of a balancing score summarising information of covariates (𝑋) into a single 
index function that gives us the probability of claiming the ETI based on the observed 
characteristics of the firm. 
 𝑌𝑓
𝑇 , 𝑌𝑓
𝑐 ∐ 𝐸𝑇𝐼| 𝑃(𝑋) (4.8) 
The CIA then extends to propensity scores, that is, conditional on propensity scores 𝑃(𝑋), the 
potential outcomes 𝑌𝑇 and 𝑌𝐶  are independent of treatment (in the pre-policy phase) as described 
in equation (4.8).  
Equation (4.7) is amended to include the conditioning from 𝑋 to 𝑃(𝑋) to get the following 
equation: 
 𝐸(𝑌𝑓
𝑐|𝑃(𝑋), 𝐸𝑇𝐼 = 1) = 𝐸(𝑌𝑓
𝑐|𝑃(𝑋), 𝐸𝑇𝐼 = 0) = 𝐸 (𝑌𝑓
𝑐|𝑃(𝑋)) (4.9) 
The curse of dimensionality is avoided with the use of 𝑃(𝑋) and if the unobservable characteristics 
are the same. This means our counterfactual can be represented as follows:   
 𝐸(𝑌𝑓
𝑐|𝐸𝑇𝐼 = 1) = 𝐸𝑃(𝑋)[𝐸(𝑌𝑓
𝑐|𝑃(𝑋), 𝐸𝑇𝐼 = 0)|𝐸𝑇𝐼 = 1] (4.10) 
Equation (4.10), the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), is updated with the new 
counterfactual: 
𝐸(∆|𝐸𝑇𝐼 = 1) = 𝐸(𝑌𝑓
𝑇|𝐸𝑇𝐼 = 1) − 𝐸𝑃(𝑋)[𝐸(𝑌𝑓
𝑐|𝑃(𝑋), 𝐸𝑇𝐼 = 0)|𝐸𝑇𝐼 = 1] (4.11) 
This means that ETI firms can be matched with non-ETI firms where they have the same 
propensity score. The propensity score can be estimated using a standard probability model such 
as a logit or probit model and the quality of matching depends on how well the propensity score 
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is estimated and the ability to find comparison firms. An examination of the firms not matched 
will give us confidence whether any incomplete matching will bias our results.  
4.2.4 Conditional Difference-in-Difference approach 
Thus far, we have argued that matching allows us to deal with selection bias on observables, what 
remains is for us to deal with the selection bias from unobservable factors. Assuming the matching 
is successful, we assume that both treated and untreated firms face the same economic milieu 
allowing us to assess the effect of the policy. The DID measures the difference between the 
treatment and control group before the policy and subtracts from it the difference between the 
treatment and control after policy implementation. This is represented in equation (4.12).  
 𝐷𝐼𝐷 =  𝐸(𝑌1
𝑇 − 𝑌0
𝑇|𝐸𝑇𝐼1 = 1)  −  𝐸(𝑌1
𝐶 − 𝑌0
𝐶|𝐸𝑇𝐼1 = 0) (4.12) 
The DID approach requires a parallel time trend assumption and allows for time invariant selection 
bias.  
Heckman et al. (1998) introduced the conditional DID (cDID) estimator extending the usual 




𝑇|𝑃(𝑋), 𝐸𝑇𝐼1 = 1) =  𝐸(𝑌1
𝐶 − 𝑌0
𝐶|𝑃(𝑋), 𝐸𝑇𝐼1 = 0) (4.13) 
Equation (4.13) demonstrates that conditional on propensity score matching, the average 
treatment effect on the treated is estimated by examining the differences between the matched 
treated-control firms before and after the policy.  
This is similar to the approaches of Bruhn (2016), Crichton and Maré (2013), Hujer, Caliendo 
and Radic (2002), Kaiser and Kuhn (2016), Kangasharju (2007) and Rotger and Arendt (2010) for 
the evaluation of wage subsidy programmes, using administrative data in other countries.   
This cDID approach accounts for selection on observables through the matching and 
unobservable characteristics through the difference-in-differences. This idea is illustrated in Figure 
4.1 below.  
 
21 Conditional DID means combining matching with the DID. 
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Figure 4.1 Conditional Difference-in-differences approach 
Note: Matching does not eliminate the differences between firms thus it is expected that matched ETI and non-ETI 
firms are different in pre-treatment years. 
Source: Author’s own illustration 
ETI and non-ETI firms are matched at time 𝑡 − 1. Matching does not eliminate the differences 
in employment of youth between ETI and non-ETI firms, rather, it provides us with a statistically 
comparable non-ETI firm with which to compare ETI firms. This means it is possible for firms 
to have substantial differences on some of the firm characteristics. It is also possible for there to 
be different between matched treatment and untreated groups when there are thin densities in at 
least one group of firms who are untreated. This is when the difference-in-differences approach is 
required. Differences in employment of youth at 𝑡 − 1 are compared and subtracted from the 
difference between the ETI and non-ETI firms at 𝑡 + 1. This provides the average treatment on 
the treated as indicated in Figure 4.1. The estimation equation for the ATT is thus: 
 ∆𝑡+1= [𝑌𝑡+1
𝑇′ − 𝑌𝑡−1
𝑇′ ] − [𝑌𝑡+1
𝐶′ − 𝑌𝑡−1
𝐶′ ] (4.14) 
where: 
𝑌 Refers to the outcome measured 
𝑇′ Refers to the matched ETI firm 
𝐶′ Refers to the matched non-ETI firm 
𝑡 − 1 Refers to the pre-policy period 
𝑡 + 1 Refers to the period after policy implementation at time 𝑡. 
The ATT estimates the change in employment beyond the number that would have been employed 
in the absence of the subsidy. This means that the interpretation of the ATT estimate is the number 
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of jobs created due to the wage subsidy policy. The estimation method assumes non-interference 
across firms. This assumption would break down if the increase in employment at one firm is due 
to the loss of employment at another firm. Given the large number of unemployed youth in South 
Africa this is unlikely. Young workers are unaware of the wage subsidy and there would be no 
incentive for them to switch jobs. 
As a scenario, Firm A and Firm B are both expanding their firms and hiring more workers. 
Both firms are in industries that have a need for semi or low-skilled youth. In the absence of the 
subsidy, these firms will continue to hire and expand. The subsidy is introduced in 2014 but only 
Firm A claims the subsidy. Firm B does not claim the subsidy as they are unaware of the policy. 
Firms A and B are matched on their pre-policy characteristics, including industrial classification, 
firm size, and employment growth rate. During the policy years, it is assumed that a recession takes 
place that affects both firms’ hiring patterns. Firm A sees an increase in youth employment beyond 
the recession compared with the period before. A before–after comparison will be limited, as it 
does not account for any change in the economic environment. A DID approach, on the other 
hand, takes the economic environment into account and reflects the true effect of claiming the 
ETI. This means that a cDID approach will distinguish any increase in youth employment at Firm 
A and allow us to attribute it to the policy. 
Lastly, Kahn-Lang and Lang (2020) argue that DID will be more plausible if the treatment and 
control groups are similar in levels. In this case, this means that youth employment levels are 
similar between matched treatment and control groups. DID with matching makes youth 
employment levels more similar, however, both treatment and control groups contain very small 
and very large firms. This forms part of the motivation for the further analysis done by matching 
firms within firm size groups. 
4.3 Study sample 
Firms in the final empirical equation are a subset of firms in the data. First, the group of control 
firms needs to be selected. Firms in the public sector are removed as they are ineligible for the 
subsidy. There are 328,111 firms in the unbalanced panel from 2011 to 2015, of which 175 public 
sector firms are dropped. Public sector firms are assumed to be so different and to operate in such 
a different “market” that they hold no relevant information for tracking even the impact of time 
varying circumstances and are thus not a good comparison group. 
Second, the panel data is supplemented with firm characteristics from the Company Income 
Tax panel (CIT-IRP5). This gives more information on firms that enables a more suitable match 
between firms to be found. The downside of this, however, is that not all firms in the IRP5 have 
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corresponding CIT data. This can be a result of the lag in submitting a firm tax return to SARS. 
Since matching is done in 2013, firms with no CIT information in 2013 are dropped.  
Third, ‘pre’ and ‘post’ intervention data is required to conduct the DID. For example, a firm 
that registered for the first time in the 2014 tax year will not be included in our analysis as the data 
does not include sufficient pre-intervention information with which to match a firm not claiming 
the ETI. The sample is further restricted to firms that were operating in 2011 and 2012 to include 
lagged employment information in our estimation. Thus, no firm that registered after 2011 is 
included in the model giving a balanced panel of 115,053 firms. 
The balanced panel includes 18,719 firms claiming the ETI in 2015. This is less than the total 
number of firms claiming the ETI in 2015 presented in Table 3-4 as the restrictions applied reduces 
the sample. The remainder of non-claiming firms are used to form the control group of firms. 
Lastly, firms with more than 1,200 employees are dropped. This is because the take-up rate for 
these very large firms is approximately 72% and the credibility of our matching may be 
compromised. There are 367 firms with more than 1,200 employees claiming the subsidy, which 
represents 2% of all ETI firms. However, the value of ETI claimed is large. In terms of the value 
of ETI claims, the study sample of ETI firms claim R2.37 billion in subsidy and the 367 very large 
firms claim 56% of this. Dropping these firms has an implication on the external validity of the 
results. The estimation will therefore be limited to formal sector private firms; operating from 2011 
onwards; with company tax information in 2013 and with less than 1,200 employees representing 
57% of all ETI claiming firms in 2015. 
4.4 Estimating the propensity score, matching, and achieving balance 
4.4.1 Determinants of ETI take-up 
Crucial to the assessment of the employment impacts of the ETI at firm level, are the determinants 
of policy take up. It has been shown, in the previous Chapter, that there are many factors that may 
affect the firm’s choice to hire an eligible worker and claim a subsidy. All firms in the private sector 
are eligible to claim the subsidy when they employ a young, low-wage worker. However, not all 
firms with eligible employees are making use of the subsidy. A simple comparison of firms claiming 
the subsidy with firms not claiming the subsidy runs the risk of selection effects.  
Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) advise the use of a logit or probit model for the binary treatment 
case as the two models have similar results and thus, decision is not critical. In this analysis the 
logit model is used to estimate the probability of ETI take up:  
 𝑦𝑖
∗ = 𝛽′𝑥𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 (4.15) 
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where 𝑦𝑖 is equal to 1 if firm 𝑖 claims the ETI in 2015 and 0 if firm 𝑖 does not claim the ETI. The 
drivers of participation in the ETI are given by the vector 𝑥𝑖 .  The variables used to predict the 
probability of subsidy take up are from the pre-policy period, 2013. Explanatory variables in the 
pre-policy period include firm location, 1-digit industry and firm size by number of employees. In 
addition to these factors, we include firm turnover, assets, firm learnership claims indicator, 
average wages and average age as these are standard determinants of labour demand (Kangasharju, 
2007). 
The results of the logit estimation are presented in Table 4-1. The dependent variable gets the 
value of 1 if the firm claimed the subsidy in 2015.  
The estimation results indicate that firm size and learnership claim status have a positive 
significant impact on the likelihood of firms taking up the policy.22 Unsurprisingly, the higher the 
mean age and mean wage at the firm, the less likely a firm is to take up the subsidy given the wage 
and age criteria linked to the subsidy claims.  




22 Firm size bins are used as this results in a larger number of matched firms. 
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Table 4-1 Determinants of Firm ETI take-up 
 Coefficient Standard Error 
Firm sales turnover -1.01e-11 (5.65e-12) 
Firm assets -1.15e-11 (1.04e-11) 
Firm learnership claim (dummy) 0.754*** (0.0599) 
Average age  -0.0852*** (0.00228) 
Average wage -1.28e-05*** (1.22e-06) 
Employment growth rate (%) -0.0127 (0.0407) 
Lagged employment growth rate (%) -0.0114 (0.0345) 
Youth employment growth rate (%) -0.0133 (0.0272) 
Lagged youth employment growth rate (%) 0.00170 (0.0260) 
Firm province (reference Western Cape)   
- Eastern Cape 0.0211 (0.0427) 
- Northern Cape 0.132* (0.0716) 
- KwaZulu-Natal -0.238*** (0.0552) 
- Gauteng -0.128*** (0.0319) 
- North West -0.299*** (0.0574) 
- Mpumalanga -0.315*** (0.0259) 
- Free State -0.335*** (0.0503) 
- Limpopo -0.412*** (0.0626) 
Firm industry (reference Agriculture)   
-  Mining -0.229** (0.0968) 
-  Manufacturing -0.0391 (0.0390) 
-  Electricity supply 0.00478 (0.140) 
-  Water management -0.311** (0.128) 
-  Construction -0.224*** (0.0513) 
-  Wholesale & retail 0.137*** (0.0408) 
-  Transportation & storage 0.0274 (0.0625) 
-  Accommodation & service activities 0.318*** (0.0535) 
-  Information & communication -0.937*** (0.203) 
-  Financial & insurance services -0.113** (0.0462) 
-  Real Estate Activities -0.208** (0.105) 
-  Professional, scientific, & technical -0.0372 (0.0494) 
-  Administrative & support service activities -0.131 (0.0904) 
-  Education 0.146* (0.0857) 
-  Health & social work activities -0.188** (0.0827) 
-  Arts & entertainment -0.0934 (0.114) 
-  Other service activities -0.116 (0.0950) 
Firm size (reference: Micro firms 0-5 workers)   
- Small: 6 – 10 0.780*** (0.0439) 
- Medium: 11 – 50 1.750*** (0.0389) 
- Large: 51 - 100 2.826*** (0.0455) 
- Very Large: 100+ 3.540*** (0.0472) 
Constant 0.406*** (0.0889) 
Observations 79,476  
Note: The full population of firms are used in this estimation. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Authors’ own estimates based on IRP5 data 
4.4.2 Propensity score matching 
Each ETI firm is matched in the year prior to the policy to a “counterfactual” non-ETI firm based 
on the firms’ propensity scores. To calculate the propensity scores, the probability of take-up is 
estimated on firm characteristics in 2013 conducted in the previous section.  
Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) provides some guidance regarding the variables to include in the 
propensity score model. Variables that affect the choice to claim the ETI and influence the number 
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of employees should be included in the model. However, variables should be unaffected by the 
ETI and thus the propensity score model is estimated based on the 2013 (pre-ETI) firm 
characteristics. Where firms cannot claim the ETI, the probability of take-up cannot be explained 
by any of the covariates and matching cannot be used. This is the case for firms in the public sector 
who are ineligible for the ETI and the common support condition required for matching fails. 
This was established when the study sample was constructed.  
Matching on firm size, industry and previous employment finds firms that would plausibly 
exhibit common trends in the absence of the subsidy policy. Matching allows the comparison to 
ETI firms with non-ETI firms if done correctly. The mechanics of this are as follows: each ETI 
firm is matched to one or more comparable non-ETI firm based on their propensity score to 
minimise the differences between the firms where all key controls are in the take-up equation. The 
results from the estimation of the probability of ETI take-up (from equation 4.15) are then used 
to generate matches between ETI and non-ETI firms. 
There are various ways in which to use propensity scores to conduct matching. (described in 
detail by Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008)). Matching methods trade bias against precision where bias 
relates to the differences between the treated and control groups while precision relates to the size 
of the control group. Both nearest neighbour and kernel matching methods are used in this 
chapter. 
Nearest neighbour matching identifies the ‘most similar’ non-ETI firm to be compared with an 
ETI firm. The downside of this matching method arises if the nearest neighbour is “far away”. In 
this case, some ETI firms have many close neighbours and others have few neighbours that may 
be far away. Kernel matching is favoured over nearest neighbour matching in such a situation as 
nearest neighbour matching could result in poor matches when compared to kernel matching 
(Bryson, Dorsett & Purdon, 2002). 
Kernel matching is a non-parametric method using all firms in the control group to build a 
weighted composite according to the distance between propensity scores. Observations closer in 
absolute propensity score distance, |𝑃(𝑋𝑖) − 𝑃(𝑋𝑗)|, are assigned a greater weight. Kernel 
matching produces smaller standard errors as more information is used to build the weighted 
counterfactual. In the matching process the Gaussian kernel function is used with a bandwidth of 
0.06. We later show the results for both nearest neighbour and kernel matching to show that our 
estimates are not sensitive to the choice of matching method. 
Another way of improving the matching method may be to conduct matching within groups. 
An example of this can be seen in the study by Hujer, Caliendo and Radic (2002) where matches 
are made within firm size and industry groups. This method requires enough treatment and control 
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units in each of these sub-categories within which to match. Given the large differences in take up 
rates between firms of different sizes, matching is also conducted within firm size groups and 
present the results. 
The matching strategy finds counterfactual firms in about 92 percent of all cases. Matching 
itself does not identify the treatment effect in our model, matching provides us with a treatment 
and control group for the DID estimation. Before the cDID estimation takes place, the matching 
success needs to be confirmed.23 
4.4.3 Common support and achieving balance 
Checking whether the matching process has reduced the difference between the ETI, and non-
ETI firms renders them comparable giving confidence in estimating the average treatment effect 
on the treated in the cDID. The matching process is incomplete if insufficient matches are found 
for all the treated firms in 2015. However, firms with a propensity score equal to zero cannot be 
matched. There are 1,489 ETI firms with a propensity score of zero that cannot be matched. 
Examination of these zero propensity score firms reveals no potential bias created by dropping 
them. This gives us confidence in proceeding with the cDID estimation to estimate the ATT. 
Overall, there are 18,352 ETI firms in our study sample, of which matched are found for 16,863 
ETI firms representing 92% of study sample of ETI firms.  
Examining the covariate means before and after matching ensures that any differences before 
matching have been reduced by the matching process. Figure 4.2 presents the standardised 
percentage bias across the covariates used in the matching process. This offers a graphical 
depiction of the covariate balance between the matched and unmatched groups using the kernel 
matching method. The standardised percentage bias is the percentage difference of the sample 
means in the treated and control (matched and unmatched) groups of firms.24 A measure further 
away from zero suggests a large difference while a measure closer to zero represents a small or no 
difference. Visible from the graph are the large differences in some covariates between the treated 
and control groups before matching. These differences are reduced for the matched treated and 
control groups indicated by the bias close to zero for all the covariates. The same graph using the 
nearest neighbour matching method is presented in the chapter appendix section 4.7. The nearest 
neighbour matching also appears to reduce all the differences in covariates between the two 
groups. 
 
23 Our estimations are conducted using Stata 16 along with the “psmatch2” user-written module by Leuven and Sianesi 
(2003) 
24 The standardised percentage bias is a balancing score used to compare treatment and control groups. The 
standardised percentage bias is the  percentage difference of means, in the two groups, as a percentage of the square 
root of the average of the sample variances in the treated and control groups (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). 
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Figure 4.2 Covariate comparison using kernel matching 
 
Notes: All covariates in the matching process are included. The full list covariates are included in Table 4-1.  
Source: Author’s own estimates using IRP5 and CIT data. 
The requirement for the successful implementation of matching is sufficient overlap between the 
distributions of propensity scores for the treated and control groups. Figure 4.3 contains the 
distribution of the propensity scores for the unmatched and matched groups. The top panel 
indicates that there is sufficient common support suggesting matching on propensity score may 
be successful in removing any observable differences between ETI and non-ETI firms. In the 
lower panel, the matched group is displayed and the propensity score distribution of the ETI and 
non-ETI groups closely overlap. The same graph is prepared for the nearest neighbour matching 
and presented in Figure. 4.A.1 in the appendix. The comparison between ETI and non-ETI firms 
in the matched group is indistinguishable. Kernel matching is strengthened by the large group of 
non-ETI firms, but the nearest neighbour matching appears to further reduce any differences in 
comparison to the kernel matching. For this reason, both matching methods are presented in the 
next section.  
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Figure 4.3 Distribution of propensity scores for unmatched and matched groups 
 
Notes: Matching is done in 2013, before the policy start.  
Source: Author’s own estimates using IRP5 and CIT data. 
Finally, having confirmed the matching process has sufficient common support the next step is to 
conduction the cDID. The matched ETI and non-ETI firms feature in the main results regression 
which takes the following form: 
 𝑌𝑖 =  𝛼 +  𝛽𝐸𝑇𝐼𝑖
∗ +  𝛾𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛅(𝑬𝑻𝑰𝒊
∗ ∙ 𝒂𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒊)  +  𝑖, 𝑡 (4.16) 
where 𝑌𝑖   is the outcome variable (employment) for firm i, 𝐸𝑇𝐼𝑖
∗
 is an indicator variable with value 
equal to one where the matched firm is claiming the ETI and zero where the matched firms is not 
claiming the ETI. 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡  is an indicator set to one for the post policy period, 2015. The coefficient 
𝛅 of the DID interaction term, 𝑬𝑻𝑰𝒊
∗ ∙ 𝒂𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒊 is the coefficient of interest which measures the 




4.5.1 Conditional difference-in-differences estimation 
This section estimates the effect of subsidy usage using the conditional difference-in-differences 
method and propensity scores calculated in the previous section. Table 4-2 displays the results 
from the conditional DID estimation for the matched sample and five firm size group subsamples. 
The coefficients represent the effect of claiming the ETI for youth employment, non-youth 
employment and total employment. The results represented the average treatment effect on the 
treated. 
Table 4-2 Results of the cDID estimators from matched firms 
 Youth  Non-youth 
employment 




Kernel  Nearest 
Neighbour 
Kernel  Nearest 
Neighbour 
Kernel 
Matched sample 2.904*** 2.897***  5.776*** 5.772***  8.675*** 8.663*** 
(<1200 employees) (0.760) (0.759)  (1.156) (1.157)  (1.808) (1.807) 
         
Micro firms  1.709*** 1.647***  1.301*** 1.236***  3.031*** 2.899*** 
(0-5 employees) (0.145) (0.138)  (0.206) (0.194)  (0.328) (0.311) 
         
Small firms  2.353*** 2.232***  2.048*** 2.076***  4.411*** 4.317*** 
(6-10 employees) (0.301) (0.300)  (0.439) (0.441)  (0.708) (0.712) 
         
Medium firms  2.656*** 2.544***  2.581*** 2.725***  5.253*** 5.280*** 
(11-50 employees) (0.182) (0.175)  (0.260) (0.251)  (0.396) (0.382) 
         
Large firms  6.147*** 5.977***  7.597*** 7.672***  13.77*** 13.67*** 
(51-100 employees) (1.095) (1.081)  (1.763) (1.748)  (2.669) (2.648) 
         
Very large firms  12.22*** 11.90***  19.80*** 19.55***  32.13*** 31.56*** 
(101-1200 employees) (3.638) (3.594)  (6.017) (5.950)  (8.777) (8.671) 
Note: The 2014 tax year is excluded from the specification because the policy began at the end of the tax year. For 
the kernel estimates use the Gaussian kernel with a bandwidth of 0.06. Alternate bandwidths and kernel functions 
were checked with no significant difference on the estimates presented. The firm sample considered is indicated 
for each row. The coefficients of the dependent variables are the differences between the outcomes in 2013 and 
the differences in outcomes in 2015. The independent variables used in the cDID are the same variables used to 
estimate the propensity score in the matching stage. For the matched sample in Row (1), the explanatory variables 
are reported in Table 4-1. The common support restriction is imposed for both nearest neighbour and kernel 
matching estimates. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Source: Authors’ own estimates based on IRP5 data. 
The two columns present the estimated effects using nearest neighbour and kernel matching 
estimators. The results for the matched sample indicate a positive significant increase in youth 
employment under both matching specifications. This means that ETI-firms have between 2.897 
and 2.904 additional youth employed in 2015 when compared with non-ETI firms. At the same 
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time, positive and significant increases for non-youth employees and total employees are seen at 
the firm.  
The estimated effect on non-youth employment is larger than for youth employment. There 
are two possible ways non-youth can be affected by the policy. One, non-youth employment can 
decrease if youth are substitutes for non-youth workers and two, an increase in the demand for 
non-youth labour can be seen should the firm use the savings from the tax incentive to employ 
additional older workers with more experience (the technical details of the effect on non-youth is 
discussed in Section 2.4). The output effect would need to be larger than the substitution effect to 
enable an overall positive effect on the employment of non-youth. The elasticity of substitution 
must be low to see this large increase in the demand for non-youth. The larger, positive, significant 
result implies that the ETI enables firms to grow both youth and non-youth employment. It is 
possible that firms hire additional older worker they believe to be more reliable and less risky. 
Firms may choose to hire some eligible workers in order to the claim the tax windfall but fewer 
additional eligible workers if they believe eligible workers are riskier that older, ineligible workers.   
The positive significant results for total employment that is greater than the result of the target 
group is similar to results found in other studies (Kaiser & Kuhn, 2016; Rotger & Arendt, 2010).  
The assumption in the model above is that of a “constant effect” at the firm level, that the ETI 
affects our sample of firms in the same way (Holland, 1986). This assumption is checked by 
estimating the average treatment effect on firm size subgroups as the subsidy take-up rates differ 
by firm size. This can also be seen as a way of improving the matching method. In order to do so, 
firms are matched within firm size groups. If the estimated effects vary, then the constant effect 
of the policy is violated, and the size of the firms driving the effect of the overall result will becomes 
apparent. Additionally, Table 4-2 contains the results of the cDID estimation within firm size 
subgroups on youth, non-youth, and total employment estimates. 
The results suggest significant increases in employment at each of the firm size groups 
examined. The effect on youth is larger than the effect on non-youth for the small and medium 
sized firms. Comparing the results to the literature, Crichton and Maré (2013) find an increase of 
1.1 subsidised workers in firms with less than 50 employees in New Zealand and Rotger and 
Arendt (2010) find an increase of 0.26 additional workers in small subsidised firms. The estimates 
are larger which may be related the broad application of the subsidy (all except the public sector) 
and the nature of the target groups where the supply of young, low-wage workers is in abundance.  
In the case of micro, large firms and very large firms, the coefficients for non-youth workers is 
larger than for youth employees. Crichton and Maré (2013) see a similar trend where the increase 
in unsubsidised workers is greater than the increase in subsidised workers. 
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Often the literature does not test the outcomes for the non-subsidised group, instead measuring 
the impact on the subsidised group and total employment at the firm. However, when tested, it is 
frequently the case, where an increase in employment of the subsidised group is found, there is an 
increase in total employment greater than the increase of the subsidised group (Hujer, Caliendo & 
Radic, 2002; Kaiser & Kuhn, 2016).   
In summary, the constant effect assumption is violated. This means that for the sample of firms 
examined, the ETI does not affect firms in the same way. This matters if it is believed that job 
creation is important for certain firm size subgroups. Birch (1979) argues that job creation happens 
at small firms and not at large corporations when he analyses employment generation in the USA. 
In a later work, Birch, Medoff and Medoff (1994) claim that it is not all small firms that create jobs 
but a subset of small firms growing rapidly, which the authors term ‘gazelles’. Henrekson and 
Johansson (2010) conduct a meta-analysis of the literature and find that the Birch, Medoff and 
Medoff (1994) assertion can also be found in 20 studies in developed countries. Henrekson and 
Johansson (2010) find that Gazelles create all or a large share of net new jobs and they are, on 
average, younger and smaller firms. The findings in Table 4-2 support the argument that small 
firms are part of the groups of firms creating jobs.  
4.5.2 Alternate outcomes and displacement 
Next, three further outcomes are examined to check the sensitivity of the results to the choice of 
dependent variables as well as any displacement that could have resulted from the policy. Bruhn 
(2016) estimates the log of total employment for a wage subsidy programme in manufacturing 
firms in Mexico. The author uses a similar matching DID approach and finds positive but not 
statistically significant effects ranging from 5.7 to 13.2 percent in magnitude. Kangasharju (2007) 
uses payroll as a proxy for total employment at the firm and finds positive statistically significant 
effects of a wage subsidy on payroll. 
These approaches are adapted to estimate the effect of the ETI on the log of number of youth 
and total payroll at the firm. In addition, the impact on the youth ratio at the firm is estimated, 
that is, the ratio of youth to total employment. The results presented Table 4-3 below are in line 
with the results found in Table 4-2; there is a positive significant impact on the employment of 
youth and total employment.25  
In terms of displacement, concern was raised by COSATU regarding the replacement of older 
workers as a result of the policy (COSATU, 2013). The subsidy makes youth relatively cheaper to 
 
25 It is possible for the youth to total employment ratio to increase while the number of non-youth also increases 
provided the increase in the number of non-youth is less than double than the increase in the number of youth.  
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hire than non-youth, which may induce displacement of non-subsidised workers (see Section 2.3.3 
for further discussion on displacement effects). Displacement effects have been found in other 
programmes and it may be reasonable to assume displacement could take place as result of the 
ETI (Crépon et al., 2013).  
If non-youth workers are considered as a substitute for youth workers, there may be a decline 
in the employment of non-youth workers. The opposite is seen in Table 4-2; where instead there 
us an increase in the employment of non-youth. Older workers have more years of work 
experience and are less risky to employ given their experience. Firms may be employing older 
workers to compensate for the lower productivity in younger workers. 
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Table 4-3 Alternate employment outcome 
 Log number of youth  Log payroll  Youth ratio  Non-youth (30-40)  Higher wage youth 
 Nearest 
Neighbour 
Kernel  Nearest 
Neighbour 
Kernel  Nearest 
Neighbour 
Kernel  Nearest 
Neighbour 
Kernel  Nearest 
Neighbour 
Kernel 
All firms 0.108*** 0.0552***  0.146*** 0.146***  0.0552*** 0.0552***  3.213*** 3.210***  0.356*** 0.356*** 
 (0.0164) (0.00224)  (0.0177) (0.0177)  (0.00224) (0.00224)  (0.614) (0.613)  (0.0701) (0.0701) 
               
Constant 1.198*** 0.352***  13.91*** 13.91***  0.352*** 0.352***  7.312*** 7.312***  0.407*** 0.407*** 
 (0.00458) (0.000826)  (0.00545) (0.00545)  (0.000826) (0.000826)  (0.0743) (0.0743)  (0.00682) (0.00682) 
Observations 311,026 317,904  317,896 317,880  317,904 317,888  317,904 317,888  317,904 317,888 
R-squared 0.165 0.030  0.098 0.098  0.030 0.030  0.069 0.069  0.027 0.027 
Note: The 2014 tax year is excluded from the specification because the policy began at the end of the tax year. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 




To the extent that it is believed that not all non-youth workers are substitutes for young workers, 
two additional groups of ineligible workers are examined that are more likely to be substituted by 
eligible workers: first, workers between the ages of 30 and 40 years old and second, age-eligible 
workers earning between R6,000 and R7,000. Among 18 to 29-year-olds, the policy is making a 
subset of them cheaper to hire. If youth earning just below R6,000 are substitutes for youth earning 
just above R6,000 then the policy will likely displace higher wage youth.  
The results indicate a positive statistically significant increase in the number of 30-40 year olds 
employed. In terms of magnitude this is larger than the effect on youth seen in Table 4-2. For the 
higher wage youth, the effect is positive and significant, but the magnitude is much lower than for 
the broad category of youth. These positive results, together with the positive results for non-
youth employment in Table 4-2 indicate no displacement of workers was induced by the policy.  
4.5.3 Robustness 
Included in the matching process is a variable calculating firm employment growth. This variable 
is included to ensure that the estimation does not count intended firm employment growth as a 
result of the policy. To examine this point more explicitly, positive-growth firms and negative -
growth firms are examined separately. Employment growth is defined as the difference in 
employment between 2012 and 2013. Positive employment growth refers to firms with a positive 
growth in 2013, negative employment growth refers to firm with zero or negative employment 
growth 2013. The results for the two groups are presented in Table 4-4.  
Table 4-4 cDID estimation, by employment growth 
 Youth  Non-youth  Total employment 
 Nearest 
Neighbour 
Kernel  Nearest 
Neighbour 
Kernel  Nearest 
Neighbour 
Kernel 
Positive growth 3.951*** 3.267***  6.696*** 6.823***  10.65*** 10.07*** 
 (1.020) (0.969)  (1.554) (1.445)  (2.435) (2.283) 
         
Negative growth 2.295** 1.341  3.788** 3.014**  6.096** 4.359* 
 (0.980) (0.942)  (1.618) (1.517)  (2.447) (2.318) 
         
Alternate control 2.846*** 2.349***  4.992*** 4.800***  7.839*** 7.145*** 
 (0.775) (0.704)  (1.211) (1.079)  (1.874) (1.683) 
Note: The 2014 tax year is excluded from the specification because the policy began at the end of the tax year. 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Column (1) restricts the sample to positive growth 
firms while column (2) includes on negative growth firms. 
Source: Authors’ own estimates based on IRP5 data. 
Estimation results for the growing and shrinking ETI firms are positive and significant for youth 
employment. The effect is less pronounced for shrinking firms and the kernel matching 
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specification is not significant. This helps us understand that it is not only positive growth firms 
creating jobs but the ETI is allowing even the negative firms to create jobs. 
Lastly, a narrower control group of firms is considered; firms with at least one eligible youth 
but have not taken up the subsidy. The results are robust to this change in control group. The 
results from this subsection give some confidence that the initial results are not driven by the 
assumptions made to ensure a well-constructed comparison group. 
4.5.4 Discussion 
The results from the cDID are nested in the distribution of all firms claiming the ETI and our 
econometric assumptions. When all firms claiming the ETI are observed versus firms not claiming 
the ETI there appears to be an increase in youth employment. It is known from the descriptive 
statistics that small firms are reacting differently to the ETI than very big firms. Taking away the 
very big firms, a trend break emerges but this is at the cost of removing firms that claim about half 
of the ETI and represent the employment of half of the youth in the ETI firms in the study sample. 
Since credible matches for these firms are challenging to find, it is not possible to confirm or deny 
whether these firms are creating any jobs or not. The cDID estimation for very large firms shows 
a positive significant result for the employment of youth suggesting that it may be possible for 
firms with more than 1,200 employees to be creating jobs. This leaves behind a group of firms 
that are large in number but do not represent the bulk of the ETI claim.  
In the slightly broader context of youth employment, it does not matter whether small firms or 
large firms are creating jobs; what matters is that jobs for low-wage youth are being created. The 
policy could be better targeted to smaller and medium size firms that are creating more jobs.  
To put the findings into context, the cost of the policy vis-à-vis the number of jobs created for 
youth is studied. Estimates from Table 4-2 are used to calculate the number of jobs created by 
multiplying the cDID estimate by the number of ETI firms in the category. This amounts to 50,370 
new jobs created in the 16,863 firms that claimed the subsidy in 2015 and were matched for the 
analysis. Adding up the amount of ETI claimed by these firms then dividing the amount by the 
number of jobs created gives a cost of R11,704 per job created. The National Treasury, in its public 
discussion paper, predicted that 423,000 jobs would be subsidized and 178,000 jobs would be 
created over three years (National Treasury, 2011). If it is considered that for each year of the 
policy, 59,333 jobs were supposed to be created annually (178,000 ÷ 3 = 59,333) then according 




There is a small body of literature evaluating the effect of wage subsidy policies on labour demand 
using administrative data. This chapters adds to this literature through the examination of the ETI 
as a policy intervention on labour demand in a developing country. This chapter makes use of 
administrative tax data, with the population of firms, to estimate the effects of the ETI on 
employment at firms in South Africa. Changes in the youth labour market are examined using a 
conditional difference-in-differences approach where firms are matched in terms of pre-policy 
firm characteristics. 
Considering the effect of the ETI in all firm in the study sample a positive significant change in 
the number of youth employed is seen in the 2015 tax year. ETI firms have 2.897 additional youth 
compared to non-ETI firms as a result of the policy.  
The findings are difficult to take up by firms of different sizes was different and it is understood 
that firms of different sizes reacted differently to the ETI. For example, it is possible that the 
reasons for not taking up the subsidy for a micro or small firm differs from, the reasons of a large 
firm. The positive ATT is limited to the firms that were matched in the analysis (firms that existed 
from 2011 with fewer than 1,200 employees).  
The estimated impact of the ETI on firm employment is larger than estimates for similar 
programmes in other countries. Crichton and Maré (2013) estimate the impact of a wage subsidy 
programme in New Zealand and show that firms with less than 50 employees increase employment 
by 1.09 additional persons. The largest impact is 1.57 for firms with more than 250 employees. 
Kaiser and Kuhn (2016) estimate an impact of 0.458 additional workers for the highly skilled group 
that were subsidised in Danish firms.   
When broken down into different firm size categories, firms employing up to 1,200 workers 
have a positive significant effect on youth employment. The methods used do not enable credible 
matches for firms with more than 1200 employees as the take-up rate for these very large firms is 
very high, leaving few very large non-ETI firms with which to match.  
The increase in total employment is greater than the estimation of the increase in youth 
employment for the overall and subgroup estimations. This is in line with other international 
studies implying that wage subsidies enable firms to grow their total employment.  
Other outcomes of the policy, log of youth employment, log payroll and youth ratio, all indicate 
positive significant results suggesting that among the firms matched there is an increase in youth 
employment. No evidence of displacement of older workers is found as a result of the policy. 
Lastly, the chapter considers the growing and shrinking firms. Estimates remain positive indicating 
that the main estimates are not being driven by firm employment growth.  
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These findings suggest that the youth wage subsidy may be an effective tool for increasing the 
demand for youth at small to medium size firms. The positive, statistically significant results for 
non-youth indicate that firms are not laying off workers in order to employ youth and benefit from 
the subsidy. The number of jobs created relative to the cost of policy in 2015 leaves questions 
about the efficiency of the policy. Future work on estimating the impact of the ETI at the firm 
level should check if there is a trend in the effects over time and consider the timing of the firm 




Appendix 4.A Nearest neighbour matching balance 
Figure. 4.A.1 Covariate comparison using nearest neighbour matching 
 
Notes: The graph shows the standardized percentage bias for each covariate used in the nearest neighbour matching 
process, before and after matching. 






Figure. 4.A.2 Propensity score for matched and unmatched groups. 
 
Notes: The graph shows the distribution of propensity score for ETI and non-ETI firms. The top panel compares 
the propensity scores between unmatched firms while the bottom panel compares the propensity scores for matched 
firms.  




Chapter 5. Individual-level responses to a firm-side subsidy  
5.1 Introduction 
The consensus view in the earlier economic work on the impacts of wage subsidies (such as Gruber 
(1997)) suggests that since labour demand is typically more elastic than labour supply, the incidence 
of wage subsidies (or payroll tax reduction) falls on the employees. This means that earnings rise 
and the final gross wage cost to the employer is not affected. Hence, employment does not react 
either. However, recent work in Colombia (Kugler & Kugler, 2009), Greece (Saez, Matsaganis & 
Tsakloglou, 2012), France (Cahuc, Carcillo & Le Barbanchon, 2019), and Sweden (Saez, Schoefer 
& Seim, 2019) indicate the opposite effect: earnings are not affected and hence the incidence is 
(mostly) on employers, opening up a way to positive employment impacts. 
One would need to know how employment subsidies work in an emerging economy such as 
South Africa. It is also important to examine whether the positive view on the cost effectiveness 
of hiring subsidies expressed in Brown (2015) and Brown and Koettl (2015) remains valid in the 
present case.  
This chapter contributes to the literature by examining the efficiency of wage subsidies in an 
emerging market context, where the capacity to administer the system (both in firms and within 
the administration) may be less perfect than in high-income countries. The sheer size of the 
unemployment crisis also makes evaluating the efficiency of the policy pressing. The maximum 
duration of the subsidy is 24 months, which means that the system is a hybrid between a (short-
term) hiring subsidy and a more permanent system. The policy was originally planned to last for 
three years, was subsequently extended for another two years, and has been extended for ten more 
years. This chapter uses labour market survey data and the universe of payroll tax data from the 
South African Revenue Service (SARS) to examine the impacts of the system.  
Since the system has been targeted at both low-wage and young workers, any differential trends 
that have affected either young workers or low-wage workers can be separated out in a triple 
differences identification strategy. There are some earlier studies evaluating the South African ETI 
policy which is covered in Section 2.3.4. Relevant to this chapter is the study by Ranchhod and 
Finn (2015). The authors compare the development of youth and non-youth employment over 
time in a difference-in-differences (DID) fashion, but only for the first year after the reform.  
One dimension not yet examined by previous ETI studies is the labour market outcomes of 
individuals eligible for ETI jobs. Little is known about the youth who entered jobs supported by 
the ETI system due to the paucity of data available. This chapter seeks to answer how a young 
person gets a job, where the employer is eligible for ETI and compare to the employment and 
earnings of youth in the absence of the policy. However, potential earnings cannot be observed 
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for the unemployed or those not entering ETI jobs, to make the comparison between the two 
groups. To get around this problem, predicted earnings are used instead of actual earnings from 
the PALMS data.  
This chapter utilizes a triple differences approach (DDD), which uses exogenous or predicted 
characteristics of individuals to isolate the causal effect of the tax change on employment outcomes 
such as earnings, entry into employment, separations and number of days worked. The strength 
of a DDD over a difference-in-difference approach is that trends that may differently affect the 
treatment and control groups in a DID estimator are differenced out in a DDD estimator. The 
ETI was implemented when the South African economy was facing severe challenges in the labour 
market. It is possible that if employment downturns disproportionally affect young workers, a 
DID estimator would pick up this development. This would lead to a downwards biased estimate. 
The DDD estimate is robust to such trends since confounding impacts that only affect low-paid 
young workers would bias the estimate.  
The key assumption in a DID estimator is the common trend assumption; that the treated and 
control groups evolve in the same way in the absence of the policy. The key assumption in the 
DDD estimator is that there is no additional shock during the treatment period that affects the 
demand for the treated and control groups.  
The identification in this chapter is based on the eligibility of workers, that is, I am mainly 
interested in the intention-to-treat (ITT) estimates, which identify the programme impacts, 
including the part that stems from partial take-up. This is also the first study to examine the 
earnings incidence of the policy.  
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 5.2 presents the theoretical framework, Section 5.3 
presents the data used and some descriptive statistics and Section 5.4 shows the empirical strategy. 
The results from the survey data are presented in Section 5.5, and the results based on 
administrative data are available in Section 5.6 with Section 5.7 concluding. 
5.2 Theoretical framework 
Wage subsidies can be offered either to the job seeker or to the firm. A subsidy can be claimed by 
a job seeker once employment has been found. Also known as worker-side subsidies, wage 
subsidies offered to job seekers aim to increase labour supply in the market and are often seen in 
developed countries. Such policies include the Earned Income Tax Credit in the United States, 
Working Families’ Tax Credit in Britain, the Self-Sufficiency Project in Canada, and other 
programmes in Australia, New Zealand, Finland, Ireland, and Belgium (Smith, 1993). 
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Firm-side subsidies are subsidies given to firms when the firm employs individuals eligible for 
the subsidy. The aim of a firm-side subsidy is to incentivise firms to hire eligible individuals they 
would otherwise not be interested in hiring. A wage subsidy decreases the cost of employing an 
individual without altering the amount that the individual is paid. This allows firms to increase 
employment of the subsidized group and output, leaving the wages of the subsidized individual 
unchanged. The elasticity of labour demand and the amount of the subsidy determines the increase 
in employment at a firm. Of the two types of subsidies, the firm-side subsidy fits the South African 
context as it deals with the demand for youth labour where the youth labour supply is already high. 
In recent years, tax credits have been discussed as a policy tool for reducing the cost of hiring 
groups with high unemployment rates. The policy discussion in South Africa is simple; targeted 
tax credits can boost employment of youth. Although firms could potentially pocket the tax credit 
as economic rent or release older workers in order to hire younger workers, the policy includes a 
penalty levied to firms found engaging in these practices. 
5.3 Data  
Two different datasets are used to investigate the impacts of the reform: the tax data complimented 
with the Post-Apartheid Labour Market Series (PALMS) data. PALMS 3.3 is a publicly available 
dataset from DataFirst at the University of Cape Town (Kerr, Lam & Wittenberg, 2019). The 
PALMS dataset provides consistent and harmonized survey information about employment and 
wages and is representative of the population. The survey data is used to estimate the effect of the 
subsidy on employment and unemployment rates and number of hours worked. The strength of 
the survey data lies in the richness of the many demographic variables available. 
This chapter also makes use of the panel of individual level tax data derived from the IRP5 
records described in Chapter 3. The panel is based on the PAYE reports (IRP5 forms) submitted 
by employers to SARS. The data are population wide with detailed information about earnings, as 
well as the actual ETI use status. However, the administrative data only have information about 
gender and age and possess no other demographic characteristics such as race or education level 
that would be useful in labour market analysis in South Africa. These data cover the tax years 2011 
to 2018 and is used to measure earnings, labour market transitions and number of days worked. 
Both datasets are used to examine the extensive and intensive margins. 
The use of tax data is advantageous for the examination of the earnings incidence as a results 
of the ETI. The subsidy is claimed through a reduction in taxes owed to SARS, which means there 
are records of these claims for every firm that claimed the subsidy. The subsidy is available to all 
firms registered for PAYE and the tax data represents the entire population of PAYE firms 
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irrespective of their claim on the subsidy. The data are panel in nature, which allows us to observe 
formally employed individuals before the start of the subsidy and during implementation.  
The primary disadvantage of using tax data is its lack of demographic information and for this 
reason the survey data is used to compliment the tax data analysis. The remainder of this section 
provides descriptive statistics for the survey and tax data. 
5.3.1 PALMS data 
As a first step, all public sector and informal workers are removed from the data. As the subsidy 
is claimed through the tax system, it is not possible for firms to claim for informal workers. The 
subsidy was designed to stimulate job growth in the formal sector making public sector workers 
ineligible. The period of data used is from 2010 to 2018.26 A low wage indicator is created for those 
earning less than R6,000 per month and the sample is restricted to those between the ages of 18 
and 35 years old to identify the target population and a comparison group. 






Age 687,266 25.65 5.139 18 35 
Hours worked 161,364 44.23 11.23 0 140 
Years of education  682,737 10.68 2.385 0 17 
Real Earnings 131,325 10,714 247,922 0 1.236e+08 
Predicted earnings 682,737 3,145 2,522 874.3 37,908 
Employed 687,266 0.255 0.436 0 1 
Unemployed 687,266 0.358 0.479 0 1 
Female 687,266 0.511 0.500 0 1 
Married 687,266 0.212 0.408 0 1 
Urban 687,266 0.647 0.478 0 1 
Black  687,266 0.827 0.378 0 1 
Coloured 687,266 0.0829 0.276 0 1 
White 687,266 0.0650 0.247 0 1 
Indian  687,266 0.0252 0.157 0 1 
Note: The table displays number of observations, the mean, the standard deviation, minimum and maximum for a 
set of variables in survey dataset. 
Source: Author’s own estimates using PALMS v3.3. 
In the survey data, there are three main variables of interest: employed, unemployed and hours worked. 
Table 5-1 provides summary statistics for these and other variables used in the analysis. The 
variable Employed takes the value one if the individual is classified as employed irrespective of the 
sector of employment. The variable is created from the employment status question in the 
 
26 While the first year of tax data examined is 2011, this covers the period 1 March – 31 December 2010 making the 
2010 survey year comparable to the 2011 tax year. 
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Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS). Similarly, the unemployed variable takes on the value of one 
if the individual is unemployed defined using the broad definition of unemployment, also from 
the employment status question in the QLFS. Hours worked refers to the number of hours worked 
in the last week. The age variable allows us to determine whether an individual is eligible for the 
subsidy or not and allows us to construct a control group from those just above the eligibility age. 
Race, gender, urban or rural location, marital status and years of education are also used in the 
analysis.  
5.3.2 Tax data descriptive statistics 
The take-up behaviour provides a backdrop for the analysis, as it indicates among which 
population groups the intention-to-treat impacts may be the greatest. Table 5-2 provides a 
breakdown of ETI take-up by year, gender, and age. It also displays those sectors where the take-
up rate has been the highest. The mean take-up rate is somewhat higher among women. It is also 
much greater among younger workers in the eligible age group and among typical low-wage 
sectors, such as agriculture and retail. Perhaps the most pertinent feature which emerges from the 
table is that the take-up rate has been steadily increasing over the years. Based on this information, 
it is expected that the impacts could be greatest among the younger age groups during the latest 
years. This is taken this into account in the empirical approach by using year fixed effects and 
consider analysing subgroups separately. The treatment impact varying over the years is captured 
when including the year fixed effects. 
117 
 
Table 5-2 ETI take-up characteristics 
 ETI eligible ETI claimed Take-up 
By tax year    
2015 2,692,550 810,834 30 % 
2016 2,594,056 1,002,556 38 % 
2017 2,468,684 1,101,897 44 % 
2018 2,241,741 1,110,552 49 % 
By industry    
Wholesale and retail 2,129,276 1,033,152 48 % 
Agriculture 1,640,091  772,088 47 % 
Catering and 
Accommodation 524,519 220,028 41 % 
Finance and Insurance 2,185,919 909,073 41 % 
Water services 21,397 8,571 40 % 
By gender    
Female 4,810,189 1,938,743 40 % 
Male 5,726,930 2,224,692 38 % 
By age    
18 103,443 44,609 43% 
19 368,572 169,196 46% 
20 591,857 271,793 46% 
21 796,736 356,985 45% 
22 967,798 421,122 44% 
23 1,087,015 461,971 42% 
24 1,145,347 471,593 41% 
25 1,144,478 453,438 40% 
26 1,115,514 422,390 38% 
27 1,070,455 385,531 36% 
28 1,022,823 349,216 34% 
29 972,197 308,681 32% 
Notes: The table displays the number of ETI eligible workers, the number of ETI 
claims and the take up rate (ETI claimed divided by ETI eligible) by tax year, industry, 
gender, and age group.  
Source: Author’s calculations using IRP5 data. 
The years in the survey data relate to the calendar years. Since the 2014 year in the survey data 
relates to a full policy year this year of data is kept in the survey data analysis. The 2014 calendar 
year overlaps by 10 months with the 2015 tax year. 
5.4 Empirical approach 
The ETI is likely to affect employment at the extensive margin (i.e., whether an individual works 
or not) and the intensive margin (the wages and working hours of workers already employed).  
The main approach is to estimate the intention to treat (ITT) or the impact of being eligible on 
the subsidy, using a triple differences (DDD) strategy. The approach is similar to Huttunen, Pirttilä 




𝑌𝑖, 𝑡 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖
+ 𝛽5𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡
+ 𝜷𝟕𝒚𝒐𝒖𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒊𝒂𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒕 +  𝜖𝑖, 𝑡 
(5.1) 
where 𝑌𝑖,𝑡  is the outcome variable (such as earnings or employment) for individual i in year t, 
𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑖  is an indicator variable with value equal to one if the individual is at most 29 years old, 
𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖   is an indicator of whether the individual belongs to the low-wage group, and 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡  is an 
indicator set to one for the years after the reform. The coefficient 𝛽7 of the triple interaction term, 
𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡 , is the coefficient of interest which measures the impact of being eligible for 
the youth wage subsidy system. A simpler DID strategy, where the interest is about the term 
𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡 would limit the analysis to the impact on all young workers.  
The DDD uses both a different state and control group within the treatment state, a more 
robust analysis than the DID estimation where there are possible changes in the environment that 
could affect the treatment group differently to the control group. A DDD is suitable to the 
evaluation of the ETI as the subsidy is available to a subset of workers: defined both by age and 
wage.  
The OLS estimate 𝛽7 can also be expressed as follows:  
𝛽7 = (?̅?𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ,𝑙𝑜𝑤,𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 − ?̅?𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ,𝑙𝑜𝑤,𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒) − (?̅?𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ,𝑙𝑜𝑤,𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 − ?̅?𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ,𝑙𝑜𝑤,𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒)
− (?̅?𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ,𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝑙𝑜𝑤,𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 − ?̅?𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ,𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝑙𝑜𝑤,𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒) 
 where  
?̅?𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ,𝑙𝑜𝑤,𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟
− ?̅?𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ,𝑙𝑜𝑤,𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 
denotes the difference in outcome between low-wage, youth 
before and after the policy 
?̅?𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ,𝑙𝑜𝑤,𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟
− ?̅?𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ,𝑙𝑜𝑤,𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 
denotes the difference in outcome between low-wage, non-youth 
before and after the policy 
?̅?𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ,𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝑙𝑜𝑤,𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟
− ?̅?𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ,𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝑙𝑜𝑤,𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 
denotes the difference in outcome between non low-wage, youth 
before and after the policy.  
The identifying assumption is that there are no differential trends that would have affected young 
low-wage workers differently than older low-wage workers or higher-wage young workers. The 
difference-in-difference-in-difference (DDD) approach can control for simultaneous changes that 
affect all young or all low-wage workers. The first control group is constructed by defining non-
youth as those just above the age eligibility criteria, that is, 30 to 35 years old. The second control 
group is defined as youth as those with earnings just above the eligibility criteria, that is, earning 
between R6,000 and R9,000 per month. 
The challenge in this analysis is that the earnings level is only observed if the individual is 
working. As a solution to this, in the PALMS analysis, predicted income is used based on pre-
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reform data, using a model with age, race, gender, and years of education as regressors. This 
approach provides a good predictor of individuals’ earnings, since the income levels differ 
markedly between socioeconomic groups (see Table 5-3). The 𝑙𝑜𝑤 dummy takes a value of one if 
the predicted income is less than R6,000, in line with the policy wage eligibility criteria. 
Table 5-3 Pre-reform shares of youths 
 Africans Non-Africans 
 Men Women Men Women 
Low education 0.82 0.93 0.64 0.80 
High education 0.55 0.63 0.24 0.31 
Note: The table shows the pre-reform share of youth within race, education, 
and gender groups. The sample is restricted to those with wage less than R6,000. 
Source: Authors’ own estimates based on the PALMS 3.3 data. 
Figure 5.1 checks the predicted earnings against actual earnings. Around 75% predictions are 
correct, that is, for those who have income, they are low wage if they are predicted to be and not 
low wage if they are not predicted to be low wage.  
Figure 5.1 Predicted versus actual log earnings. 
 
Notes: The graph compares the actual log earnings to the predicted log earnings. 
Source: Author’s own illustration using PALMS 3.3 data. 
The model overpredicts the prevalence of low wage. The predicted earnings distribution is 
narrower than the actual earnings distribution. We check the means of the background 




Table 5-4 Means characteristics by predicted earnings quartiles.  
Quartile Female Black Low education 
1 0.64 0.95 0.96 
2 0.58 0.92 0.42 
3 0.54 0.92 0.11 
4 0.32 0.57 0.03 
Total 0.51 0.83 0.36 
Note: The table displays the mean for gender, race group and 
education level by predicted earnings quartiles. 
Source: Authors’ own estimates based on the PALMS 3.3 data. 
 
From the table we can see that those in the first quartile of the predicted earnings distribution 
capture the disadvantaged youth for which the ETI is aimed at. In the analysis using tax data the 
lack of demographic variables does not permit predicted earnings to be used. However, the missing 
earnings problem does not arise as the data is made up of everyone formally employed in the 
country. While it is recognized that the earnings can be endogenous, the actual wage rates are used 
to divide workers into low-wage and higher-wage categories.  
 
Where possible, an instrumental variable (IV) strategy is implemented by using eligibility as an 
instrument for the subsidy claim. This is a Wald estimate, where the intention-to-treat (our DDD 
estimate) is multiplied by the inverse of the take-up rate. Hence, the IV can only be statistically 
significant when the intention-to-treat is significant.  
Finally, we include a specification using year fixed effects in equation (5.2), a modification of 
equation (5.1). This is to account for the increase in take up of the policy each year. The estimation 
equation is as follows:  
 













+ 𝜖𝑖, 𝑡 
(5.2) 
 
No statistical significance for 𝝀𝝉 for the period 𝜏 ∈ [−4, −1] provides support to the assumption 
of no pre policy trends. 
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Identification in the analysis comes solely from the difference between treated (eligible) and 
untreated (ineligible) individuals over time and not from individuals going between treatment and 
control groups. This means this research does not suffer from the identification issues in typical 
event-study estimation using only the treated unit nor the issues from DiD with staggered 
treatment (Borusyak & Jaravel, 2017; Goodman-Bacon, 2018). The estimation results, 𝜆𝜏, from 
equation (5.2), are plotted to illustrate the effect of the policy on the outcomes of interest over 
time.  
We include a specification using clustered standard errors in for equations (5.1) and Error! 
Reference source not found.. The motivation for clustering is that there may be unobserved 
parts of the outcomes for individuals within clusters which are correlated (Bertrand, Duflo & 
Mullainathan, 2004; Moulton, 1990). This may be a problem in our analysis and there is no single 
accepted way to address this challenge (Cameron & Miller, 2015). In an attempt to address the 
issue that eligibility for the ETI may be clustered, estimates with clustered standard errors are 
presented. Clustering at the level of treatment would, however, provide too few clusters. Since the 
extent of the treatment, the actual ETI amount, depends on the income level, clustering is done at 
the level of R500 income groups and age (younger and older workers). Results for regressions with 
clustered standard errors are reported in all tables. 
The analysis is conducted for all eligible workers as well as for various sub-groups: men and 
women to examine whether there are any gendered effects of the policy, younger (18-24 year olds) 
and older cohorts (25-29 year olds) given the difference in unemployment rates of these two 
groups described in Figure 2.1, and by earnings level (below 2,000; 2,000-4,000, 4000-6000) in line 
with the ETI claim value structure outlined in Figure 2.2.  
The next section examines employment, unemployment and number of hours worked as 
outcomes in the survey data. 
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5.5 Results using survey data 
The intention-to-treat impacts of the policy on employment, unemployment and number of hours 
worked are examined in this section. Figure 5.2 provides graphical information about the trends 
in our outcomes of interest in the survey data. The graphs are normalised in 2013, before the policy 
start and make comparisons between the eligible group of workers and the two control groups, 
namely the higher wage youth and older low wage workers.  
Figure 5.2 Panel A1, which describes the employment rate, suggests no trend break for the 
employment rates of the target group of low-wage young workers. There appears to be a small 
increase in employment rates in 2015 in comparison to control groups, but it decreases thereafter.  
Figure 5.2 Normalized outcomes for target group and control groups. 
 
Notes: The figures display the mean outcomes for employment, unemployment and hours worked. Mean outcomes 
are normalized to one for 2013 to adjust for the level differences across the three groups: target, other youth, and 
older low wage Only the private, formal sector is examined as the subsidy is limited to the private sector only. Low-
wage status is based on predicted earnings. Older low wage is defined as workers between the ages of 30 and 35 years 
old with wages less than R6,000. Other youth is defined as workers earning between R6,000 and R9,000 between the 
ages of 18 and 29 years old. Corresponding regression estimates are provided in Table 5-5. 
Source: Authors’ own estimates based on PALMS v3.3. 
Panel A2, describing the unemployment rate, suggests that there has been no trend break in the 
unemployment rate for low wage young workers when compared to both control groups. While 
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the unemployment rate is increasing in the treatment years, the rate of increase appears to be 
slower than both control groups.  
As discussed in Section 2.3, the subsidy is offered to both part-time and full-time workers. Since 
firms can respond to the ETI by employing young workers for more hours than they were 
previously able to, the number of hours worked can be used to examine the effect of the policy 
along the intensive margin. The results are captured in Panel B1 of Figure 5.2. The graph does not 
suggest any trend break for the target group. Next, the DDD estimation results from Figure 5.2 
are presented in Table 5-5.  
Column (1) and (2) present results on employment, columns (3) and (4) on unemployment and 
columns (5) and (6) on hours worked. For each outcome, the results are presented for the ETI 
indicator corresponding to equation (5.1) in Panels 1 to 3 and year-specific treatment effect 
corresponding to equation Error! Reference source not found. in Panel 4. We further analyse a 
subgroup of individuals where the predicted income does not perform as well. That is, we drop 
quartiles 2 and 3 from the predicted earnings distribution where the predicted earning is greater 
than actual earnings even though the percentage of incorrect predictions is only 25 per cent. The 
results for this specification are presented in columns (2), (4) and (6).  
The basic DDD estimated in Panel 1 shows that there is no significant change in employment 
rates. There is a small negative significant effect on unemployment rates and no change in number 
of hours worked. The subsequent panels consider other specifications as robustness checks. In 
Panel 2, differential pre-existing trends between the treatment and control groups are controlled. 
Potential differences in pre-trends are removed by estimating the trend from pre-reform data, 
predicting it for the post-reform years and subtracting this prediction from actual outcomes. The 
estimates are slightly greater for the effect on unemployment. Panel 3 uses clustered standard 
errors where the clustering is done by income level and age. The standard errors are large with the 
clustering and any significant results from Panel 2 are lost in Panel 3. Panel 4 displays the year-
specific treatment effects for each outcome. There appears to be a positive significant increase in 
employment for the eligible group in 2016 and a negative significant impact on unemployment in 
the same year. This also corresponds to an increase in take up of the policy shown in Table 5-2.27 
There are two possible reasons why this may be the case. The first phase of the policy was set to 
end in 2016 and firms may have increased their take up of the policy to ensure they were able to 
benefit from it. Late in 2016, the government announced the extension of the ETI which may also 
have spurred a change in behaviour as firms would be able to benefit from the subsidy for a longer 
period.  
 
27 The 2016 calendar year in the survey data is captured in the 2017 tax year. 
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The second specification in columns (2), (4) and (6), limiting results to the first and fourth 
quartile of the predicted income distribution,  are very similar to the main results in columns (1), 
(3) and (5) which suggest that there have been no significant employment gains for low-wage 
youth, small decreases in unemployment and no overall increase in the number of hours worked 
by the target group. 
The switching of signs and changes in significance across the panels may also be a result of 
heterogeneous effects within the target group due to the design of the policy. The next subsection 
covers these possible heterogeneous effects. 
Table 5-5 DDD estimation on employment, unemployment and hours worked. 
 Employment rate  Unemployment rate  Hours worked 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
1: Basic DDD        
 0.0037 0.0043  -0.0495*** -0.0428***  0.3123 0.3764 
 (0.0124) (0.0128)  (0.0105) (0.0110)  (0.3078) (0.3262) 
2: control for pre-existing trends       
 0.0045 0.0054    -0.0499*** -0.0430***  0.3146 0.3607 
 (0.0124) (0.0128)  (0.0105) (0.0110)  (0.3077) (0.3261) 
3: clustered standard errors       
 0.0045 0.0054    -0.0499 -0.0430  0.3146 0.3607  
(0.0277) (0.0309)  (0.0304) (0.0308)  (0.4652) (0.4917) 
4: year-specific treatment effects       
x 2014 -0.0259 -0.0336  0.0253 0.0330  -0.5636 -0.5546 
 (0.0247) (0.0255)  (0.0215) (0.0225)  (0.6199) (0.6581) 
x 2015 0.0228 0.0219  -0.0377* -0.0164  -0.7023 -0.5220 
 (0.0255) (0.0263)  (0.0226) (0.0235)  (0.6654) (0.7040) 
x 2016 0.0697*** 0.0699***  -0.0603*** -0.0438*  -1.0916 -0.6748 
 (0.0257) (0.0265)  (0.0226) (0.0236)  (0.6705) (0.7090) 
x 2017 -0.0019 -0.0032  -0.0387* -0.0326  0.1125 0.2716 
 (0.0261) (0.0269)  (0.0232) (0.0243)  (0.6554) (0.6969) 
x 2018 -0.0158 -0.0210  -0.0470* -0.0314  0.5578 0.8451 
 (0.0266) (0.0274)  (0.0241) (0.0251)  (0.6859) (0.7220) 
Observations 663,985 323,416  663,985 323,416  143,311 79,493 
Notes: The table presents DDD estimation results for the employment rate, unemployment rate and number of 
hours worked. Estimates are based on equation (5.1) in Panels 1-3 and equation (5.2) in Panel 4. ETI dummy is an 
indicator for an ETI eligible worker. Panel 1 is the basic DDD estimate. Panel 2 controls for differential pre-existing 
trends for the treatment and control groups. Panel 3 uses clustered standard errors where clustering takes place at 
the level of R500 income groups and age (younger and older workers). Panel 4 presents the year-specific treatment 
effects estimations. Robust standard errors in parentheses for Panels 1, 2 and 4. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Source: Authors’ own estimates using PALMS v3.3. 
5.5.1 Gender and age cohort analysis 
The analysis of subgroups is motivated by the ETI take up characteristics presented in Table 5-2. 
First, any differences in outcomes between men and women in the target group are considered. 
Next, younger, and older cohorts are considered within the target group. This is motivated by the 
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differences in unemployment rates for these two groups displayed in Figure 5.3. As a reminder, 
the unemployment rates for those between the ages of 18-24 is 58 percent at the end of 2019. In 
contrast the unemployment rate for those aged 25-30 is 42 percent.  
Figure 5.3 Unemployment rates for younger and older cohort 
 
Notes: Graph displays the unemployment rates for 18-24 year olds and 25-29 year olds for the period 2008 to 2019. 
Source: Authors’ own estimates using QLFS data (Statistics South Africa, 2020) 
The DDD regression results for the impact of being eligible for the subsidy measured in subgroups 
are presented in Table 5-6. Columns (1) to (3) present the impact of ETI eligibility on the 
employment rates, columns (4) to (6) the impact on the unemployment rates and columns (7) to 
(9) the impact on number of hours worked. Estimates for all individuals, women, and men for the 
full target group and then separately for two age groups (18 to 24 and 25 to 29 year olds) are 
reported.28  
The results highlight that the negative effect on employment has been concentrated among 
men with a larger negative impact on younger men. The employment results for women suggest 
small employment increases. Younger men appear to have the largest decrease in unemployment. 
No significant impacts are seen on the number of hours worked across the subgroups.  
The general conclusion from the PALMS data analysis is that the ETI has had little effect on 
hours worked and employment but small decreases in the unemployment rate of youth. 
 




Table 5-6 The effect on employment, unemployment and hours worked, by subgroups. 
 Employment  Unemployment  Hours worked 
 All Women Men  All Women Men  All Women Men 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
All target group 0.00451 0.0440** -0.0373**  0.00371 0.0376** -0.0269  0.318 0.0542 0.446 
 (0.0124) (0.0184) (0.0166)  (0.0125) (0.0186) (0.0168)  (0.308) (0.408) (0.464) 
Age 18-24 -0.0450*** 0.0263 -0.0873***  -0.0440*** 0.00990 -0.0745***  0.0860 -0.0604 0.313 
 (0.0152) (0.0276) (0.0190)  (0.0153) (0.0281) (0.0192)  (0.452) (0.783) (0.592) 
Age 25-29 0.0512*** 0.0389* 0.0462**  0.0494*** 0.0355* 0.0516**  0.452 0.209 0.548 
 (0.0142) (0.0201) (0.0198)  (0.0143) (0.0202) (0.0201)  (0.334) (0.433) (0.514) 
Notes: The table reports the DDD estimates for the effect of the ETI on employment, unemployment and hours worked for subgroup estimations. The estimates reported are in 
relation to equation (5.1) where the coefficient measures the impact of being eligible for the subsidy. All DDD estimates adjusted to account for existing pre-trend differences 
between the groups. There are 687,266 observation in the full target group, including those between the ages of 18 and 29 years old earning and both men and women. The first 
row in the table reports the triple difference coefficient of the full target age group (18-29 years old). The next row reports the triple difference coefficient where the sample is 
restricted to the younger individuals in the target group (18-24 years old). The last row reports the triple difference coefficient where the sample is restricted to the older individuals 
in the target group (25-29 years old). The first column in the table includes both men and women, the second column is restricted to women only and the third column includes 
only men. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Source: Authors’ own estimates using PALMS 3.3. 
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5.6 Results using the tax data 
This subsection turns the focus to the tax data where there are four outcomes of interest: earnings, 
entry into employment, exit from employment and job duration. As above, the development of 
key outcomes is examined using graphical evidence then followed with regression results. The 
regression results are also based on equations (5.1) and (5.2) as the previous section. The treatment 
group remains those who are eligible for the subsidy, that is workers between the age of 18 and 
29, earnings less than R6,000 per month. The control groups are made up of non-youth (between 
the age of 30 to 35) and youth earning between R6,000 and R9,000 per month. 
The investigation begins with the response to earnings level to detect the incidence of the 
subsidy. Error! Reference source not found. uses the normalised mean log earnings for the target 
and control groups. The figure suggests the target group experience a faster increase in earnings 
after the reform.  
Figure 5.4 Normalised log earnings by group. 
 
Notes: The figure displays the mean outcomes for log earnings. Log earnings are normalized to one for 2013 to adjust 
for the level differences across the groups: target, other youth, older low wage. Other youth is defined as workers 
earning between R6,000 and R9,000. Older low wage is defined as workers between the ages of 30 and 35 years old 
earning less than R6,000. Corresponding estimates are provided in Table 5-7. 
Source: Authors’ own estimates using IRP5 data. 
To investigate this further, Figure 5.5 depicts the developments in the earnings distribution for 
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has shifted to the right. Early in the system, the general shift was the only marked change whereas 
five years into the system, in 2018, a spike in the distribution is visible at the R2,000 level, that is, 
where the subsidy rate is the greatest (See Appendix Figure A1 for 2015 comparison). It is likely 
that the employers have gradually learnt more about the system and have been able to adjust to 
offering jobs according to the incentives created by the system. 
Figure 5.5 Distribution of earnings for young versus older workers 
  
Notes: The figure illustrate the earnings distribution. The left panel compares the distribution of earnings in 2013 
(before) versus 2018 (after) for the target groups of workers, whereas the right panel presents the same before-after 
comparison for older workers aged 30 to 35 years old. 
Source: Authors’ own estimates using IRP5 data. 
Since it can be established whose employers have used the ETI, the wage distribution by ETI-
claiming status is captured in Figure 5.6. The results confirm that there is now more mass in the 
wage distribution for ETI-supported jobs, whereas the distribution of workers has not changed 
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Figure 5.6 Earnings eligible vs ETI-claimers 
 
Notes: The figure compares the wage distribution by ETI claiming status comparing the uprated wages of all those 
eligible (before the reform, 2013 and before) to those who are eligible but did not claim the subsidy (for 2016 and 
later) and those who were eligible and for whom the subsidy was claimed (for 2016 and later).  
Source: Authors’ own estimates using IRP5 data. 
Figure 5.7 captures the changes in wage distribution in a DID manner. The figure depicts the 
distribution of wages and changes over time for young and older workers, respectively. There is 
wage growth for both younger and older workers and both an increase and a decrease in wages in 
the R2,000–R4,000 range. As a reminder, the subsidy to wage percentage is highest (50%) for those 
who earn R2,000 and less, a flat R1,000 in the R2,000-R4,000 range with a subsidy to wage 
percentage from 50% to 25%. The bottom panel, displaying the DID, suggests that there has been, 
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Figure 5.7 Wage distribution for 18–29-year-olds, 2013 and 2018 
  
Notes: The figure displays the wage distribution before and after the reform and the calculated differences. The top 
panel displays the wage distribution before (2013) and after (2018) for the target group and older, low wage workers. 
The second panel shows the before and after differences for the two groups. The sample of older workers is restricted 
to those between the ages 30 and 35, younger workers are restricted to the target group between the ages of 18 and 
29. Only wages below R10,000 are included. The bottom left panel is the difference in the number of workers in 
earnings bins between young and older workers, that is, the difference between the middle panel left and right graphs.  
Source: Authors’ own estimates using IRP5 data. 
Following the graphical evidence, Table 5-7 estimates log earnings to check for any statistically 
significant change in earnings for the target group. The estimation considers the impact of being 
eligible for the subsidy (or the ITT) and corresponds to equation (5.1). The 2014 tax year is 
excluded from all the regressions using the tax data because the policy was implemented in the 
final 2 months of the tax year making it both a ‘treated’ and ‘untreated’ year. 
The basic DDD estimated in Panel 1 of Table 5-7 shows that there is a small positive significant 
effect on log earnings. The effect of eligibility on earnings is around 2.5% (𝑒𝑥𝑝(0.0248) ≈
1.025). For example, there is a R75 increase in wages for those with a monthly wage of R3,000.  
The subsequent panels consider other specifications as robustness checks. In Panel 2, differential 
pre-existing trends between the treatment and control groups are controlled by regressing the pre-
existing trend against the pre-reform data (See example in Kleven et al. (2013)) The outcome is 
first regressed for all years prior to 2014 on group fixed effects and two group specific time trends. 
The residuals are then used as the outcome in the regression specifications (5.1). The estimates are 
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standard errors where the clustering is done by income level and age. The standard errors are larger 
in these estimations and the significance from the previous panels is lost. Panel 4 controls for 
imperfect take-up by instrumenting the ETI indicator (given actual take-up) by the intention-to-
treat average ETI eligibility. This is the Wald Estimator which is calculated to control for the 
imperfect take up described in Table 5-2. The intention-to-treat estimate (DDD estimate from 
Panel 2) is multiplied by the inverse of the take-up rate. The Wald estimator has a coefficient of 
0.0655 which is statistically significant at the 1% level and is larger than the effect reported in 
Panels 1 and 2. Panel 5 displays the year-specific treatment effect. The effect on log earnings is 
larger for later years of the policy which is in line with the increases in take up and change in 
behaviour by firms in the later years of the policy. The largest effect on wages is seen in 2018, that 
is, an increase of 5.87% or R176 for those with a monthly wage of R3,000.  
Table 5-7 DDD estimation on log earnings 
 ETI dummy 
1: Basic DDD  
 0.0248*** 
 (0.000857) 
2: control for pre-existing trends  
 0.0247*** 
 (0.000856) 
3: clustered standard errors  
 0.0247 
 (0.0627) 
4: control for imperfect take-up (IV)  
 0.0655*** 
 (0.0023) 
5: year-specific treatment effects  
x 2015 0.0101*** 
 (0.00172) 
x 2016 0.0262*** 
 (0.00170) 
x 2017 0.0348*** 
 (0.00172) 
x 2018 0.0570*** 
 (0.00171) 
Note: The table presents DDD estimation results where the dependent variable is log earnings. Number of 
observations 36,098,402. Estimates are based on equation (5.1) in Panels 1-4 and equation (5.2) in Panel 5. ETI dummy 
is an indicator for ETI eligible worker. ETI amount is the potential subsidy value. The 2014 tax year is excluded from 
the specifications, because the policy was enacted in 2014 at the end of the tax year. Panel 1 is the basic DDD estimate. 
Panel 2 controls for differential pre-existing trends for the treatment and control groups. Panel 3 use clustered standard 
errors where clustering takes place at the level of R500 income groups and age (younger and older workers). Panel 4 
controls for imperfect take-up, instrumenting the ETI indicator (given actual take-up) by the intention-to-treat average 
ETI eligibility. Panel 5 presents the year-specific treatment effects estimations. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
in Panels 1, 2, 4 and 5. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Authors’ own estimates using IRP5 data. 
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The estimation results on log earnings are positive and significant for all except for the 
specification using the clustered standard errors. Given the design of the policy, we examine the 
kink points in the value of the subsidy and the sharp bunching seen in Figure 5.7 which are 
suggestive of heterogeneous effects. Figure 5.8  presents the estimation results from equation (5.2) 
for income subgroups to establish whether there may be any differences. The graphs suggest that 
the ETI lead to a 10% increase in earnings for those that earn less than R2,000 per month shown 
in the first panel. The second panel shows the results for the R2,001-R4,000 wage group and the 
third panel show results in the R4,001-R6000 wage group. Large negative effects in the last 
subgroups could be driving the limited results for the estimates in Table 5-7.  
Figure 5.8 Impact of the ETI on log earnings by subgroups 
 
Notes: These figures report the DDD year-specific treatment estimates of the effect of the ETI on log earnings as 
described in equation (5.2)The first panel reports the impact for those with wages between 0 and R2,000, the second 
panel reports for the R2,001 to R4,000 group and the last panel for the R4,001 to R6,000 subgroup. 95 percent 
confidence intervals are displayed using robust standard errors. 
Source: Authors’ own estimates based on IRP5 data 
It is recognised that the way in which the subgroups are divided would limit any earnings increased 
beyond the upper bound for each group. The takeaway point, however, is that the overall increase 
in earnings result may be driven by the increases for the very low earners.  
Further heterogeneity effects are estimated as was done with the survey data. The results on 
earnings are presented in Figure 5.9. Column 1 presents estimates for both men and women, 
column 2 for women and column 3 for men. Row 1 presents estimates for the full target group, 
row 2 for 18 to 24 year olds and row 3 for 25 to 29 year olds. The largest positive impact on 










                                 










                    
133 
 
Figure 5.9. Impact of the ETI on log earnings by subgroups 
 
Notes: These figures report the DDD year-specific treatment estimates of the effect of the ETI on log earnings, as 
described in equation (5.2), for age and gender subgroups. The first column includes both men and women, the second 
column only women and the third column only men. The top row includes everyone age 18 to 29, the second row 
includes those 18 to 24 years old, and the bottom row includes those 25 to 29 years old. 95 percent confidence intervals 
are displayed using robust standard errors. 
Source: Author’s own estimates based on IRP5 data.  
The evidence on earnings suggests that, somewhat surprisingly and in contrast to the latest 
international literature, the incidence on the subsidy is (partly) on workers. This would limit the 
impact on employment and make sense in light of the results from the survey data. 
Next, additional outcomes in the tax data are examined. Different from the survey data, the tax 
data permit examination of entry into employment as the ETI is very similar to a hiring subsidy 
and could have the greatest impact through increased entry into employment. Earlier in Chapter 
3, it was noted that, year on year, there are fewer firms hiring subsidy eligible youth so it would be 
interesting to see whether the subsidy stimulated entry.  
The subsidy could also work by decreasing the exit from employment of youth. This would not 
be the desired outcome of the policy, but wage subsidies have been used in other countries during 
a recession to prevent the further job losses. Lastly, it is expected that the subsidy would keep 
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Figure 5.10 displays the normalized entry into employment (Panel A1), exit from employment 
(Panel A2) and job duration (Panel A3) for the target and control groups. The graphs are all 
normalised to one in 2013, before the policy start.  
In Panel A1 there appears to be an increase in entry relative to older low wage workers 




Figure 5.10 Normalized outcomes for target group and control groups  
 
Notes: Mean outcomes are normalised to one for 2013 to adjust for the level differences across the three groups: 
target, other youth, and older low wage. Other youth is defined as workers earning between R6,000 and R9,000. Older 
low wage is defined as workers between the ages of 30 and 35 years old earning less than R6,000. The 2018 tax year 
is excluded from the analysis on exit from employment and the 2011 tax year is excluded from the entry to employment 
analysis due to data limitations (See Section 3.3.2 for full details). Corresponding estimates are provided in Table 5-8. 
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Panel A2 suggests decreased exit for the target group in comparison to other youth but no change 
relative to the older low-wage workers. Lastly Panel A3 depicts the job duration of the target group 
in comparison to the control groups. The policy gives firms an incentive to retain workers for 
longer, or at least for the first 12 months where the subsidy claims are higher. There is no visible 
trend break for the target group that would lead us to believe there is any change in job duration. 
Table 5-8 presents the regression results on the outcomes examined in Figure 5.10. The 2018 
tax year is excluded from the exit from employment regression and the 2011 tax year is excluded 
from the entry to employment as an entry and exit in these years cannot be confirmed (See Section 
3.3.2 for full details). 
The basic DDD estimation results are in Panel 1 of Table 5-8. In Panel 2, any differential pre-
existing trends between the target and control groups are controlled, Panel 3 uses clustered 
standard errors where the clustering is done by income level and age, Panel 4 account for the 
imperfect take-up and Panel 5 displays the year-specific treatment effect. 
There are very small positive significant increases for entry into employment and even smaller 
decreases in exit from employment. A decrease in exit can be seen as a positive spillover effect as 
retention could provide young workers with much needed work experience. While the effects on 
entry and exit are statistically significant, these effects are perhaps too small to see any effect on 
employment rates when using the palms data or derive any meaningful economic effect. Lastly, 
there are small positive significant increases in job duration.  
As done with the earnings outcome, the intention-to-treat take up rates are instrumented by 
the actual take up rates to calculate the Wald estimator. The ITT estimates for entry, exit and job 
duration are statistically significant therefore the IV estimate can be statistically significant and, in 
this case, is more than double the estimates in Panel 2 for these outcomes. 
Considering the way in which the subsidy is designed some of the switching between positive 
and negative results, or significant and non-significance in different specifications, could be driven 
by heterogeneous effects within the target group based on the value of the subsidy received (or 
monthly income on which the subsidy is based). This is the subject of the next subsection. 
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Table 5-8 DDD estimation on jobs, entry, exit and job duration. 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
 Entry into employment  Exit from employment  Job duration 
1: basic DDD      
    0.0094***    -0.0020**     1.1907*** 
 (0.0010)  (0.0009)  (0.2399) 
2: control for pre-existing trends      
    0.0095***    -0.0019**     1.1483*** 
 (0.0010)  (0.0009)  (0.2399) 
3: clustered standard errors      
    0.0095    -0.0019     1.1483  
(0.0171)  (0.0152)  (5.4166) 
4: control for imperfect take-up (IV)      
   0.0251***   -0.0053**    3.1278*** 
 (0.0025)  (0.0026)  (0.6350) 
5: year-specific treatment effects      
x 2015    0.0105***    -0.0041**    -0.2801 
 (0.0018)  (0.0017)  (0.4791) 
x 2016    0.0025    -0.0054***    -0.5615 
 (0.0018)  (0.0017)  (0.4756) 
x 2017    0.0038**     0.0007    -0.1976 
 (0.0018)  (0.0017)  (0.4711) 
x 2018    0.0169***      -1.7161*** 
 (0.0017)    (0.4658) 
Note: The table presents DDD estimation results. Estimates are based on equation (5.1) in Panels 1-4 and equation (5.2) in Panel 5. The table presents estimation results for the 
entry into employment, exit from employment and job duration. ETI dummy is an indicator for an ETI eligible worker. The 2014 tax year is excluded from the specifications, 
because the policy was enacted in 2014 at the end of the tax year. Panel 1 is the basic DDD estimate. Panel 2 controls for differential pre-existing trends for the treatment and 
control groups. Panel 3 uses clustered standard errors where clustering takes place at the level of R500 income groups and age (younger and older workers). Panel 4 controls for 
imperfect take-up, instrumenting the ETI indicator (given actual take-up) by the intention-to-treat average ETI eligibility. Panel 5 presents the year-specific treatment effects 
estimations. Robust standard errors in parentheses in Panels 1, 2, 4 and 5. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Authors’ own estimates using IRP5 data. 
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5.6.1 Heterogeneity by income, gender, and age group 
We examine heterogeneity by income groups, gender, and age groups. Figure 5.11 captures the 
impact of the ETI on entry within wage groups by plotting the year-specific treatment effects. The 
first panel examines the wage group for those earning less than R2,000, the second panel the 
R2,001-R4,000 wage group and the third panel the R4,001-R6000 wage group. There are more 
clear positive significant increases in the number of entrants in the second wage group and negative 
but insignificant effects on the number of entrants in the first and third wage groups.  
Figure 5.11 DDD year specific treatment estimation results on entry 
 
Notes: The graphs present the coefficients of the DDD year-specific treatment estimation results as described in 
equation (5.2). The dependent variable is the number new job entrants. The x-axis is the tax year relative to the ETI, 
that is, tax year zero is 2014 and the y-axis the coefficients of the number of hires. 95 percent confidence intervals are 
displayed using robust standard errors. 
Source: Authors’ own estimates using IRP5 data. 
Given the way in which the policy was designed, there is an incentive for the increased job entry 
around the maximum subsidy which is seen in the results from Figure 5.11. The large number of 
workers in the R2,001-R4,000 category is likely driving overall positive impact found in Table 5-8. 
The same analysis is run within wage groups for exit and job duration and reported in the chapter 
appendix. The decrease in exit from employment from Table 5-8 appears to be driven by R0-
R2,000 group. There appear to be positive increases in job duration in the first and second wage 
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Figure 5.12 displays the impact on age and wage groups for entry into employment. The graphs 
display the coefficient plots for the year-specific treatment effects.29 The impact on entry appears 
to be stronger for the younger group, more pronounced for women in 2018 and more pronounced 
for men in 2015. Younger workers may be more attractive to firms as they would be eligible for 
the subsidy for longer which could explain the larger increase in entry for the younger groups.  
The year-specific treatment effect graphs for exits and job duration within these same 
subgroups are available in the chapter appendix. No heterogeneous effects are observed for exit 
and job duration.  
Figure 5.12 Impact of ETI on Entry by subgroups 
 
Notes: The graphs present the coefficients of the DDD year-specific treatment estimation results, as described in 
equation (5.2), where the dependent variable is the number of job entries. The x-axis is the tax year relative to the 
ETI, that is, tax year 0 is the 2014 tax year. The y-axis represents the coefficients of the estimation results. The first 
column includes both men and women, the second column only women and the third column only men. The top row 
includes everyone age 18 to 29, the second row includes those 18 to 24 years old, and the bottom row includes those 
25 to 29 years old. 95 percent confidence intervals are displayed using robust standard errors. 
Source: Author’s own estimates using IRP5 data. 
5.6.2 Industries with high take up 
Chapter 3 examined the distribution of take up among industries and find higher take up in some 
industries which is also described in Table 5-2. Towards the end of Chapter 3, it is established that 
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there is a clear set of industries employing young, low wage workers. In the international literature, 
discussed in Section 2.2.3, it is found that some countries have limited their wage subsidy policies 
to certain industries where it is believed that a wage subsidy will have the largest impact. There 
were similar recommendations in South Africa to target the ETI policy to labour intensive 
industries where job creation is more likely. The motivation behind this is also to limit any possible 
deadweight losses arising from firms claiming the subsidy without creating any new jobs. In this 
final section, our analysis is limited to those industries with greater than average take-up of the 
ETI. The results for all outcomes examined in the tax data are displayed in Table 5-9. Comparisons 
are made to Table 5-7 and Table 5-8 reflecting the full population. For industries with higher than 
average take up rate, results are only slightly larger for earnings. The effect on entry is smaller but 
still significant. All significance is lost for the effect on exits and the effect on job duration is much 
stronger in the industries with above average policy take-up. The Wald estimate (accounting for 
imperfect take-up) in Panel 4 instruments the actual ETI claim for the intention-to-treat ETI 
eligibility. This correction has a larger impact on the estimate of job duration suggesting an increase 
of 13 days for ETI participants. This would point to intensive margin effects and, contrary to any 
expectations, suggest that job growth is not likely at industries with high subsidy take up.  
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Table 5-9 DDD estimation for industries with high take up 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 Log earnings  Entry into employment  Exit from employment  Job duration 
1: Basic DDD        
 0.0278***  0.0077***  0.0006  5.874*** 
 (0.0012)  (0.0015)  (0.0015)  (0.389) 
2: control for pre-existing trends        
 0.0286***  0.0082***  0.0007  5.673*** 
 (0.0012)  (0.0015)  (0.0015)  (0.390) 
3: clustered standard errors        
 0.0286  0.0082  0.0007  5.874  
(0.0878)  (0.0214)  (0.0221)  (7.235) 
4: control for imperfect take-up (IV)        
 0.0667***    0.0186***  0.0029  13.573*** 
 (0.0027)  (0.0035)  (0.0037)  (0.900) 
5: year-specific treatment effects        
x 2015 -0.0099***  0.0103***  -0.0033  1.945** 
 (0.0024)  (0.0029)  (0.0028)  (0.783) 
x 2016  0.0264***  0.0001  0.0021  1.810** 
 (0.0023)  (0.0028)  (0.0028)  (0.764) 
x 2017  0.0211***  0.0013  0.0103***  2.638*** 
 (0.0023)  (0.0027)  (0.0027)  (0.746) 
x 2018 0.0554***  0.0189***  -  -0.195 
 (0.0023)  (0.0027)    (0.737) 
Note: Estimates are based on equation (5.1) in Panels 1-4 and equation (5.2) in Panel 5. The table presents estimation results for log earnings, entry into employment, exit from 
employment and job duration. ETI dummy is an indicator for an ETI eligible worker. ETI amount is the potential subsidy value. The 2014 tax year is excluded from the specifications, 
because the policy was enacted in 2014 at the end of the tax year. Panel 1 is the basic DDD estimate. Panel 2 controls for differential pre-existing trends for the treatment and 
control groups. Panel 3 uses clustered standard errors where clustering takes place at the level of R500 income groups and age (younger and older workers). Panel 4 controls for 
imperfect take-up, instrumenting the ETI indicator (given actual take-up) by the intention-to-treat average ETI eligibility. Panel 5 presents the year-specific treatment effects 
estimations. Robust standard errors in parentheses in Panels 1, 2, 4 and 5. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 




This chapter set out to examine the individual-level effects of the ETI. In particular, the earnings 
and entry into employment impacts of the ETI. The subsidy has been available for the employers 
of workers below 30 years earning at most R6,000 a month. The targeted nature of the policy 
allowed for a triple difference estimation strategy to be utilised with both older workers, in the 
same earnings range and young workers, slightly above the wage criteria, as the two control groups.  
The analysis relied on two data sets: the publicly available harmonized survey data (PALMS) and 
the population-wide administrative payroll records from the South African Revenue Service 
(SARS) available at the National Treasury Secure Data Facility in Pretoria. 
The analysis reveals that the policy has not increased the employment rate or led to large 
reductions in the unemployment rate for the eligible group. These results are in line with the 
findings of Ranchhod and Finn (2014) who examine a broader eligible and comparison group in 
the first year of the policy.  
Despite this negative result, it is found that the policy led to a small, statistically significant 
increase in the earnings for the target group. On the one hand, this may be due to the fact that 
more new jobs were created in the range where the subsidy is the greatest (when earnings are 
between R2,000 and R4,000), but on the other hand, mean earnings even within this subsample 
increased. Increases in entry to employment and decreases in exit from employment are also found, 
but these effects are perhaps too small to see any change in the number of jobs. Lastly, while no 
increase in the number of hours worked are found in the survey data, there are statistically 
significant increases in the job duration for the eligible group with a larger impact seen in high take 
up industries. 
The results in this chapter are at odds with the most recent influential work on the employment 
impacts of wage subsidies, including (Cahuc, Carcillo & Le Barbanchon, 2019) and Saez, Schoefer 
and Seim (2019). Very limited overall employment impacts are found, and the results also indicate 





Appendix 5.A Earnings changes 
Figure. 5.A.1 Distribution of earnings for workers for young versus older workers 
 
Notes: The left panel compares the distribution of earnings in 2015 versus 2013 for the target groups of worker, 
whereas the right panel presents the same comparison between 2015 and 2013 for low-wage workers aged 30 to 35 
years old. 

















                      
              
           
















                      
              
           
             
144 
 
Appendix 5.B Heterogenous impacts on exit and job duration 
Figure. 5.B.1 Estimated impact of ETI on exit, within wage subgroups 
 
Notes: The graphs present the coefficients of the DDD year-specific treatment estimation results, as described in 
equation (5.2),  where the dependent variable is the number of exits. The x-axis is the tax year relative to the ETI, that 
is, tax year 0 is the 2014 tax year. The y-axis represents the coefficients of the estimation results. 95 percent confidence 
intervals are displayed using robust standard errors. 
Source: Authors’ own estimates using IRP5 data. 
Figure. 5.B.2 Estimated impact of ETI on job duration, within wage subgroups 
 
Notes: The graphs present the coefficients of the DDD year-specific treatment estimation results, as described in 
equation (5.2), where the dependent variable is job duration. The x-axis is the tax year relative to the ETI, that is, tax 
year 0 is the 2014 tax year. The y-axis represents the coefficients of the estimation results.  95 percent confidence 
intervals are displayed using robust standard errors. 
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Appendix 5.C Subgroup analysis on exit from employment and job duration 
Figure. 5.C.1 Impact of ETI on exit, by subgroup 
 
Notes: The graphs present the coefficients of the DDD year-specific treatment estimation results, as described in 
equation (5.2), where the dependent variable is the number of exits. The x-axis is the tax year relative to the ETI, that 
is, tax year 0 is the 2014 tax year. The y-axis represents the coefficients of the estimation results. The first column 
includes both men and women, the second column only women and the third column only men. The top row includes 
everyone age 18 to 29, the second row includes those 18 to 24 years old, and the bottom row includes those 25 to 29 
years old. 95 percent confidence intervals are displayed using robust standard errors. 
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Figure. 5.C.2 Impact of ETI on job duration, by subgroup 
 
Notes: The graphs present the coefficients of the event study estimation results where the dependent variable is job 
duration. The x-axis is the tax year relative to the ETI, that is, tax year 0 is the 2014 tax year. The y-axis represents the 
coefficients of the estimation results. The first column includes both men and women, the second column only women 
and the third column only men. The top row includes everyone age 18 to 29, the second row includes those 18 to 24 
years old, and the bottom row includes those 25 to 29 years old. 95 percent confidence intervals are displayed using 
robust standard errors. 
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Chapter 6 Conclusion 
This aim of this thesis was to examine the Employment Tax Incentive in the context of stubbornly 
high levels of youth unemployment in South Africa. Thinking about the demand-side, instead of 
the supply-side challenges of youth unemployment, allowed for new questions to be posed and 
further discussions to be held about the labour market.  
Active labour market policies such as the ETI are rare in developing country settings given the 
high cost and the uncertain outcomes of these policies. The main contributions of this thesis are 
relevant both within a South African and international context. The first main contribution is the 
development and description of the tax data used within this thesis as the best source of 
information on the implementation of the policy. This includes useful insights into both the 
benefits and the challenges for researchers interested in policy analysis using tax data in South 
Africa and other developing countries. A profile and set of characteristics, of the beneficiaries, 
firms, and individuals, of the ETI is also presented where only limited information was available 
before. 
The second main contribution is a rigorous evaluation of the ETI at the firm level with the aim 
of understanding the wage subsidy as a mechanism for increasing labour demand for young, low-
wage workers. This includes insights into the relationship between youth and non-youth labour 
pointing to no displacement or substitution between the two at low wage levels. 
The third main contribution is the analysis of the individual-level impacts of the policy on the 
intensive and extensive margin using the strengths of both survey and tax data. Where the survey 
data provides a better picture of the employed versus the unemployed the tax data allows for a 
deep dive into the workers benefitting from the subsidy.  
Chapter 2 situates the ETI policy in the international and local context of active labour market 
policies. Evaluations of ALMPs suggest that the effects of policies vary, though some have large 
impacts and others have no impact. An employment subsidy is one such ALMP that has seen 
varied impacts internationally which does not instil confidence that a subsidy policy in South Africa 
is likely to work. The chapter also provides us with a theoretical framework within which to 
examine the ETI in this thesis. The chapter covers the institutional background of the policy to 
ensure that this evaluation of the policy is rooted in the South African context. The ETI comes 
off the back of a collection of policies aimed at improving employment levels, however, it is the 
first large policy with very specific targeting of low-wage youth. The mechanics of the policy are 
documented and shows how the policy design allows for variation in the resulting outcomes. 
However, employment subsidy policies are not without potential disadvantages, many of which 
are acknowledged and apply to the South African job market.  
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Chapter 3 prepares for the analysis by providing all the necessary information on the tax data 
relevant to this thesis. It tells us about the firms claiming the subsidy and the subsidised workers. 
The tax dataset used in this thesis is constructed from the anonymized payroll and company 
income tax data available in the National Treasury secure data facility. The tax data comes with 
many advantages such as a large sample size and detailed information on subsidy claims and 
claimants. As the data has only been available in recent years and is not publicly accessible, the 
chapter covers, in some detail, the structure and challenges of the tax data. This is done to justify 
the use of the dataset for this thesis. There are also disadvantages to using tax data and the chapter 
brings to light the pitfalls of working with tax data for future analysis of the ETI and any other.  
It is found that around 15% of all firms and, 25% of firms with one subsidy eligible worker are 
claiming the ETI in the first four years of the policy. These ETI firms are typically large, 
concentrated in provinces with large economic centres and with high take up rates in the 
manufacturing, wholesale and retail, and financial and insurance services sectors. Descriptively, 
there are no changes in the hiring or firing of young workers in these early policy years. Alarmingly, 
it is found that the top twenty claiming firms account for almost 30% of the total value of subsidies 
claimed. Chapter 3 also looks at the characteristics of eligible and participating workers. There are 
around 2 million workers eligible for the subsidy, but subsidy claims for only half of these 
individuals. The policy seems to be well targeted and reaching the younger workers in the target 
group with higher levels of unemployment.  
Chapter 4 uses the firm-level dataset constructed in Chapter 3 to estimate the effects of the 
ETI on employment at firms in South Africa. Changes in the labour demand are estimated using 
a conditional difference-in-differences approach. Firms matched in terms of firm characteristics 
and results are estimated over a period that spans the start of the policy. In order to conduct the 
DID analysis information is needed about the two groups of firms, claiming and non-claiming, 
before and after policy implementation. The sample is restricted to ETI firms employing fewer 
than 1,200 worker as larger firms cannot be matched as take up of the policy is high and thus the 
comparison group too different and small. The matched ETI firms examined represent almost 60 
percent of all ETI claiming firms in 2015. This limits the external validity of our results. 
For the ETI firms examined a statistically significant increase in number of youth and all 
workers is seen. The effect varies by firm size, is robust to other measures of youth employment 
and is not driven by firms already growing their employment in the pre-policy period. No evidence 
of displacement of non-subsidized workers is found in the analysis.  
Chapter 5 is focused on the subsidy eligible group of workers. It calculates the intention-to-
treat (ITT) estimates, which identifies the impact of the policy on eligible workers. Using a triple 
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difference approach, comparing eligible workers to older, low-wage workers and young, higher 
wage workers, the individual level employment outcomes are studied. Different from Chapters 3 
and 4, the individual worker perspective is considered making use of survey data in addition to the 
tax data.  Earnings are predicted based on the pre-policy period using the several regressors from 
the survey data. This is done because earnings can only be observed where an individual is working. 
No evidence is found of the policy leading to increases in employment or decreases in 
unemployment from the estimations using the survey data and no change in the number of jobs 
in the tax data. There is evidence of the policy leading to small increases in entry and decreases in 
exit which, however, have not translated into impacts on the number of jobs. There is no evidence 
that the number of hours worked changed but positive significant impact on job duration or the 
number of days worked. Lastly, there is evidence of positive, significant impacts on earnings for 
eligible workers as a result of the subsidy policy. 
The results from Chapters 4 and 5 appear to be contradictory in terms of changes in 
employment of youth. The results from Chapter 4 highlight that the ETI has been successful in 
creating jobs for youth at a subset of ETI firms while Chapter 5 suggests that there is no statistically 
significant effect on employment or the number of jobs for the eligible group of young, low-wage 
workers. This is plausible as it highlights the difference between an evaluation focussed on the 
actual employed versus those eligible to be employed. Only half of the population of eligible young, 
low-wage workers are being subsidized through the ETI and this is being driven by large firms. It 
is likely the case that the jobs created at ETI firms examined have not been sufficient to move the 
needle on youth unemployment in South Africa.  
There are a few reasons why the ETI might not be having any effect on youth unemployment. 
Firstly, the ETI is claimed through the tax system, thereby excluding small firms not registered for 
PAYE or firms in the informal sector. In practice, the ETI has been used by medium and large 
sized firms. Given that small firms are more labour intensive than large firms, small firms could 
better facilitate job creation, however, the incentive is not accruing to these small firms. Secondly, 
the subsidy value may not be sufficient for firms to change their employment patterns. The ETI 
is challenging to calculate and paying for tax advice to claim the incentive may cost more than the 
benefit to the firm. Simplification of the policy design and implementation could quickly see 
increases in take up rates. Thirdly, the administrative burden and lack of information available to 
small firms means take up is incredibly low. Targeted information to small firms may go a long 
way to increase take-up and in turn, create jobs.  
There are several policy insights that stem from this thesis. First, the scale of the programme in 
its original form was modest. Creating 178,000 jobs in light of 3 million unemployed youth is a 
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modest target and the policy was perhaps never adequately designed to deal with the youth 
unemployment crisis. The notion that the ETI is the silver bullet to solving South Africa’s youth 
unemployment crisis is false. The policy was perhaps unfairly located relative to its size against 
other ALMPs. It has set the policy up for unrealistic expectations in terms of solving the scale of 
the problem and government could have worked harder to ensure that the policy was not the only 
hope for the country. The take up rate has been larger than the government estimated but a further 
increase in take up, even at small firms, may not yield sufficient jobs to curb unemployment.  
Second, it is challenging to justify the deadweight loss in a country with constrained fiscal 
resources and many other challenges to address. A firm planning to employ 10 youth can simply 
claim a tax incentive for these employees and forgo any obligation to hire any additional ETI 
eligible employees. This is precisely what has been tested in Chapter 4. It has been demonstrated 
in Chapter 4 that these firms may be employing additional non-youth workers which is thought to 
be due to the low productivity of young workers. There is a view in government that it may be 
necessary to subsidise all youth employment as long as the youth are retained. This thesis finds 
some evidence to support this view, that is, there is evidence of a reduction in the exit rate of 
eligible workers. An analysis on the long-term impact on subsidised youth may be able to answer 
the question whether retention was a key part of the policy. In any case, leakages, such as increases 
in non-youth employment, can be seen as a simple cash transfers to firms. Against the policy’s 
own merits, the policy might be working to create some jobs for youth, but the social cost may be 
high against the tsunami of the youth unemployment problem in the country. 
Third, while the positive impacts on employment are seen, the policy can be better targeted, 
for example, to smaller firms in certain industries. The most concerning part of this thesis is the 
high value in claims by the top twenty claiming firms. Large firms dominate the formal sector 
employment which is a problem the ETI inherited and did not set out to fix. Should take up be 
increased at smaller firms, government will need to be honest about the scope to impact the 
extensive margin. There are several ways to deal with large firms claiming the bulk of the subsidy. 
One, create an upper limit on the value of claims thereby freeing up subsidy resources for smaller 
firms and reduce any possible deadweight loss at large firms. Two, introduce a condition for large 
firms to demonstrate job creation in order to claim the subsidy such as the case in Turkey 
(Betcherman, Daysal & Pagés, 2010). Three, make it a requirement for large firms to provide 
training to subsidised workers. 
In terms of future research, one aspect of the policy that warrants attention is the long-term 
impact the period of subsidised employment has on subsidised workers. Within the international 
literature on wage subsidies this is an under examined topic. The tax data provide an opportunity 
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to see young workers enter into employment and then follow those who get a subsidy versus those 
who do not. You can then track which group of workers fare better in the labour market once 
their jobs end. Early in the thesis it was mentioned that the first job, and first work experience, are 
crucial for young people to find their next job.  
At the time of ETI inception, the government was seeking, from the policy community, ideas 
for ALMP options to resolve South Africa’s unemployment crisis. The government was seeking a 
policy to fund that would have a serious and lasting impact. The first phase of the ETI was short 
and the policy very narrowly targeted. One could consider the first phase as a pilot programme to 
see how a wage subsidy would perform in South Africa given particular characteristics of the 
formal private sector labour market characteristics highlighted in this thesis. While the policy was 
implemented in a low growth economy, there is also the question of whether the demand and 
supply sides of the labour market over the policy period were too daunting for any ALMP to work 
other than direct public sector employment policies. Although extensions have been made to the 
policy in terms of policy duration, little has changed in the structure of the policy since inception.   
In summary, the results of this thesis are somewhat disappointing but not necessarily surprising. 
The necessity for the policy has not diminished since the policy was first conceived. The effects 
of the ETI are small and, in its current form, may never reach the desired outcome to change the 
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